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This thesis focuses mainly on three related issues of the new institutional economics and political
economy research: (i) the evolution of formal economic and political institutions over time (ii)
the causality between political institutions and economic institutions, and that between institutions
and economic development; (iii) and the role of institutions in economic development through the
channel of foreign direct investment and in the control of rent seeking and corruption in Kenya.
These issues are discussed in four distinct essays, each essay constituting an independent and
self-contained chapter. The study adopts the conceptual framework on institutions proposed by
Douglass North.
The central theme of the thesis across all chapters is the demonstration of how political players
holding de-facto political power operating under weak political rights and civil liberties use le-
gal operators to benefit themselves and their close associates. For instance, starting with British
rule—protectorate period (1885-1920) and colonial period (1920-1963)—an extensive legal ap-
paratus designed by those holding de-facto political power expropriated much of the land and
redistributed it to themselves at the expense of the indigenous populations whose political rights
and civil liberties were crossly undermined. However, even after independence, several political
players in the newly independent Kenya made little effort to fundamentally change the colonial
laws that governed land rights and could not as well promote strong political rights and civil liber-
ties. The thesis argues that despite pressures from the populace, political leaders and their interest
groups holding de-facto political power entrench themselves in the system under weakly institu-
tionalized environment, and oppose the constitutional reforms by all means including force, since
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such reforms go against their interests. The delay in such reforms often leads to the breakdown of
governance. Such breakdown inevitably leads to conflict and social crisis such as the Kenya post-
election crisis of 2007. The chapters in the thesis are organized in such a way that they start by
tracing the evolution of rights promoted by people holding de-facto political power, then later the
remaining chapters take on the assessment and implications of how such rights promoted under
weakly institutionalized environment affect economic outcomes. The specific issues addressed in
these chapters are outlined in the paragraphs that follow.
The first essay explores the evolution of institutions in Kenya over a 130-year period (1880-2010).
It addresses three related questions: what kind of economic institutions and political institutions
did the colonial settlers set up in Kenya? Did they set up inclusive institutions or extractive insti-
tutions, in the terminology of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)? How did these institutions evolve
over time? Did these institutions change after independence? This essay provides the narrative
evidence to show the dynamic interactions between political and economic institutions, and how
the equilibrium economic institutions are shaped by political forces over time. The essay con-
tributes to the institution-development literature by filling in the research gap identified by North
(1993, page 1) when he stated that “although Ronald Coase made the fundamental contribution
of pointing out that when it is costly to transact, institutions matter, neither he nor most of his fol-
lowers have explored how property rights and other institutions come about”. This essay further
contributes to the literature on the measurement of institutions in general by providing a novel
dataset on the institutions in Kenya. By design, this new dataset circumvents the major prob-
lems identified in conventional institutional indices. This essay also contributes to the political
economy literature which addresses questions centered on the creation of institutions and their
evolution.
The second essay provides empirical evidence to address three basic questions of the institutions-
development literature: (a) Are institutions persistent? And why are they persistent? (b) Do
political institutions cause economic institutions? (c) What is the direction of causality between
institutions and economic development in Kenya? This essay is motivated by the paucity of em-
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pirical studies that test the widely accepted assumption that institutions are persistent. Second,
it is motivated by the claim by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that political institutions drive
economic institutions, which has not been empirically tested. Lastly, it is motivated by the con-
tinuing debates on the direction of causality between institutions and economic development. The
essay makes three distinct contributions to the institutions-development literature. First, it pro-
vides evidence for the assumption that institutions are persistent and offers explanations for this
persistence. Second, it provides a conclusive test of the hypothesis advanced by Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012) that political institutions drive economic institutions. Third, it contributes to the
institutions-development literature by presenting evidence on the causality between institutions
and economic development for a country case study using Time Series methods as suggested by
Chang (2011) and Chang (2006).
The third essay assesses the role of property rights institutions on foreign direct investment in
Kenya. This assessment is a response to the emerging theoretical claim by the New Institutional
Economics (NIE) literature that developing countries are unable to attract and retain foreign capi-
tal due to weaknesses in property rights institutions. Despite the general acceptance of this claim,
empirical evidence in its support is lacking for the developing countries especially at a coun-
try level. This is in part due to the unavailability of property rights measures that date far back
enough to be used to undertake the Time Series analysis to validate such a relationship. This
essay contributes to the economic literature in three ways. First, it provides evidence in support
of this theoretical claim. This analysis meets Chang (2011) and Rodrik (2008)’s requirement that
economic development studies must also apply Time Series case studies to understand the role
of institutions on economic development outcomes. Second, it contributes to this literature by
constructing a theoretical model that presents the channel that links the quality of property rights
institutions and decisions to invest in a developing country by foreign firms. Third, it contributes
to the growing development literature that looks at the channels through which institutions in-
fluence the process of economic development in developing countries. As pointed out by Alfaro
et al. (2007) there is little systematic evidence on the specific mechanisms of how institutions
affect economic development. This work identifies FDI as one of those missing links.
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The last essay explores the relationship between political institutions and illicit financial flows
from Kenya. This exercise is motivated by the puzzle of the continued net outflows of financial
resources experienced by a number of African countries despite their developmental challenges
of lack of resources to finance their developmental goals. This essay addresses one basic ques-
tion: What is the relationship between political institutions and illicit financial flows and rent
extraction from Kenya? The essay assesses empirically the role of political institutions in illicit
financial flows. This empirical assessment reveals that increased executive powers in Kenya is
positively associated with illicit financial flows. Thus weaknesses in political institutions matter
for illicit financial flows from Kenya. The implication from this evidence is clear: Reducing pow-
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Prologue
“Nations fail today because their extractive economic institutions do not create the incentives needed for people
to save, invest, and innovate. Extractive political institutions support these economic institutions by cementing the
power of those who benefit from the extraction. Extractive economic and political institutions, though their details
vary under different circumstances, are always at the root of failure. .”




“Therefore the factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education,capital accumulation, etc.) are not
sources of growth; they are growth. Factor accumulation and innovation are only proximate causes of growth and
development. The fundamental cause of growth and economic development is institutions”. The key to growth was
and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals
incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities-rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation
and/or excessive taxation, that reduce individual incentives.”
– North D.C and Thomas R.P (1973: page 2).
1.1 Background and Thesis Overview
ONE of the most pressing issues in comparative economic development literature is explain-ing the causes of economic development (or the lack thereof) of countries across the
world. This is particularly so for countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: First, a number of these
countries have had poor development performance on average over the past five decades of post-
colonial rule1, and they continue to face several major developmental challenges, which are not
1For instance, Fosu (2009) shows that over the period 1960-2005, real per capita GDP growth averaged 1 percent
per year while during the same period, a comparable rate of growth was 2.8 percent for the OECD countries and 2.2
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limited to, extreme poverty levels, low levels of social and private investment (both foreign and do-
mestic investment), lack of resources to finance their development programmes, corruption and re-
curring civil wars and conflicts (Aryeetey et al., 2012; African Development Bank Group (AfDB)
and UNECA, 2012; Blankenburg and Khan, 2012; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2011; Ndikumane
and Boyce, 2011)2. Second, despite their economic hardships and the development finance gap,
these countries continue to experience net outflows of financial resources to the developed world3.
These financial resource outflows that are estimated close to US $1.4 trillion over a 30-year (1980-
2009) period have meant further deepening of underdevelopment as these countries continue to
lose resources that could be used to finance their development goals (African Development Bank
and Global Financial Integrity, 2013; Ndikumane and Boyce, 2011). This capital outflow puzzle
could indicate that these countries are experiencing a “savings glut” (in Ben Bernanke’s terminol-
ogy).
Given that these countries were once colonized by the European imperial powers, the issue is
whether these developmental challenges are a result of institutions that were created during the
colonial period, but which have persisted to the present-day, and continue to affect their patterns
of economic development. In other words, is the state of underdevelopment the aftermath of col-
onization which has had a persistent effect through its impact on the patterns of institutional de-
velopment? This issue remains central in the literature on institutions and economic development
(New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature)4. This literature has advanced the institutional hy-
pothesis that contends that the process of economic development (or the lack thereof) is primarily
a function of the quality of economic and political institutions-the institutions whose roots are
traced back to colonial rule5(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; North and Thomas, 1973b).
percent for the Latin American countries. This growth performance has not only been episodic overtime but also varied
substantially across countries.
2 see also Rodrik (2005); Easterly and Levine (2001); Sender (1999); Scully (1988)
3These financial flows are claimed to be illicit and they are a result of political corruption, kickbacks, tax evasion,
criminal activities, transactions of certain contraband goods, and other illicit business activities across borders. (Reuter,
2012; Ndikumane and Boyce, 2011; Heggstad and Fjeldstad, 2010; Hollingshead, 2008).
4This literature follows the classical ideas of North (1993, 1990, 1987a); North and Thomas (1973b).
5For instance, in a recent series of landmark papers, La Porta et al. (2000, 1999, 1998) have argued that the historical
fact of being colonized by Britain for example, rather than any of the other colonial powers, has a strong effect on the
legal system of the former colonies and, through that, on economic development.
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Institutions, in this context, are understood to be a composite of norms and rules that govern
human interactions and the enforcement thereof (North, 1990, 1993). On one hand these insti-
tutions are said to include formal rules such as the laws that protect private property rights, the
enforcement of the rule of law, and the protection and respect of peoples’ political and civil lib-
erties. On the other hand, they are claimed to include informal rules that comprise habits, beliefs,
social cleavages, traditions and norms (North, 1990, 1993). It is argued that these institutions
provide the overall incentive structure that supports markets, that channel individual economic ef-
forts into economic activities that bring the private rate of return close to the social rate of return
, and that enable trade and exchange to take place to increase the economy’s productive capacity
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Banerjee and LYER, 2005; North and Thomas, 1973b). In one
of his landmark contributions to this literature, North (2006, p.6) further claims that development
(economic change) depends largely on "adaptive efficiency," of the country’s institutional ma-
trix. The concept of adaptive efficiency, he explains, relates to society’s capacity and capability
to create institutions that are productive, stable, fair, and broadly accepted—and, yet sufficiently
flexible enough to be changed or replaced in response to exogenous shocks or to growing tensions
inherent in society’s development. Therefore, according to him, different societies create the in-
stitutional infrastructure that greatly determines their economic development trajectories (North,
1993, 1990; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2003).
Relying on North’s conception of institutions, this literature suggests that developing countries,
in particular those in Africa, failed to develop because they did not create the development-
promoting institutional structures of the type created by Western countries or, where they were
created, they were either weak, or poorly devised and implemented. This literature further argues
that the State in each of these countries was either too weak to act as a guarantor of rights and
institutions or much too predatory in its own demands, posing a threat to them (Bardhan, 2001)6.
In contrast, Western societies developed because they established the incentive creating institu-
tions that constrained the behaviour of participants in markets (i.e economic markets and political
6The nature of the state and the question relating to the circumstances under which the state would protect private
property rights are the classical issues that framed North’s contributions to the New Institutional Economics literature.
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markets); that reduced uncertainty in social interactions through the protection of property rights;
that limited agency costs and rent seeking; and in general, that prevented excessive transaction
costs in markets. The transaction costs are understood in this context to include the costs of mak-
ing exchange, costs of contract enforcement, and the information costs (Coase, 1992, 1988). All
these costs are said to affect not only contractual arrangements but also what is produced and
exchanged, and the size and activities of the entire economy (Coase, 1992). At the same time
Western countries had strong states that had credible commitment to enforcement of the rule of
law and were less predatory. In consequence, these countries realized productivity gains from
larger scale and improved technology that stimulated their economic development. The empirical
evidence in support of the institutions hypothesis that institutions matter for economic develop-
ment. The hypothesis emerged in the early classical papers starting with those by Barro (1996,
1991),Keefer and Knack (1995), Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2002, 2001). Later
studies by Rodrik et al. (2002); Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) and Easterly and Levine (2003,
2001), also produced evidence in support of this hypothesis.
In contrast to the New Institutional Economics strand of literature, there are other competing
views on the main causes of lack of economic development among African countries. These
include the “government policy failure hypothesis” and “the geography hypothesis”. I do not
discuss these competing hypotheses in detail since they do not form the core part of this thesis,
rather I present a summary discussions of them and their weaknesses.
The Policy Failure Hypothesis
This hypothesis was an early explanation for African underdevelopment in general. According
to the proponents of this hypothesis, the problem of economic development of the African states
is a result of government policy failure or bad economic policy making. This hypothesis argues
that government intervention in markets and policy induced distortions in these countries from the
1960s to the 1970s after they attained independence from the colonial rule, were the main struc-
tural constraints to their economic development. At the same time, the quantitative restrictions
imposed under import substitutions strategies were seen as the main driving force behind rent-
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seeking and corruption in these countries. These prior beliefs gave rise to the reform agenda of
the 1990s that exemplified a fundamental paradigm shift away from the structural perspective that
advocated the import substitution and government intervention strategies on the basis that mar-
kets would not function in developing countries in the same way as in advanced economies due
to a variety of structural constraints: Limited and fragmented markets, insufficient information,
poverty traps and weak infrastructure (Szirmai, 2005).
The 1990s reform agenda that was coined within the Washington consensus framework attempted
to solve the problem of underdevelopment of African countries through three basic strategies:
Macroeconomic discipline, a market based economy, and the outward-orientation policies. In
Rodrik (2006, p.973)’s words, this policy strategy involved three basic ideas- “stabilize, priva-
tize and liberalize”. These market oriented reforms further gained impetus with the collapse of
the Sovient Union-a situation that strengthened the claim that government involvement in market
activities was distortious. These strategies were grounded in the Neo-classical assumptions of
zero transactions costs (“frictionless world”), perfect information and an institutions-free world
(North, 1990). However, after a decade of implementation of this reform agenda, the develop-
mental challenges of these countries had not been solved. This was evidenced by the continued
disappointing growth performance which remained well below that achieved under the earlier
import substitution policies.
Anderson (2009); Ndulu et al. (2008); Bates (2005) note that the said market oriented policies of
the 1990s resulted in the unintended consequences of leaving the majority of the people worse
of and benefiting a few elite groups in societies. Bates (2005) further argues that in a number of
African countries distorting macroeconomic policies (monetary policies, exchange rate policies
and fiscal policies) were adopted for short-term political goals including redistribution, employ-
ment, and patronage rather than long-term economic development7. They argue that such poli-
cies could not be abandoned timely due to the collective action problem hence people in these
economies failed to mobilize political oppositions to their governments. The end product of this
7See also Cox and McCubbins (1986), Dixit and Londregan (1996)
5
was the long-run underdevelopment. Bates’s claims support the notion that African underdevel-
opment is a result of the inability of the African governments to make credible commitments and
refrain from opportunistic behaviour8.
But government policy itself is framed by the types of players and their interest in the politi-
cal game. Therefore policy mistakes used to explain underdevelopment are not really mistakes
because people get policies wrong by design in order to benefit certain groups or individuals (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2012). It is for this reason that the quality of political, legal, and economic
institutions has been found to be central in influencing such outcomes over time. Consequently,
the basic reforms that improve institutions are regarded as one of the surest routes for transform-
ing a country in the long run from poverty to prosperity. This view, which underlies a good deal of
recent empirical research on economic growth and development, is also the central theme pursued
by many international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.
The New Geography Hypothesis
The new geography hypothesis views natural resources endowment, the effects of climate, tropi-
cal diseases burden, transportation costs and the diffusion of technologies across spatial barriers
within and between nations as the main determinants of development (Diamond, 1997; Gallup
et al., 1998). Geography is claimed to exert a strong influence on agricultural productivity and
the quality of human resources. While Sachs (2001) does not give any recognition to policy vari-
ables or institutional factors as important for economic development, Gallup et al. (1998) claim
that some effects of geography are mediated by policies and institutions: “Good policy and good
geography may have a tendency to go together.... the result is that natural differences in growth
potential tend to be amplified by the choice of economic policies.” Yet their central claim remains
that geography matters, even when policies and institutions are controlled for. However, this hy-
pothesis has been challenged in the context of Africa given the abundance of natural resources
that the continent possesses, the reduction in transportation costs due to changes in technology
and the growth of some countries which are also landlocked. If the geography hypothesis was cor-
8see Coate and Morris (1999)who claim that once such distortions have been implemented, they cannot be reversed
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rect, African economies would have grown faster (Noman Akbar and Stiglitz E.Joseph, 2012).
This hypothesis would also not explain the puzzle of net outflows of capital in the presence of the
development financing gap.
This thesis is based on the New Institutional Economics literature, and as such it will examine
the research gaps and the unexplored research questions from this literature. These will form the
basis of inquiry for this thesis.
Research Gaps and Criticisms of Literature
The contributions and insights from the New Institutional Economics literature has contributed
insights on economic development. However there are limitations to this literature and some
research gaps that still warrant attention. The basic limitation of this literature has been its exclu-
sive use of cross country econometric analyses with less attention given to country case studies to
prove the importance of institutions for economic development. For instance, Rodrik (2008) notes
that the evidence provided by such analysis is uninformative because it ignores the influence of
institutions (economic and political institutions) at a country specific level despite the recognition
that developing countries are different from advanced economies. He notes further that because
countries are heterogeneous, the kind of institutions that work in one country might not necessar-
ily work in another. Developing countries might need “appropriate” institutions. By “appropriate
institutions” he refers to those institutions that are country and context specific. In addition, Ro-
drik (2007:15) argues that while competitiveness-enhancing institutions have the same functions
across economies-namely, the protection of private property-their form is context specific, and
history dependent.
Chang (2011, p.483) endorses Rodrik’s argument and notes further that “given that the relation-
ship between institutions and development is almost certain to differ across countries, ‘time-
series’ evidence may offer better further that such evidence should also not be confined exclu-
sively to econometric analysis, which cannot capture complexities that characterize the domain of
institutions, but should include historical narratives and comparative historical studies. In the light
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of the foregoing arguments, an exploration of the influence of institutions on economic outcomes
at the country level is warranted.
Although the NEI literature has suggested the need to understand the formation and evolution of
institutions across time and space to understand the process of economic development (North,
1993, 1990; North et al., 1971), the studies that attempt to do so are limited9. This omission
was noted earlier by North in his seminal works as is reflected in the following extract: “although
Ronald Coase made the fundamental contribution of pointing out that when it is costly to transact,
institutions matter, neither he nor most of his followers have explored how property rights and
other institutions come about”North (1993, page 1). Bardhan (2001) corroborates North (1993)
and notes that “...it is clear that the literature has barely scratched the surface of an as yet largely
unexplored story in poor countries. Particularly lacking are the theoretically informed, inductive,
historical analyses of institutional evolution and change (or atrophy) in these countries of the kind
Greif has so incisively carried out for late medieval Europe”10. North has further emphasized
the need to first understand the stability characteristic of institutions, and the interaction between
political institutions and economic institutions in order to understand institutional change.
Despite this oversight, the literature has at least advanced the notion that the current institutions
in the former colonies were shaped by their colonial history. This notion has been popularized by
Acemoglu et al. (2001) who develop an elaborate argument based on the colonial legacy of former
colonies. Specifically these authors postulate that Europeans colonizers established institutions
that were not conducive for investment and development (that were extractive, in Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012)’s terminology) in places where they could not settle because they faced high
mortality rates. They contend that such extractive institutions did not foster the process of eco-
nomic development and have persisted to the present-day, and continue to stifle the process of
economic development. In places where they settled because they faced lower settler mortal-
ity rates, they created durable institutions (inclusive institutions, in their terminology) that were
9Few studies such as those by North and Thomas (1973b) and Greif (1994) discussed the evolution of institutions
in Western World but they also do not look into formal institutions
10 Chang (2011) also notes this weakness in his claim that the dominant discourse on institutions and development
suffers from lack of understanding on how institutions evolve and change.
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conducive for private investment and thus promoted economic development.
Criticism of this literature lies in its omission of the channels through which institutions affect the
process of economic development, and in identifying a set of institutions important for economic
development at country level. In one of their often cited papers, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003)
argue that while there is considerable evidence that institutions are important determinants of
economic and financial outcomes, there has been relatively little work investigating which types
of institutions matter more for economic outcomes. This thesis offers a step in that direction.
In addition, the evidence presented by the institutions-development literature has often been crit-
icised for using conventional institutional indicators (the Heritage Foundation index of property
rights, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measures of property rights and investors
protection, and Polity IV measures of political institutions) that are claimed to be suspect. For in-
stance, Glaeser et al. (2004) criticize these measures on the grounds that they measure outcomes
and not permanent characteristics of institutions as postulated by North (1990). These authors
further claim that these indicators rise with per capita income and are highly volatile and thus are
poor measures of permanent or even durable features of institutions. This thesis contributes to
the institutions and development literature by providing a new set of institutional indicators that
circumvent these weaknesses.
Research Questions and the Contribution of the Thesis to the Literature
Despite theoretical and empirical contributions and insights from this literature, a number of
important but challenging research questions remain to be explored in this broad research agenda.
These basic questions are: How do institutions evolve across time and space? To what extent
have the institutions established during the colonial period persisted to the present-day? Why
have they persisted? Do political institutions determine economic institutions? How and to what
extent have these institutions impacted on the process of economic development of the former
colonies at individual country level? Is the continued net outflow of financial resources a result
of weak political institutions that were established during the colonial period but persisted to
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the present-day? Are they rather a reflection of broader post independence institutional failures?
To what extent do such institutions (i.e. the property rights institutions) continue to affect the
process of investment (either domestic or foreign investment) of the former colonies in Africa?
Understanding these issues remains crucial for paving the new developmental path for African
states and continue to warrant attention in both academic and policy discourse.
As part of this discourse, this thesis explores some of the foregoing research questions of the
broader new institutional economics and political economy research agenda. This research seeks
to avoid the caveats of the literature highlighted above. The thesis focuses mainly on three related
issues: (i) the evolution of economic institutions and political institutions across time and space,
(ii) the causality between institutions and economic development outcomes, and between politi-
cal institutions and economic institutions, (iii) the role of institutions in economic development
through the channel of foreign direct investment and the control of rent seeking and corruption.
This research makes use of the conceptual framework on institutions proposed by Douglass North.
This framework relaxes the Neo-classical assumptions of perfect information, zero transaction
costs and perfect rationality. This framework will be explained in the sub-section that follows.
Based on this framework, emphasis will be placed on the role of legal institutions-both property
rights institutions and political institutions on economic development outcomes. These issues are
discussed in four distinct essays as outlined below, where each essay constitutes an independent
self-contained chapter.
This thesis is focused mainly on Kenya as a case study and the motivation for choosing Kenya for
this research work will be explained .
Essay One: Evolution and Measurement of Formal Institutions in Kenya
This essay, considers evolution of formal institutions, both economic and political institutions,
over a 130-year period (1880-2010) using Kenya as a case study (this is presented and discussed
in chapter three). The study is concerned with how political institutions and economic institutions
arise as a result of self-interest of those who hold political power. Three central questions that
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frame this exploration are: What kind of economic institutions and political institutions did the
colonial settlers create in the colonies where they settled? That is, did they set up inclusive insti-
tutions or extractive institutions, in the terminology of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)? How did
these institutions evolve over time? Did these institutions change after independence? If they did,
why did they change? or if they did not change, why did they not change? The focus is on formal
institutions because doing so provides a way through which the dynamic interactions between
political and economic institutions can be understood. It can also reveal how the equilibrium
economic institutions are shaped by political forces over time. This approach meets North (1993,
page 13)’s suggestion that since economic institutions (property rights) are specified and enforced
by polities, an in-depth understanding of the way polities evolve is important to understand the
way property rights evolve.
A lengthy 130-year time span has been chosen for the study. This follows Kaufmann et al. (2003)
who argue that the likelihood of observing significant changes over time in institutional variables
increases substantially with the length of time under consideration. Such a lengthy time span
is also chosen in order to unfold some nuanced historical information that might shed light on
Kenya’s economic development problem. The motivation for this chapter is the general lack of
research on the evolution of institutions across time and space, and how they change, particularly
in developing countries. The exploration of the evolution of institutions across time and space
fills the existing gap in the institution-development literature as identified by North (1990). This
contribution further advances the political economy literature where the main thematic question
centers on the creation and evolution of institutions(see Grindle, 2001). The study also con-
tributes to the literature on the measurement of institutions by providing an alternative lengthy
time series dataset on the evolution of institutions at least for one representative African country.
This dataset can be used to understand the dynamics of economic development in this economy.
The issue of the measurement of institutions, particularly property rights institutions and political
institutions that date far back for developing countries, has been one of the outstanding issues
in this literature. By design this new dataset to a large extent circumvents the major problems
identified with the conventional indices. Research using this dataset can inform debates relating
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to the measurement of institutions in the institution-development discourse in general.
Essay Two: Persistence of Institutions, and Institutions-Development Causality in
Kenya
This essay uses the dataset discussed in the previous chapter to answer four key questions of the
institutions-development literature: (a) Are institutions really persistent11? If yes, why are they
persistent?; (b) Do political institutions cause economic institutions?; (c) What is the direction
of causality between institutions and economic development in this representative African econ-
omy? This chapter is motivated first by the lack of empirical studies that test the widely used
assumption that institutions are persistent. This assumption has often been applied in both the-
oretical and empirical work on institutions-development discourse as a base for the instrumental
strategy used to prove the primacy of institutions over other causes of development. However, this
assumption has rarely been empirically tested due to the dearth of Time Series data on African
institutions going back to the colonial era12. This assumption was popularized by Acemoglu et al.
(2001) who develop an elaborate argument based on the colonial legacy of former colonies. Sec-
ond, this essay is motivated by the latest compelling claim from Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
that political institutions drive economic institutions which in turn drive the process of economic
development, yet also has not been empirically tested. Last, it is motivated by the continuing de-
bates on the direction of causality between institutions and economic development. For instance,
while a number of theoretical and empirical studies claim that it is institutions that drive the pro-
cess of economic development.Lipset (1959)13 and his followers argue that development leads to
better institutions (Chang, 2011, 2006)14. According to these authors, a minimum threshold level
11Few studies (see Melisa Dell, 2010 for the case of Peru) have provided evidence in support of this assumption
hence I provide further evidence on the test of persistence using time series data
12Studies that rely on this assumption in particular, contend that, in colonies where high mortality rates discouraged
settlement by European colonialists, extractive institutions that were not conducive to investment were designed. The
persistence of such institutions has hindered current economic development. At the other end of the spectrum, in
places with low mortality rates, the colonialists settled and developed institutions–akin to those in Western Europe–
that created the conditions for enhancing private investment and economic development.
13Lipset (1959) advanced this hypothesis known as the Lipset hypothesis.
14However Chang (2011) notes that the paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is a partial exception in the sense that it
recognizes the two-way nature of the relationship at a theoretical level. However it goes on to conclude through the
use of instrumental variables that the causality runs from institutions to development.
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of economic development and human capital is the basic requirement for sustaining democratic
institutions and economic institutions. These authors further posit that such a minimum threshold
level could even be reached through policies pursued by dictators (Glaeser et al., 2004; Djankov
et al., 2003).
This chapter therefore makes three distinct contributions to the institutions-development liter-
ature. First, it provides evidence for the assumption that institutions are persistent and offers
explanations for this persistence. Second, it provides evidence for the hypothesis advanced by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that political institutions drive economic institutions. These two
hypotheses have not been tested in empirical literature on institutions-development discourse.
Third, this study contributes to the institutions-development literature on the direction of causality
between institutions and economic development by presenting evidence on this causality analysis
for a country study. This case study uses Time Series methods as suggested by Chang (2011,
2006). It is hoped that this evidence will add to the already existing evidence on this highly
controversial issue.
Essay Three: Foreign Direct Investment and Institutions in Kenya: Are Institutions A
Binding Constraint?
This essay assesses the role of property rights institutions on foreign direct investment in Kenya.
This assessment is a response to the emerging theoretical claim by the New Institutional Eco-
nomics (NIE) Literature that developing countries are not able to attract and retain foreign capital
due to weaknesses in their property rights institutions. This literature stands in complete con-
trast to the earlier views of the proponents of the neoclassical paradigm; They asserted that the
failure of these countries to attract and retain foreign capital was caused by trade protection mea-
sures, import substitution strategies and repressive financial policies adopted after the colonial
rule(see Salvatore, 1991; Brainard, 1997). This earlier literature had suggested that the solution
to this problem was the liberalization of trade regimes, the deregulation of goods and financial
markets, the abandonment of trade protection measures, and the pursuance of the outward/export
orientation strategies. Yet a number of the African countries failed to attract FDI even after imple-
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menting these Neo-liberal policy prescriptions in line with the Washington Consensus(Fine et al.,
2004). These strategies thus failed to change foreign investors’ incentives to invest in developing
countries, and led to the new theoretical claims by the NIE theorists.
Despite the general acceptance of this emerging theoretical claim, empirical evidence in its sup-
port is lacking for developing countries at a country level. This is in part due to unavailability of
property rights measures that date far back and could be used to undertake a time series analysis
of such a relationship at country level. This research discussed in this chapter fills this research
gap. However, it asserts that although property rights institutions are important for FDI in Kenya
as reflected by their positive effect on FDI flows, they might not be the only binding constraint.
This is suggested because Kenya has a relatively good property rights institutions as proxied by
Freehold Property Right Index yet has only realized meager FDI flows. This can be referred to as
the “property rights-FDI puzzle” in a developing country. This puzzle could be explained perhaps
by a lack of credible enforcement of such institutions. That is, even if de-jure institutions are
sound, they may not be enforced and this will continue to stifle investment.
The contributions to the economic literature in this essay are threefold. First, the study pro-
vides evidence in support of the theoretical claim that property rights institutions are important
for investment in developing countries using Time Series analysis at a country level. This anal-
ysis surely meets the requirement of Chang (2011); Rodrik (2008)that economic development
researchers must also apply Time Series case studies to understand the influence of institutions
on economic development outcomes. Second, this research contributes to the literature by con-
structing a theoretical model that demonstrates the link between the quality of property rights
institutions and foreign direct investment decisions related to a Developing country. Third, the
work contributes to the growing literature that looks at the channels through which institutions
influence the process of economic development in developing countries. As pointed out by Al-
faro et al. (2007) there is little systematic evidence on the specific mechanisms of how institutions
affect economic development. This work identifies FDI as one of those channels. It also shows
that the quality of property rights institutions shapes international capital in developing countries
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such as Kenya. Thus foreign investment might be one of the missing links through which institu-
tions affect long-run development in these countries. This study is in line with the recent work on
economic development that emphasizes the role of institutions in achieving higher income levels.
Essay Four: Illicit Financial Flows and Rent Extraction in Kenya: To What Extent do
Political Institutions Matter?
This last essay examines the relationship between political institutions, proxied by the increasing
powers of the executive, and illicit financial flows from Kenya. This exercise is motivated by the
puzzle of continued net outflows of financial resources experienced by a number of African coun-
tries despite their lack of resources to finance their developmental goals. Two general questions
are of importance in this chapter: Does increasing the powers of the executive increase illicit
financial flows and rent extraction from Kenya? Why do Kenyans continue to vote for leaders
that they suspect are corrupt? To this end, the research assesses empirically the role of political
institutions in illicit financial flows. Findings from this study are that increased executive powers
is positively associated with illicit financial flows. Thus weaknesses in political institutions matter
for illicit financial flows (rent extraction) from Kenya. This research could be taken further by
others to see if these findings are applicable to other African countries.
This essay fills the existing research gap in the literature on political accountability and rent
seeking, illicit capital outflows from developing countries using Kenya as a case study. To the
best of my knowledge, there has not been any study that attempted to demonstrate the influence of
increasing powers of the executive on illicit capital flows from Africa or elsewhere. All previous
studies such as that by Ng’eno (2000) do not consider political institutions as the explanatory
variable in their regressions. The only study that has attempted to study the factors that influence
illicit financial outflows from Kenya is that by Ng’eno (2000). However, that study used the Neo-
classical framework and equated the illicit capital flows to capital flight. This was a fundamental
weakness of the study. It also largely ignored the political economy and institutional explanations
of such flows. It further ignored the changing political context within which illicit financial flows
have occurred in Kenya.
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This paper linked to earlier research that attempts to understand capital flight from and corruption
in Africa. These include those by Yalta and Yalta (2012); Ndikumana and Boyce (2011); Ali
and Walters (2011); Fofack and Ndikumana (2010); Ndikumana and Boyce (2008); Cerra et al.
(2008); Ndikumana and Boyce (2003); Boyce and Ndikumana (2001); Lensink et al. (1998); Ajayi
(1995). The paper is also related to research on the political economy of corruption and the new
institutional economics such as examinations by Acemoglu et al. (2011, 2004, 2003); Alesina and
Tabellini (1989).
1.2 Thesis Conceptual Framework
This thesis adopts the conceptual framework and definition of institutions postulated by Douglass
North. This was the view that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or...the humanly
devised constraints that shape human interactions ” in the economic, social and political spheres
(North, 1990:3). These comprise both the formal rules (constitutions, laws and regulations) and
informal constraints, such as norms of behaviour, and self imposed codes of conduct. However,
this thesis is concerned more with formal constraints and takes a more macro-analytic perspec-
tive. This approach is more pertinent for economic development and reform (Williamson, 2000).
It considers the political and legal rules of the game and the institutions of governance. Thus, it
places emphasis on those factors that shape the institutional environment. This macro-analytic
approach finds support from Williamson (2000) who argues that “although the institutional eco-
nomics strand of principal interest is mainly with micro-analytic matters, there would be much
less incentive to turn to the micro-analytic side if the macro-analytic approach had been more
successful” (Williamson, 2000:172).
Within this framework, institutions can be divided into two broad groups following Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012): the inclusive institutions and extractive institutions. This division applies
to both economic institutions and political institutions. That is, inclusive economic institutions
and the inclusive political institutions, and the extractive economic institutions and the extractive
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political institutions. This thesis adopts an operational definition of “inclusive economic institu-
tions” of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) who define them as those institutions that, (i) protect
private property (private property rights), (ii) judicial and contracting institutions that uphold
contracts and enable individuals to enter into mutually beneficial agreements. More importantly,
these institutions are seen to provide a level playing field by ensuring that individuals are not
prevented from entering into businesses and choosing options that are best for themselves. Ac-
cordingly these authors make a compelling argument that broad-based political institutions are a
prerequisite for building the kind of economic institutions from which growth can translate into
sustainable development.
1.3 Contribution to the Related Literature
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it produces a time series indices for
institutions (related to de-jure political freedoms and civil liberties, property rights, political op-
pression and the defacto political instability) for Kenya over the period 1884-201015. It discusses
the evolution of these institutions over an extended period of time. It then tests the assump-
tion that institutions are persistent-an assumption often made implicitly or explicitly in empirical
work but not empirically validated. Secondly, the thesis investigates the mechanisms through
which institutions influence economic development and identifies the specific types of institu-
tions that matter for economic development in Kenya. The thesis further contributes to explaining
economic growth in one African country by testing empirically whether institutional underdevel-
opment explains lack of foreign financing (capital immobility) in this country. In particular, the
thesis reveals how property rights and contractual institutions effect international financing for
economic growth. The thesis also falls within the Law and Economics, Economics and Politi-
cal Science literature because it assesses the influence of legal and political characteristics of a
15Empirical evidence suggests that research should investigate specific institutions because aggregate measures such
as the rule of law are too broad and fuzzy to contain meaningful information. Objective measures are generally pre-
ferred over subjective measures, and institutions should be as formally defined in legislation (de jure) and as factually
implemented (de facto). However, it is worth mentioning that the ability to measure institutions does not imply the
ability to create and modify institutions at will.
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country on economic growth and international financial patterns. Lastly, the thesis contributes to
the growing literature on institutions, by showing the extent to which institutional enforcement
influences economic growth.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
This research comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis and high-
lights the general motivation of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents the measurement of institutions and
the discussion on the evolution of institutions in Kenya over the period 1884-2010. Chapter 3
explores the interaction and causality between formal institutions and economic development in
Kenya. Chapter 4 explores the interaction between formal institutions and foreign direct invest-
ment in Kenya. Chapter 5 explores whether political institutions matter for illicit financial flows




Figure 1.1: Map of Kenya Showing Colonial Land Capture
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Chapter 2
Evolution and Measurement of
Institutions in Kenya
In leaving out history, institutions, and distributional considerations, neoclassical economics was leaving out the
heart of development economics. ”
– Stiglitz and Hoff (1999: page 390)
2.1 Introduction
THE literature from economic development emphasises the importance of property rights in-stitutions and political institutions in the process of economic development (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2012; Rodrik et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001;
Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; North, 1990, 1987a). It claims that property rights and polit-
ical institutions are important because they provide the basic economic incentive structure that
stimulates investment in the key development enhancing variables. These include human capital,
physical capital and technological change. Institutions in this context are defined as the rules in a
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society that are devised to constrain human behaviour and shape the interactions between agents
in the economy. They comprise both formal rules (i.e. laws, constitutions) and informal con-
straints (i.e customs and traditions). This literature further claims that the enforcement of these
rules is important to realise the desired economic outcomes (Aron, 2000; North, 1987a).
While the importance of institutions is widely recognized in this literature, there has generally
been a paucity of research on their evolution over time and how they change, particularly in
developing countries. This is despite Douglass C. North’s emphasis that in order to understand the
process of economic development, one must first understand institutions and how they evolve over
time (North, 1993, 1990; North et al., 1971). In a number of his theoretical contributions, North
further emphasises that in order to understand institutional change, one must first understand
the stability characteristic of institutions and the interaction between political institutions and
economic institutions. The limited amount of research on the evolution of institutions and how
they change was also noted by North (1993) in his earlier contributions, and this is reflected in
the following extract: “although Ronald Coase made the fundamental contribution of pointing
out that when it is costly to transact, institutions matter, neither he nor most of his followers have
explored how property rights and other institutions come about”(North, 1993, page 1).
The paucity of research on the evolution of institutions is a result of the difficulty of measuring
institutions since they encompass both formal and informal constraints (Hodgson, 2009; Nelson,
2009; North, 2006). The informal constraints are more difficult to define. In their simplest form
they include conventions and norms of behaviour (North, 1990). Although, formal constraints
such as laws and constitutions might appear less difficult to study, they have not been studied in the
economic tradition because of the difficulty to integrating the aspects of political and social the-
ory with those of economic theory. Past attempts to measure institutions have been criticised. For
instance, Glaeser et al. (2004) criticise conventional measures of institutions such as the Heritage
Foundation Index of Property Rights, the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) measures of
property rights and investors protection, and Polity IV measures of political institutions, on the
grounds that they measure outcomes and not permanent characteristics of institutions as postu-
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lated by North (1990). The authors claim that these indicators rise with per capita income and are
highly volatile. These characteristics, they argue, make them poor measure of durable features
of institutions. However, even if one could refute these criticisms as unwarranted, a fundamental
weakness remains-an omission of how institutions come about.
This chapter explores this largely overlooked important research issue of evolution in institutions
in Kenya since 1880 to 2010. Specifically this research sets out to measure and explore the evo-
lution of both political and economic institutions over a 130-year period in Kenya. The concern
here is with how political institutions and economic institutions arise as a result of self-interest
of those who hold political power. The focus is on formal institutions because this provides a
way through which the dynamic interactions between political and economic institutions can be
revealed. It fosters an understanding of how the equilibrium economic institutions are shaped by
political forces over time. This approach meets North (1993, page 13)’s suggestion that since
economic institutions (property rights) are specified and enforced by polities, an in-depth under-
standing of the way polities evolve is important to understand the way property rights evolve. This
assertion is affirmed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2006)1. The long 130-year time span fol-
lows Kaufmann et al. (2003) who argue that the likelihood of observing significant changes over
time in institutional variables increases substantially with the length of time under consideration.
Such a lengthy time span is also chosen in order to unfold some nuanced historical data that might
shed light on Kenya’s economic development problem.
The choice of Kenya as a case study is motivated by several factors. First, the debates on Kenya’s
poor economic performance have pointed towards weak political and economic institutions as the
main factors behind such performance (Aryeetey et al., 2012). These institutions are claimed
to have been largely shaped by colonial imperialism and have persisted to the present day hence
continue to affect development outcomes.Kenya was colonised by Britain. According to the argu-
ment developed and raised by Acemoglu et al. (2001) it should therefore have been endowed with
1 Acemoglu and Robinson (2008, 2006) argue that the equilibrium economic institutions emerge from the inter-
action between political institutions, which allocate de-jure political power, and the distribution of de-facto political
power across social groups.
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robust and growth-enhancing institutions. However, since the colonial era, Kenya has been char-
acterized by lack of socio-economic development and institutional weaknesses which arguably
have been driven by the burning question of land. Five decades after independence, Kenya contin-
ues to experience poor socio-economic performance. Real GDP per capita income is estimated at
US$1,160, an estimated 45.9% of the population live below the poverty line, and life-expectancy
at birth is estimated at 61 years (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). All these
socio-economic indicators place it among poor countries with a low human development index.
The country has also experienced recurring social, ethnic, political and economic conflicts over
land resources, and grapples with increasing inequality. Over the past four decades, the country
also faced high corruption levels sustained by an entrenched system of political patronage.
A variety of factors have been suggested to explain Kenya’s poor economic performance and
recurring conflicts over resources. These include adverse climatic conditions, unfavourable terms
of trade shocks, macroeconomic imbalances, policy mistakes and reversals. Other explanations
include the contested property rights and contentious land redistribution policies that favoured
the few political elite at the expense of the landless majority, weak institutions characterized by
lack of checks and balances, disregard for the rule of law, corruption and contested property
rights(Wakhungu et al., 2008). Yet such claims have not been empirically validated because of
the absence of long-range data on institutions that could be used to understand the dynamics of
these problems. These research uses such a dataset to investigate these factors. Therefore in this
chapter, I provide such data set. The construction of new indicators is guided by the conceptual
framework developed by Fedderke et al. (2001) and applied in a number of studies that have
measured institutions in other African countries2. This framework is based on the legal statutes
(formal laws) that govern immovable property and those that affect peoples’ political and civil
liberties.This framework to a large extent satisfies North’s (1990)’s assertion that institutions are
durable. By design using this data circumvents the major problems identified with conventional
indices of institutions.
2See also (Fedderke and Garlick (2010),Zaaruka and Fedderke (2011b), Fedderke et al. (2011) and Gwenhamo
et al. (2008))
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The contribution of this study to the institution-development literature is therefore twofold. First,
it explores the evolution of formal institutions (freehold and non-freehold property rights, political
rights and civil liberties) that go back to the settlement of the British in Kenya and discusses this
evolution over time. The exploration of the evolution of institutions over time fills the existing
gap in the institution-development literature on the evolution of institutions, as identified by North
(1990). This contribution further advances the political economy literature which centers on in-
stitutional creation and evolution (see Grindle, 2001). Second, the research provides a long range
Time-Series data(1884-2010) on institutional indicators that can be used to validate assumptions
that have often been made in the institution-development literature. For example, the data will
be used for the first time to test the assumption that institutions are persistent-the assumption that
has become the basis for the proof of the primacy of institutions hypothesis. Most studies in this
literature typically assume that institutions are persistent, and therefore have a lasting effect on
economic development. Yet this assumption is rarely tested due to the dearth of Time Series data
on institutions going back to the colonial era3 This hypothesis was popularized by Acemoglu et al.
(2001) who develop an elaborate argument based on the colonial legacy of former colonies.
This new dataset will also be used to validate some of the claims made about Kenya’s economic
development. It will be used to answer questions around the causes of conflict over land resources.
It will also inform factors that have constrained the other drivers of economic development such as
foreign direct investment in this settler economy. By so doing, it will go a long way in informing
debates relating to the measurement of institutions in the institution-development discourse in
general.
3In particular, they contend that, in colonies where high mortality rates discouraged settlement by European colo-
nialists, extractive institutions that were conducive to investment. The persistence of such institutions has hindered
current economic development. At the other end of the spectrum, in places with low mortality rates, the colonialists
settled and developed institutions–akin to those in Western Europe–that created the conditions for enhancing private
investment and economic development.
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2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Evolution of Economic Institutions
This section provides a brief discussion on the evolution of institutions. It summarises the dif-
ferent theories that have developed to explain how property rights institutions evolve and change.
The influence of political forces on property rights institutions was first discussed in the early
works of Knight and recently revived in the works of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008).
These theoretical discussions serve as a basis for an exploration of the evolution of both political
institutions and property rights institutions in Kenya.
Evolution of Economic Institutions-Property Rights
The evolution of property rights was explained succinctly by the early scholars such as Harold
Demsetz who is said to be the founder of efficiency theory. This theory asserts that private prop-
erty rights emerge as a result of increasing values in land which consequently leads rational eco-
nomic agents to creating institutions that secure property rights (Demsetz, 1967). The theory
makes a simplifying assumption that such rising values would always lead to universal prefer-
ences for private property rights. It argues that such preferences occur because, with rising land
values, the potential gains from land transactions grow. However under an environment of inse-
cure property rights such gains are impeded. This is because an environment with insecure prop-
erty rights is characterized by increasing transactions costs which include costs of enforcement-an
issue that was advanced by Ronand Coase and his followers in later writings (see Coase, 1937,
1988; Hart and Moore, 1990)4.
4As an example of the emergence of private property rights, Harold Demsetz (1967) explores the conditions that
gave rise to private property rights institutions among American Indians in Labrador. He first hypothesized that com-
munities would abandon open-access regimes (“communal ownership,” in his terminology) in favor of private own-
ership when it becomes economically efficient for the private owners to “internalize” the externalities created by
communal ownership. To illustrate his thesis, he provided an example of hunting grounds of Native American tribes
in Labrador in the early years after the arrival of European colonists. As Demsetz explains, prior to European colo-
nization, communal ownership was an efficient way to manage hunting grounds because the value of the fur in hunted
25
The efficiency theory however made an overly optimistic assumption that as land values rise, ra-
tional actors will create institutions that create security of property. This assumption subjected
it to criticisms by the political revisionism and new institutionalism theorists following Douglass
C. North. The basis for this criticism has been the observed existence of insecurity of property
rights in some countries despite rising property values. It is also based on the omission of infor-
mation on how institutions evolve and change across time and space (Knight, 1992). According
to the political revisionism thesis, property rights institutions evolve as a result of social conflict
among actors with different and incompatible goals. In this view, "...institutions are a product of
the efforts of some to constrain the actions of others with whom they interact". Thus the private
property rights institutions are a reflection of the instruments of those in superior bargaining po-
sitions. However, although this thesis acknowledges the collective benefits that often result from
institutional innovations, it asserts that such benign occurrences are incidental. The revisionists
view further asserts that low quality institutions will persist if rulers are unwilling to anger those
powerful constituents who benefit from the status quo. In conclusion, this thesis affirms that ev-
eryone would want secure property rights institutions and the lower transactions costs associated
with them but the rulers are not willing to create such institutions because self interest.
The revisionists therefore propose that conflict and the extension of bargaining power are of pri-
mary importance for understanding the evolution of institutions and institutional change (Knight,
1992). Acemoglu and Robinson (2008); Robinson (2010) support this earlier views and show
that indeed the equilibrium economic institutions emerge from interaction between political in-
stitutions, which allocate de-jure political power, and the distribution of de-facto political power
across social groups. De-facto political power is that which is not allocated by institutions (such
as elections), but is possessed by citizens/groups as a result of their wealth, weapons, or ability to
solve the collective action problem.
The new institutionalism literature adds that the evolution of low quality institutions and their per-
animals was low. In pre-colonial times, the externalities caused by wasteful hunting habits were of a magnitude too
low to concern society. Once the value of the furs rose due to the demands of French fur traders, the magnitude of
negative externalities created by wasteful hunting practices became significant. At that point, it was efficient for the
community to transit from communal ownership to private ownership of hunting grounds.
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sistence are principally a result of incentives for corruption and the lack of institutional capacity
of the ruling authorities to create and maintain better quality institutions (see North, 1993). Thus
incentives for corruption by leaders is viewed in this context as a hindrance to the evolution of
better quality institutions that secure property rights for everyone. The supporters of new insti-
tutionalism assert that due to the path-dependence characteristics of institutions, the reforms that
could improve the quality of institutions are hard to implement.
2.2.2 Measurement of Institutions
The recognition of institutions as fundamental causes of economic development dates back to
the evolutionary works of classical economists such as Adam Smith and Karl Marx. These
economists accorded a central position to the role of property rights in the process of economic
development. However, it was only in the 20th century that attempts were made to measure insti-
tutions.Proxies for institutions were first introduced in cross-country growth and investment equa-
tions just some two decade ago, and recently this literature has experienced a renaissance. These
indices encompass the attributes of political institutions, social characteristics, social capital and
measures of the quality of institutions that affect economic exchange (property rights institutions).
This section reviews some of the most frequently used indicators in empirical studies.5
Property Rights Indicators
Security of property (property rights indicators) and risk of expropriation by government have
been measured through a number of proxies. For instance, the Economic Freedom Index is used
as a proxy for property rights. This index is compiled and published by the Frazer Institute. The
Economic Freedom Index measures the degree of economic freedom in a country in four broad
areas, namely, rule of law (property rights protection, and freedom from corruption); Limited
government (fiscal freedom and government spending), Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom,
5See Aron (2000) for a complete review of these institutional indicators
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labor freedom, monetary freedom); and Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, finan-
cial freedom). These areas are judged on 42 data points and countries are rated on a scale of 0 to
10, with 0 representing the least economic freedom and 10 being the most. The index is updated
on an ongoing basis and the latest index includes data for 141 countries from 1995 to 2014. Areas
covered by the index include a country’s legal structure and security of property rights. .
The Heritage Foundation index from the Heritage Foundation, provides another property rights
index which is partly subjective (Miller et al., 2004). This index measures security of property
rights on a score of one (very secure) or zero (non-existent). The index measures property rights
according to the ability of individuals to accumulate private property secured by clear laws that
are fully enforced by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private
property and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likeli-
hood that private property will be expropriated and measures the independence of the judiciary,
the existence of corruption within the judiciary and the ability of individuals and businesses to
enforce contracts. If the the legal protection of property is certain, then the country’s score is
one.If there are chances of government expropriation of property, the country’s score will be zero.
Countries that fall between two categories may receive an intermediate score. This property rights
index has been made available annually since 1995.
The other often used property rights indicator is the Business Risk Indicator by the International
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This indicator comprises six measures of business risk. These are
rule of law, corruption in government, quality of the bureaucracy, reputation of contracts by gov-
ernment, expropriation risk of private investment, and security of contract and property rights.
This index is available for 135 countries from 1984 to 2014. This index ranks countries based on
the composite scores ranging from zero to one hundred. Countries with scores ranging from 80
to 100 are considered low risk countries for investment(Keefer and Knack, 1995).
The last set of indicators that attempts to measure property rights is the Ease of Doing Busi-
ness Indicators by the World Bank. This index measures the protection of investors/minority
shareholders against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. It also judges the
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enforcement of contracts in a country through various measures. These include the perceptions of
corporate and securities lawyers; securities regulations; company laws; civil procedure codes and
court rules of evidence. It covers 183 countries from 2003. The index is scaled from 0 to 10-with
higher values indicating more investor protection.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indicators
Debates on how to measure political rights and political democracy have not yet been settled and
no universal measurement exists. The most popular indices often used in applied work are the
quantitative measures of political rights and civil liberties produced by Freedom House for 165
countries on an annual basis since 1972. While the political rights index is based on the degree
of political competition and freedom of people to choose their political leaders freely, the civil
liberties index is based on the rule of law and judiciary independence. The index is scaled from 1
(free) to 7 (not free).
The Polity IV database popularized by Jaggers et al. (1995) is often applied in empirical work
to measure democracy and political freedoms as well as civil liberties (Polity, 2011). There
are two main variables captured in this index; institutionalized democracy, which signals the
existence of institutions or procedures through which citizens can meaningfully express their
political preferences. The second is institutionalized index, which signals an autocratic state in
which competitive political participation is suppressed. The dataset is available for these indices
for the period 1800-2012 for some states only. Beck et al. (2001) provide another dataseton
political institutions and attempts to measure political freedoms and civil liberties. This index
comprises a variety of political variables, and the majority of which relates to political party
fractionalization, checks and balances and the type of voting systems.
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2.2.3 Criticisms of Existing Institutional Indicators
Despite their wide spread usage, most of these indicators have received criticisms particularly
regarding their measurement. For instance, Glaeser et al. (2004) argue that frequently used mea-
sures of institutions such as Polity III and IV, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Business
Risk Indicators, and World Governance Indicators (WGI), do not capture the element of per-
manent characteristics of institutions that North (1990) refers to in his definition of institutions.
Furthermore, these authors argue that these indicators are outcome based measures6 and do not
capture formal constraints on executives. Similarly, Arndt and Oman (2006) criticizes the WGI
measures as lacking comparability over time.
Kurtz and Schrank (2007) express their concerns about subjectivity in the construction of the
World Governance Indicators, and argue that these indicators are perception-based measures and
are highly correlated with each other. Voigt (2007) recognizes the foregoing weaknesses and
proposes that measures of institutions should be precise, objective and take into account de-jure
as well as de-facto elements of institutions. By doing so, the element of permanency would
be embraced. The de-jure measurement of institutions accords well with North’s definition that
institutional measurements must reflect constitutional constraints on government, thus institutions
are “rules of the game” not “outcomes of the game”, and are therefore more permanent. With
regard to transparency, Pande and Udry (2005) argue that the information that underlies most
institutional indices is not fully public, and reflects the judgment of analysts at risk assessment
organizations and therefore their credibility is questionable. This point is raised by Bollen (1980)
who argues that most institutional indices only have tenuous links with the concepts they purport
to measure.
In addition, Fedderke et al. (2001) argue that most of these indicators are measured over a short
time span and therefore cannot be used to tease out the Time Series dynamics of economic growth
and socio-economic development process. With special reference to Kenya, the Polity Indicators
6These indicators are volatile and change with changes in output of economies.
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are available from 1963 to 20127 while the expropriation risk from the ICRG is available only for
16 years (1982 to 1997). These indicators can only be used at best in cross country studies thereby
ignoring the heterogeneity of countries. The evolution and changes in institutions differ among
countries. There is therefore a need for new datasets of institutional indicators that are based on
objective and explicit criteria. Fedderke et al. (2001) provide the criteria that could be used to
compute such long-term indices. This criteria is applied for example in Zaaruka and Fedderke
(2011a), Fedderke et al. (2011), Fedderke and Garlick (2010) and Gwenhamo et al. (2008)8.
2.3 Empirical Methods
We adopt the framework proposed and used by Fedderke et al. (2001) to construct institutional
indicators for Kenya. This framework relies on the formal legislative history of a country9 that
governs immovable property, and that which affects political rights and civil liberties10. The
annual ratings of the status of rights based exclusively on such legislative history and legal frame-
work are performed against a set of standardized normative criteria. Changes in ratings reflect
either improvement in the dispensation of constitutional rights or deterioration in the dispensation
of such rights11. Although this framework avoids some of the problems inherent in the measure-
ment of institutions, it has some weaknesses. The first weakness is the aggregation bias which
results from the fact that the rating aggregates large quantities of information resulting in loss of
information associated with aggregation. The second weakness is self induced bias which arises
during the coding of the indices, resulting in less precise ratings (Bollen and Paxton, 2000 and
7Note that for some countries like the US and Canada, the dataset is available from 1800 to 2015.
8Building on the earlier work undertaken by Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001), these authors compute long term
institutional indicators for Tanzania (1884-2008), Namibia (1884-2008), Zimbabwe (1946-2006), and Malawi (1964-
1994).
9The formal legislative history and legal framework here refer to Acts of Parliament, and Amendments to already
existing statutes as well as proclamations and parliamentary approved directives issued under the aegis of enabling
legislation.
10This approach meets North’s requirement that institutions be durable and measured by a set of formal legislation
governing immovable property and constitutionally guaranteed political and civil liberties.
11For detailed methodology on how changes in legislative framework affects our indices, refer to the Institutional
Index Computation Methodology/User’s Guide attached to this thesis as appendix to Chapter 2)
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Luiz et al., 2011). To minimize these weaknesses, we follow steps proposed by Bollen and Pax-
ton (2000). These steps involve: (i) The development of a theoretical definition of the concept
measured, (ii). Identifying sub-components, (iii) setting the rating scale for sub-components, (iv).
Collection of rating information, (v) Rating of sub-components using the Delphi technique in
which a team of experts assigns scores to each of the sub-components on an annual basis, (vi).
Presentation of indices for validation to an independent panel of experts.
To increase the credibility of our measured institutional indices, we assess an extent to which
these indices reflect the de-facto behaviour of agents in the country. We provide narrative discus-
sions on whether the measured legal framework was actually applied in the Country. To do so we
rely on events that happened in Kenya to capture the de-facto behavior and power. We try as much
as possible to obtain the events that happened in the economy following the passing of legal in-
struments. We consider only those events that relate closely to the passing of the legal instrument.
The choice of these events is based on available documented information. However, we acknowl-
edge the possibility of omitted events that might have not been recorded/ documented. From
the narrative discussions of these events we found that the de-facto evidence closely tracks the
de-jure institutions with a lag. This close relationship between our measured de-jure institutions
and de-facto evidence increases the credibility of our indices given also that de-facto measures of
institutions have remained very difficult to construct.
To further increase credibility of our indices we compute the Spear-man correlation coefficients to
investigate the extent to which our measures of (i) Property Rights (Freehold and Non-Freehold),
and (ii) Political Rights and Civil Liberties (PrCL) correlate with the Heritage Foundation Prop-
erty Rights index, the Freedom House indices for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, and the
Polity IV index of political rights and civil liberties. It must however be noted that the Kenya in-
dex is build up from a careful examination of the central institutional changes and the subsequent
events that occurred in the country, following a much different methodology than those of these
other indices. Ex-ante it was not clear that different indices would be correlated. Second, our
index is transparent about the events that drive it, making interpretation of subsequent analysis
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much more clear. We found a very close association between our indices and these conventional
indicators.
2.3.1 Identification of an Ideal State of Rights
Property Rights Index
Our definition of property rights follows Demsetz (1967) who defines them as the liberty or per-
mission to enjoy benefits of wealth while assuming the costs which the benefits entail. This
definition of property rights is more preferred to other later definitions such as those by Barzel
(1989), and Alchian (1965) because it keeps the legalistic connotation of property rights. This
is deemed more relevant in our context given that the essay attempts to measure property rights
from the legal perspective. This definition of property rights is in contrast to Barzel’s definition
which disconnects property rights from any legal connotation arguing that the law is of course
relevant for enforcement, but not for the definition of the concept itself. Moreover according to
Barzel a property right is essentially an expected stream of net utility. In the interest of compa-
rability of institutional indicators with those produced in earlier studies, we adopt the conceptual
framework used in Gwenhamo et al. (2008). This framework borrows from Honore’s definition
of full liberal ownership and provides an ideal set of property rights. This ideal set of property
rights is proposed by Fedderke et al. (2001) and is composed of 7 components. Thus, (i) the Right
to Possess; (ii) the Right to use; (iii) the Right to manage; (iv) the Right to capital; (v) the Right
to security; (vi) the Incident of transmissibility and (vii) Liability to execution.
Political Rights and Civil Liberties Index (Political Democracy Index)
Our definition of political democracy follows Bollen (1980) who defines political democracy as
the extent to which political power of the elites is minimized and that of the non-elites is max-
imized. In this context, political power refers to the ability to control the national governing
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system. It is therefore the relative balance of power between elites and non-elites that determines
the degree of political democracy. Where non-elites have little control over the elites, political
democracy is low and where the elites are accountable to the non-elites, political democracy is
higher. Bollen (1986) further shows that political rights and political liberties reflect the polit-
ical power of these two groups. Thus political rights and political liberties are two dimensions
of political democracy, which remain to a large extent inseparable. The definition of democracy
by Bollen is more preferred because it emphasizes the direct rule by citizens which then implies
preservation of at least three basic dimensions of democracy: Protection of rights and civil liber-
ties of society; elections and citizen’s right to vote and independence of three arms of government.
Sartori (1987) adds an interesting dimension to the definition of democracy. He argues that polit-
ical democracy is a system in which no one can choose himself, no one can invest himself with
power to rule and therefore no one arrogate to himself unconditional and unlimited power. The
latter definition embraces the notion of limited arbitrary power of the executive.
In the interest of comparability of institutional indicators with those on political and civil liber-
ties measurement, we again follow Gwenhamo et al. (2008) who set the standard normative ideal
criteria against which the rating should be done. In this context, we assess the extent to which the
Kenyan legal framework (the Constitution, Acts of Parliament, Amendments and Statutory Instru-
ments) provides for the following rights and freedoms: (1).Voting rights/franchise; (2) Freedom of
Association; (3). Freedom of Assembly; (4). Freedom of Expression; (5). Extension of Arbitrary
Executive Power; (6). Freedom of Movement; (7). Independence of the judiciary and Legislature;
(8). Academic Freedom; (9). Limit of Government Secrecy/ indemnity; (10). Due process of law;
(11). Freedom of religion; (12). Others, which is a residual category that captures all rights and
freedoms relating to political freedom and rights that cannot be classified under any of the specific
dimensions. One key right relates to labour rights which were often repressed during the colonial
period in Kenya, and other African countries in general. We only consider political rights and
civil liberties for the majority of the population but we are aware that it would have been ideal
to have computed separate indices for both the majority population and minority groups such as
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white settlers12.
2.3.2 Scaling and Rating
Our scaling and weighting criteria follows Zaaruka and Fedderke (2011b) and Gwenhamo et al.
(2008). The scaling is performed on a range from 0 to 100 points for all institutional indicators,
where 100 represents an ideal state of property rights being guaranteed under respective tenure
regimes and 0 represents a complete absence of the right. The overall index in the case of property
rights (both freehold and non-freehold) is composed of sub-components which are given different
weights depending on their relative importance in an index. Ownership sub-component is as-
signed a weight of 20.Other sub-components that are more important in the overall index are each
assigned a weight of 15 while the remaining are assigned a weight of 10. Similarly, for the polit-
ical and civil liberties index, scaling is performed on a range from 0 to 100 points but a slightly
different weighting is used. The first eight of the twelve sub-components are each assigned a
weight of 10 and the other four are each assigned a weight of 5. In constructing each index, the
sub-components are then summed up to give the overall status of the quality of the index across
time.
Increases in the scores on sub-components indicate a move towards recognition of a specific
right, and decreases indicate a move away from an ideal state in the system. Gwenhamo et al.
(2008) note that in the case of political and civil liberties, an index ranging from 51 to 74 implies
reasonable recognition of civil and political rights and some constraints on arbitrary government
power, but may well include discriminatory laws related to various freedoms. If the arbitrariness
of state power is only slightly constrained and the legal provisions of personal freedoms are weak,
a country scores between 38 and 50, while a score between 13 and 37 indicates a state whose rights
structure grants great arbitrary power to the state and most of the individual rights and freedoms
are not recognized. Finally, a score ranging from 0 to 12 indicates a de-jure “totalitarian” state.
12Note that this is a worthwhile endeavor for future research
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The weights used in Kenya are similar to those used by Fedderke et al. (2001) and Gwenhamo
et al. (2012) for South Africa and Zimbabwe respectively. We have decided to use the same for
the purpose of undertaking comparative studies.
2.3.3 Validation of De-jure Indices and their Relation to the De-facto Evidence
The constructed institutional indicators were validated by a team of four experts drawn from the
Constitutional Law and Economic History at two universities in Kenya and University of South
Africa. Professor Simuyu Vincent who is an expert in History from University of Nairobi and
Professor Ben Sihanya who is an expert in Intellectual Property, Constitutionalism & Education
Law from University of Nairobi Law School, were chosen from Kenya while Professor Mahao
Nqosa who is an expert in Constitutional law and Associate Professor Mosito Kananelo who is
an expert in law were chosen from South Africa. The purpose of validation was to check whether
the indicators adequately capture the items which they are supposed to measure satisfactory. The
choice of the experts was purely non-subjective since we submitted a request to the relevant uni-
versities to appoint experts in Constitutional Law and Economic History who could comment on
our indices. We did not have any information ex-ante regarding their opinion and affiliation to
any political institution or organization that could jeopardize their assessment of the computed
indices. Given the process through which these experts were chosen, we consider such experts
to be relatively free of bias. It must also be noted that the choice of a mixture of experts from
two different countries (i.e. Kenya and South Africa) for validation was meant to act as a cross
validation check of opinions on the indices and this also served to reduce bias to some degree.
There was also no payment for validation except a small token of appreciation made after receiv-
ing validation reports, and this preserved their independent point of view. The comments from
these experts were then incorporated accordingly.
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2.3.4 Assumptions underlying our Indices
Our measurement of institutions is based on a number of assumptions: First we assume that the
effect of institutions are due both to their substantial content and their factual implementation.
Based on this assumption, we trace the implementation of rules through events analysis that we
provide in our narrative discussions. The implication of this assumption as pointed out by Voigt
(2013, 2007) is that both de-jure and de-facto institutions need to be measured; otherwise, it is
impossible to separate the substantive content of a rule from the effect of enforcing a rule. Thus
neglecting to measure de-jure institutions implies that all of them are completely identical which is
not the case. Although we do not provide de-facto measurement, we provide narrative discussions
to assess an extent to which the measured rules were enforced. (b) We assume that constraining
effect of institutions largely depends on their factual implementation and enforcement. This again
is provided for in our narrative discussions. In fact, in the context of Kenya, rules past largely
reflected the behavior of political actors and to some large extent de-jure rules were followed by
de-facto enforcement with a lag. Again this assumption follows the suggestion by Voigt (2013)
that “measures of institutions aiming at including the factual enforcement of institutions need
to reflect the behaviour of enforcers” (c) We further assume that factual behavior is likely to be
determined by more than one institution hence we attempt to include most potential institutions by
disaggregating our indices into sub-components. By doing so, we believe we are able to identify
those institutions that drive the effects from those that are only marginally relevant. However,
at the end we still sum up the sub-components into one index, their individual measurement is
reported.
2.4 Results and Discussions
2.4.1 Political Institutions in Kenya: a Historical Perspective
Historical Context
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In pre-colonial times, the political landscape of the territory that has become known as Kenya
was diverse. The interior was inhabited by indigenous African communities whose ancestors mi-
grated from various parts of the continent. Some communities, such as the Ogiek were hunters
and gatherers. Some such as the Agikuyu and the Miji Kenda developed agricultural economies
while others, including the Maasai and the Samburu practiced pastoralist forms of production
(Mosley, 1980; Ochieng and Maxon, 1992). Yet, other groups such as the Luo and the Abagusii
developed an economy based on crop cultivation and livestock keeping. Production was primarily
for collective subsistence rather than individual accumulation. The kinship system was the basis
of ownership of factors of production which included land, livestock and labour. Communities
were often acephalous or segmented as there was little inclination for large-scale state formation
(Brantley, 1981). Instead the largest political unit was the collectivity of a few families related
by blood. These groups were typically organized in a hierarchical manner under the leadership of
chiefs, or elders whose role (among other things) was to arbitrate over intricate matters affecting
members of their communities. The coastal regions on the other hand have a very different his-
tory. They were inhabited by the Swahili people, originally Bantu speaking groups that over the
centuries had mixed with Arab traders, to form a unique city-based fusion of African and Arab
culture and language.13 Between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, coastal city states
such as Mombasa, Malindi, Pate, Lamu was under Portuguese control before succumbing to the
domination of the Omani Sultan of Zanzibar in the nineteenth century. The economic activity
revolved around trade of ivory, cotton, silk, ceramics, jewelry, spices and slaves (Ochieng and
Maxon, 1992).
The Berlin conference in 1884-1885 set the rules of colonial occupation and marked the start
of the scramble for Africa by European powers. British and Germans who expressed interest in
East African territories signed the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement by which Germany would lay
claim on the Coast of present day Tanzania while Britain would retain present day Kenya and
Uganda. Initially, the British government granted a concession for the administration of these ter-
13Historically, The Swahili people could be found as far North as Mogadishu (Somalia) and as far south as the
Ruvuma River (Mozambique).
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ritories to a chartered commercial company-the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC)
(Hindlip, 1905). The territory under administration was larger than any Western-European coun-
try and stretched from the Eastern Coast of Africa to the Kingdom of Buganda, nearly 639,000
km2. The Company’s main responsibility was to ensure the exportation of goods and agricultural
produce, and to facilitate the construction of a railway connecting the Coast (Mombasa) to Lake
Victoria (the so-called Uganda railway) that cost the Treasury an amount of 5.5 million pounds
(Galbraith, 1972). After the IBEAC collapsed in 1895, the British Foreign Office took over the
administration and proclaimed a protectorate over the British East Africa—the East Africa Pro-
tectorate. The imperial strategy upon assuming power was unclear beyond securing the recovery
of the funds sunk into the construction of the Uganda railway. Later the primary objective was
effective occupation and the development of a self-financing settler dominated economy based
on agricultural production and exports. As we will see later, the institutions upon which this
objective rests involved land alienation for European settlers who actually held political power,
African taxation, and African migrant and forced labour, and the weakening of political rights and
civil liberties of natives. The discussions that follow will present first the development of civil
and political liberties in Kenya since 1895 to 2010. A discussion will follow on the evolution of
property rights which was framed by the desire to alienate land for European settlers who held
de-facto political power in this economy during the same period.
Development of Civil and Political Liberties during the Protectorate Era (1895-1920) in Kenya
In 1895, Britain declared dominion over the East Africa Protectorate (what later became Kenya)
with its headquarters in Mombasa (Anderson, 2000). The advent of British rule in 1895 changed
the political landscape in Kenya. A number of laws, regulations and orders restricting political
rights and civil liberties were introduced.14 As early as 1897, the East Africa Order in Council,
No.14 vested all powers to make laws for the administration of the protectorate in the hands
14Note that regulations were passed prior to 1895 that affected primarily people who were residing under the au-
thority of Sultan of Zanzibar.
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of the Commissioner.15 The Order in Council established a formal judicial system in Kenya,
and marked the first step towards constitutional dispensation, and it granted the Commissioner
powers to legislate over matters relating to customs. Thus, the Native Courts Regulations of 1897
empowered the Commissioner to make rules for administration of “Native courts” , including
alterations to any native law or custom. In addition, the Commissioner was granted extensive
powers of detention, deportation and restrictions on the freedom of movement of Africans through
the enactment of the Native Courts Regulations No.15 of 1897. These laws were formalized in
1908 through the Removal of Natives Ordinance, No.17 of 1908 (which was succeeded by No.18
of 1909). The restrictive laws were consistent with the Vagrancy Ordinance of 1896 and were
the precursor of the African Passes Ordinance of 1900 which aimed at controlling the natives’
freedom of movement between rural areas and urban centers as well as within urban centers.
To further strengthen the commissioner’s control of movement of natives, the Vagrancy16 Ordi-
nance of 1896 and African Passes Ordinance of 1900 were passed. The Vagrancy law and the
African Passes Ordinance were formal legislation meant to control the movement of indigenous
people , and to limit their behaviour and access to the places that were reserved for British settlers.
The Vagrancy Ordinance in combination with Labour Regulations of 1898 were also used as a
tool to direct African labourers to the growing number of European settlers requiring labour on
their agricultural estates (Beier and Ocobock, 2008). The promulgation of these discriminatory
laws that curtailed the freedom of the African majority is responsible for the decline of the civil
liberties and political freedom in the first decade of British rule. See Figure 2.1. A Figure plotting
the aggregate political and civil liberties index and its sub-components are shown in Appendix A,
Figure 2.9 and 2.1017.
15An Order in Council is an order issued by the British monarch or the Governor-general upon the advice of the
Privy Council.
16According to these laws, a vagrant was anyone found asking alms or wandering about without any job or visible
means of subsistence. Those suspected of vagrancy by police could be arrested without warrant, imprisoned for up to
three months. While incarcerated, vagrants were put to work until they had earned enough to pay for repatriation.
17In recognition of the fact that prior to 1895, the political landscape in Kenya allowed for free movement of natives
and permitted other civil liberties although there was no universal suffrage, we assume our political and civil index to
start rating at some non-zero value. Caution must also be made from the onset that the index represents the de-jure
political rights and freedoms within the enacted legislation, and is not intended to capture whether or not legislation
was actually applied. On the same note, the index does not separate political rights from civil liberties since the two
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Political Rights and Civil Liberties in Kenya, 1884-2010
None of these laws applied to the settlers who exerted considerable pressure to secure politi-
cal representation and have a greater say in the decision-making processes of the Protectorate
(Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). In response to the settlers’ demands, the British government
established a new Chamber in 1905, the Legislative Council (LEGCO), responsible for making
laws in the Protectorate.18 It was exclusively composed of European settlers and administrators.
In 1913 the settlers were given the right to elect their own representatives to the Legislative Coun-
cil. In contrast, Africans were denied the right to elect members to the LEGCO or to be elected
to this council (Brantley, 1981). By 1919, this state of affairs was legitimized by the Legislative
Council Ordinance No. 16 which stipulated that only literate British subjects who spoke English,
and owned property of a certain value could vote and/or stand for elections. Needless to say
Africans did not meet these requirements and were de facto disenfranchised.
are not fully independent. Finally, the index recognizes the likely commensurability issue because of the lengthy span
under which it is computed given that Kenya went through a series of political and legal regime shifts which make it
difficult to assume unified political system.
18The LEGCO was established through Order in Council of 1905 and Royal Instruction of 1907.
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Given the competing interests of settlers and natives, it is not surprising that the establishment
of the LEGCO did not improve the political rights of the latter group. Between 1905 and 1920,
further restrictive laws were passed that controlled various aspects of the life of the natives. In
particular, laws curtailing freedom of movement and regulating labour relations were critical for
the development of the settler’ economy. Facing the Africans’ reluctance to work for the settlers,
the colonial authorities enacted the Hut Tax Regulations of 1901, not only as a public finance
instrument, but also as a device to force Africans to offer labour to the settler economy. The tax
was charged on all huts used as dwellings at a rate of 2 rupees per year. It was subsequently raised
to 3 rupees from 1903. By 1910, a poll tax was also formally introduced through the Native Hut
and Poll Tax Ordinance (No. 2) of 1910. The requirement for tax payment in cash or labour
implied that the natives, given their limited cash holdings, had to work for the settlers to meet
their tax obligations. The European attitude toward these taxes is well summed up by a quote
from a prominent settler,Lord Hindlip:
“I am sure that as far as possible taxes should be paid entirely in labour or in cash.
A demand for cash should be created among the natives, who would then have to
obtain coin in order to pay their taxes.” Lord Hindlip, 1905.
In most instances these laws were passed in response to demands from the settlers. For instance,
following pressure from settlers, the Native Porters and Labour Regulations of 1902 gave employ-
ers authority to forcefully impose terms of service on their employees and insured them against
employees’ desertion.19 Similarly, the enactment of the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1906
and its subsequent amendments tightened the constraints upon African workers20. This law added
to the severity of the penalty for breach of contract by making desertion a cognizable offense.The
police were allowed to arrest deserters without a warrant (Anderson, 2000). By banning the
19The natives who served as porters in transportation of goods throughout the Protectorate were not allowed to desert
work. Should they do so, they would be liable to hefty fines.
20Its subsequent amendments were made in 1912, 1915, 1916, 1918 and 1919 but in the main, these amendments
just tightened the constraints upon employees and added to the severity of punishment, making desertion an offense, al-
lowing the police to arrest deserters without a warrant and increasing the penalties for breach of contract (see Anderson
(2000)).
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formation of trade unions, these laws also constituted a serious limitation to the freedom of as-
sociation. These laws eroded employees’ freedom of choice and liberty21. They further limited
freedom of association since they banned the formation of trade unions. During the same period,
the settlers used the Poll and Hut Tax Ordinances of 190122 as a way to force the natives to work
on their plantations because generally natives had little incentive to work for settlers who had
expropriated their land (Brantley, 1981). This forced labour limited rights enjoyed natives as
they were forcefully made to work. Thus, under the pretence of monitoring more efficiently the
supply of labour, this system ensured a very tight control on the natives’ freedom of movement
and labour rights.This led to a decline in our political rights and civil liberties index.
By 1912, the demand for labour in the newly established British settlers’ plantations, and public
works had risen substantially. To meet this demand, the Native Authority Ordinance of 1912 was
passed, which empowered local chiefs and headmen to introduce forced labour. Labourers were
forced to work up to 60 days a year for lower wages than voluntary workers in public works such
as railway construction and portage. The forced labour policy was complemented by the intro-
duction of the Native Registration Ordinance (No.15) of 1915 (Kipande). This law required all
African males aged 15 and above to wear around their neck an identity document (Kipande) that
recorded their personal details and their employment history. Those in breach of their contracts
were arrested, flogged and imprisoned. In addition, the criminalization of organized labour, and
the Kipande system ensured that wages remained low as workers could be imprisoned for de-
manding wage increase or better working conditions (Kinyatti, 2008). Thus, under the pretense
of monitoring the supply of labour more efficiently, this system ensured a tight control on the
natives’ freedom of movement and labour rights. The passage of these labour laws is reflected in
a decline in our index.
Towards the end of the protectorate period, freedom of expression of Africans was also limited by
the colonial government through the extensive use of sedition and censorship laws. For instance,
21For instance, the natives who were serving as porters in transportation of goods throughout the protectorate were
not allowed to desert work, if they did, they were to be fined heavily.
22The compulsory tax in the protectorate had to be paid in cash and given that natives had limited “cash holdings”,
it meant that they had to work in order to get some wages so that they could pay compulsory tax obligations.
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the Newspaper Ordinance of 1906 and the British Protectorate (Defence) Order in Council (No.
181) of 1916 empowered the Governor to declare any publication seditious, and to prohibit the
importation into the protectorate of any newspaper, book, or document deemed seditious. This
order was part of the emergency measures introduced during the First World War (1914-1918).
It increased the arbitrary powers of the Governor who was given (i) the authority to authorize
the trial of civilians by court martial (Wanjala and Kibwana, 1997); and (ii) the authority to
appropriate and control Africans’ property23.
Political and Institutional Trajectories during the Colonial Era (1920-1963):Civil Rights and
Political Liberties
During the 1920s, political associations emerged24 that sought to represent Africans on the polit-
ical and social front. The natives became increasingly more vocal in demanding direct political
representation (Kinyatti, 2008). The colonial authorities granted some concessions by enacting
the Local Authority Ordinance (Amendment) of 1924 that established the Local Native Councils
(LNCs) as the organ of representation for Africans. Despite some improvement in the freedom of
association and assembly, this legislation was mainly tokenistic since the LNCs were under tight
government control. Its members were appointed by the European field officers and remained
under the authority of the district Commissioner.
Meanwhile new laws such as the Special Districts (Administration) Ordinance of 1934 extended
colonial administrators’ power to arrest, restrain, and detain natives and seize their property. Col-
lective punishment for offenses committed by fellow tribesmen was legalized by the 1933 Stock
and Produce Theft Ordinance (No.18) in response to rising cattle raiding and theft experienced by
European settlers. However, the struggle for political rights and civil liberties intensified with the
creation of numerous political movements (Young Kavirondo Association, Kavirondo Tax payers
Association, Kikuyu Central Association, Kenya African Study Union, and the Kenya African
Union) (Berman and Lonsdale, 1992). This pressure resulted in the repeal of the Native Passes
23The powers of this Order in Council were lifted in 1919 when the war ended.
24For instance, the East Africa Association (EAA) and the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA) were formed in
1921 and 1922 respectively.
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Ordinance of 1900 in 1942 which allowed free movement of labour. In 1944, the colonial gov-
ernment nominated Eliud Mathu as the first African representative in the LEGCO in an attempt to
quell some of the demands of the Kenyan political movements. The number of African represen-
tatives in the LEGCO subsequently rose to four in 1948 and six in 1952. Meanwhile emergency
powers were afforded to the Governor during and after the Second World War by the Emergency
Powers Order in Council of 1939 and the Emergency Powers Ordinance, No.12 of 1948.
The failure of the political movements to attain any significant reforms from the colonial author-
ities shifted the political initiative to younger and more militant figures. Years of conciliatory
rhetoric but little substantive action from the colonial government showed its limits in 1952, as
the Mau-Mau uprising began(Kinyatti, 2008). Mau-Mau was an armed local political movement
directed principally against the colonial government and the European settlers(Kinyatti, 2008).
The movement was Kikuyu-dominated although it is commonly believed that it represented the
nationalist struggle against land expropriation and colonial rule. As the uprising began, the Gover-
nor declared a state of emergency (Mau-Mau Emergency Regulations of 1952) with broad powers
to amend, revoke or suspend any detention orders. Prior to the conflict, the Public Order Ordi-
nance of 1950 and Penal Code Amendment (No.2) of 1950 had made forced oaths illegal and
liable to death sentence25. The application of these laws increased during the uprising (Wanjala
and Kibwana, 1997). Suspected members of the Mau-Mau movement or individuals speaking
openly against discrimination and the repressive colonial policies were detained without trial over
a number of years. Thus, over 50 000 Africans were detained and over 4 000 were sentenced to
death (Wanjala and Kibwana, 1997).
The colonial government had a two-pronged strategy that consisted of (i) defeating militarily the
resistance movement; and (ii) placating the majority of the African population by making conces-
sions to reduce support for the Mau-Mau. After a four-year war (1952-1956) the British eventu-
ally defeated the Mau-Mau resistance. The war was particularly costly to the Kikuyu populations
25The Mau-Mau oaths The oath was generally characterized by the following: (1) it was militant and implicitly
threatened violence against Europeans and those who betrayed the movement, and (2) it was compulsory and people
taking the it were not allowed to leave. If they do, they would be beaten and threatened with death.
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who were forcefully deported and resettled in “protected villages” which according to Anderson
“were little more than concentration camps to punish Mau-Mau sympathizers” (Anderson, 2005).
Thus, more than a million civilians “were corralled, often against their will, into settlements be-
hind barbed-wire fences and watch towers” (French, 2011) and faced under-nourishment and
disease. Towards the end of the conflict the colonial authorities made a number of social and po-
litical concessions: (i) land reform increased African land-holding while relaxing the ban on the
production of coffee and cash crops; (ii) African unions were authorized to support wages; and
(iii) in 1954, Africans were permitted to participate in politics as per the recommendations of the
British Parliamentary delegation that visited Kenya during that period. The first general elections
held in 1957—under the Lyttleton Constitution—were characterized however by unsatisfactory
franchise as the suffrage was restricted on the basis of income, education, age, tenure at work,
and military service, which left the majority of Kenyans disenfranchised.
Between 1957 and 1963, British rule practically came to an end with the passing of the Lennox-
Boyd Constitution in 1957 which replaced the Lyttleton Constitution that the natives had rejected.
The Lennox-Boyd Constitution provided for an increased African representation in the LEGCO
and in the Council of Ministers. It further provided for an undiluted democracy based on universal
franchise and respect for the rights of all individuals regardless of their race. In 1960, negotiations
for self-governance were initiated during the first Lancaster Constitutional Conference in Britain.
The subsequent conferences (second and third) ushered the independence Constitution of Kenya.
Evidently, the end of colonial rule would witness a shift of political and economic power to the
indigenous population. But what would be the resulting political, economic and institutional
order?
Independent Kenya’s Political and Institutional Trajectory: Civil Rights and Political Liberties
In 1963, the Independence Constitution established a federal government popularly known as
majimbo with an executive, and an independent judiciary with security of tenure. The Constitution
established an independent Electoral Commission, a multiparty system of government, a Bill
of Rights and Freedoms, and safeguards for minority rights and political devolution of power
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to the country’s regions. The first general elections were held in Kenya, and for the first time
universal adult suffrage was exercised (Hornsby, 2013). The new constitutional dispensation
guaranteed the separation of powers and the protection of the fundamental rights of all citizens.
Our index rises during this period reflecting the move towards the recognition of political rights
and civil liberties in Kenya. However, during the post-independence period, and under the new
political rule by the indigenous population, a number of amendments to the Constitutions would
the be passed and these amendments would set in place a new political, economic and institutional
order. This new state of affairs would then see reversals in the constitutional provisions of the
Independence Constitution as self interested politicians dismantle the constitution to serve their
interest. In the process they created a “limited access orders” in which the political rights and
civil liberties of ordinary Kenyans were undermined.
Soon after independence, Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta (1964-1978) dismantled the par-
liamentary system and established a centralized presidential regime in which the President con-
centrated most powers in himself at the expense of Parliament and the Judiciary. Amendments to
the Constitution ensured the abolition of the Senate and the curtailment of decentralization and
devolution26. The 1964 and 1966 Amendments27 to the constitution in particular granted exten-
sive powers to the executive. These included the power to detain people without trial, to appoint
and dismiss public servants28, to create and abolish offices in the public service without neces-
sarily consulting the Public Service Commission and special emergency powers—granted by the
Preservation of Public Security Act No.189 of 1966—without approval of Parliament. The Preser-
vation of Public Security Act empowered the President to exercise special emergency powers that
could lead to curtailing the freedoms of movement, assembly and expression. By 1969, Kenya
became a de facto a one-party state when the Constitution was once again amended with a view to
suppressing the new opposition party (KPU) formed by the deserted members of the ruling Kenya
African National Union (KANU) (Gibbon, 1995)29.In 1975, the Constitution Amendment Act
26See the Act No.40 of 1966 and Act No.16 of 1968
27see Act No.14 of 1964 and Act No.17 of 1966
28The Act provided that all persons serving in the public service did so at the pleasure of the President.
29The Constitution of Kenya Constitutional Amendment Act No.17 of 1966 provided that members of the National
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No.14 allowed the President to overturn any court decision that found electoral offenses against
his favoured candidates, thereby subverting the principle of free and fair elections.30 Thus, during
Kenyatta administration, the Constitution was repeatedly under attack to suit the interests of the
ruling elites who soon reverted to the authoritarian structure of governance of the colonial era
(M’Inoti, 1991).
Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta in 1978. The early years of his presidency (1978-1992)
marked a period when the executive showed even deeper contempt for the Constitution (Wanjala,
2000). Although, constitutional amendments were fewer, they were more far reaching. Some
of these amendments completely altered the constitutional architecture of Kenya and severely
undermined the enforceability of the Bill of Rights. President Moi’s reign was characterized by
relentless effort to curtail citizen’s rights and freedoms, and a systematic assault on the judiciary
(Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, 2005). In 1982, Kenya became a one-party state de
jure through the passing of the Constitutional Amendment Act No.7 of 198231. This amendment
undermined any pretensions of Kenya’s commitment to democratic principles. It outlawed all
forms of political opposition and gave KANU-the then ruling party, the monopoly of power. In
effect, the holding of political office as well as the right to vote were conditional on being a
member of KANU32. As a result, the majority of Kenyans were disenfranchised. Moreover, the
President’s arbitrary powers were further extended by the Constitutional Amendment Act No.14
of 1986. This Act empowered Moi to appoint and dismiss the Attorney General, the Controller
and Auditor General, the Judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The security of
tenure for these public offices and the separation of power of the executive from the judiciary
were severely undermined.
Assembly who had resigned from the party on whose ticket they stood for elections had to vacate their seats and seek
a new mandate from the electorates. This amendment was intended to respond to the outflow of sitting members of
parliament from KANU to Kenya People’s Union (KPU). The formation of KPU was led by Jaramogi Odinga Odinga
who has served as a vice-president from 1964 until he resigned in 1966.
30This amendment was allegedly passed to redeem Paul Ngei, a close friend of President Jomo Kenyatta, who was
found guilty of election offenses ((Wanjala and Kibwana, 1997)).
31See Section 2A of the amendment
32The constitutional amendment was motivated by leaked information that George Anyona and Oginga Odinga had
intented to form a new political party.
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After an attempted coup d’etat in 1982 by junior officers of the Kenyan Air Force, the country
experienced a period of great political tension and repression33. During this period, there were
massive public demonstrations against the one-party state, the incarceration of many Kenyans
who were regarded as a threat to state security, and the killing of many citizens during public
demonstrations. At the height of this state of repression, Kenya passed the Constitution Amend-
ment Act No.20 of 1987. This Act made all capital offenses (e.g. treason, murder, robbery with
violence and attempted murder) non-bailable. In so doing, the Legislature actually interfered with
the the presumption of innocence and the Judiciary’s discretion to award bail and it compromised
judicial independence and impartiality. Likewise, the 1988 Constitution amendment ( Amend-
ment Act, No.4) further eroded the rights of suspects and accused persons by authorizing the
police to hold suspects of capital offenses for up to 14 days before they appear in court, instead
of 24 hours provided in earlier versions of the constitution.
By 1992, the assault on freedom and political rights under Moi’s presidency had turned Kenya into
an authoritarian State (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008). This led to agitation for reforms which
were headlined by calls for the introduction of a multiparty state. In 1992, a group of Kenyan
politicians and the international community and religious leaders exerted considerable pressure
on the government for political reforms. The government, at the time, was dependent on donor
funding and the donor community threatened to cancel aid and budgetary support unless reforms
were carried out (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008). Consequently, the government repealed section
2A of the Constitution, which then returned the country to multiparty democracy. The return to
multiparty democracy was accompanied by other fundamental amendments which provided for
the fundamental rights of the citizens. These included the repeal of the Chief’s Authority Act of
1994; the Public Order Bill of 1994; the Preservation of Security (Amendment) Bill of 1994 and
the Elections Offenses Act of 1998. The Preservation of the Public Security Act had allowed for
indefinite detention without trial and restriction on freedom of movement and the Chiefs Authority
Act had given local administration chiefs immense power to restrict the freedom of movement
33This repression has been officially acknowledged by the government. It is part of the terms of reference for the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Several suits have been filed against the government seeking compensation.
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and association of their subjects. The repeal of the Public Order Act removed all restrictions on
freedom of association, assembly and expression. Later President Moi introduced the Peaceful
Assemblies Bill as a replacement for the Public Order Act. However the new Bill still restricted
the free assembly, association and operation of groups in Kenya.
During the same period, further Constitutional amendments were made to restore the security of
tenure for judges of the High Court and the court of Appeal and the Attorney General, and mem-
bers of the Public Service Commission. These amendments included legal aid scheme for victims
of human rights violations(Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, 2005). In 2002, the Po-
litical Parties Act of 2002 was passed to provide for the formation and registration of political
parties in Kenya. This ensured that every citizen who has attained the age of eighteen years or
older had the right to, (i) participate in political activities which are intended to influence the com-
position and policies of the Government and (b) to join any political party of his own choice. The
Act further strengthened people’s freedom of association and freedom of assembly and suffrage
in the country. Towards the end of 2002, the Societies Act was amended to allow for freedom to
register lawful organizations and political parties. These lawful organizations and political parties
had been denied registration in the past.
Following this series of amendments, the Constitution was viewed as a patchwork of political
expediency and people had lost confidence in its validity and legitimacy as a tool for governance,
and protection of human rights for all. This led to a call for a complete review of the Constitution.
The review process was intended to entrench accountability and transparency, ensure democracy
and the widest political participation of the people.34. In 2002, the new government under the
leadership of President Mwai Kibaki was elected on the platform of further Constitutional reforms
and the fight against corruption. However, after assuming power, the government lost its reformist
zeal. There was little support for reducing the powers of the presidency. However, the Law
Society of Kenya, Civil Society, the Donor Community and Church Leaders and some members
of the public exerted further pressure on government to facilitate the constitutional review process
34Note that when Constitutions are framed and adopted, they tend to reflect the dominant beliefs and interest, or
some compromise between conflicting beliefs and interests, which are characteristics of the society at the time.
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(Branch and Cheeseman, 2008; Fahnbulleh, 2006). In 2004, the Constitution of Kenya Review
Act was passed to provide for a mandatory referendum to ratify a new Constitution, yet the review
process appeared to be a tall order with resistance from many organized interest groups. It was
only the post-election crises of 2007 and the scale of national violence that expedited the review
process. The crisis demonstrated that getting the new Constitutional was no longer an option but
a necessity.
Soon after the post-election crisis, Kenya passed two substantive laws: The Constitution of Kenya
Review Act of 2008 and the Constitution of Kenya Amendment Act of 2008. These two laws set
the procedure for the replacement of the constitution through a referendum in which the elec-
torate was to ratify or reject the proposed constitution. The former Act also made provisions for
the completion of the review process. In August 2010, Kenyans exercised their sovereign right by
overwhelmingly adopting the new Constitution. This exercise marked the end of a long journey
towards a new constitutional dispensation. This Constitution is as a result of the struggle of mil-
lion of Kenyans who desired fundamental changes in political, social and economic governance.
The new Constitution was passed along with a number of repeal Acts such as the Indemnity Re-
peal Act of 2010 and Official Secrets Act of 2009 (Repeal). The new Constitutions reaffirms the
existing political and civil rights of all Kenyans. It provides for a comprehensive realization of
the state of rights and civil liberties of the people in the country. It subjects the Executive, the
Judiciary and the Legislature to strong checks and balances. No longer is any organ of state above
the law. It is therefore not a surprise that Kenyans overwhelmingly supported the Constitution for
it provided a framework within which the citizens could achieve “protection of life, liberty and
property”.
2.4.2 Evolution of Property Rights Institutions and the Question of Land in Kenya
“The greater part of the wealth of the country [Kenya] is at present in our hands...This land we
have made is our land by right—by right of achievement.” Speech by the Governor of Kenya,
1946
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The land question, which continues to divide Kenya today, has its root in the colonial institu-
tions. In particular, the property rights institutions that were created through the policy of settle-
ment promoted by the colonial government with a view to recouping the investment cost of the
railway network linking Mombasa to Uganda. History suggests that property rights during the
pre-colonial period were governed by customary law—which comprises unwritten customs and
traditions and was based on social and cultural arrangements among community members. In the
customary tenure system, land ownership was vested in the community represented by the council
of elders, clan head or the chief who was in charge of allocating land to individuals or families
(Wanjala, 2000 and Ojienda, 2008). As long as those individuals cultivated their allocated plot,
no one else had the right to use it or to benefit from its produce. Farmers in effect held use rights
only and were unable to alienate or to transfer ownership or the use of that land to anyone else.
The customary property system is at odds with English property law because of its disregard for
individual ownership. It was regarded by colonialists as repugnant to English justice (Sorrenson,
1968). It was also considered as an inferior form of land ownership that discouraged commercial
farming and agricultural development in general (Coldham, 1978). The main argument is that
because of its communal nature the customary tenure system is inherently incapable of accommo-
dating “modern” and capitalistic production methods. As the first Europeans settled in Kenya, the
colonial government introduced the English freehold tenure system to protect the settlers’ land
rights after expropriating these rights from the natives. During British rule (1885-1962), a sub-
stantial body of laws, ordinances and regulations were passed to strengthen the freehold tenure
system while crippling the communal tenure system. This legislation benefited British settlers
and transnational corporations to the detriment of indigenous communities. The property rights
system was instituted along racial lines and legitimized land grabbing and policies that would
entrench the new status quo. For instance, after the expropriation of land from the Kikuyu pop-
ulations, natives were not allowed to own land in the so-called “White Highlands”, neither were
they allowed to cultivate cash crops, nor allowed to own large livestock populations. This intro-
duction of freehold property rights created two distinct property rights systems—communal and
non-freehold rights for Africans and freehold rights for European settlers—that were seemingly
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engaged in a zero-sum interaction. Given these premises, we construct two indicators of property
rights, non freehold and freehold rights.
The Non-Freehold Property Rights
Figure 2.2 plots the non freehold property rights index and its sub-components are shown in
Appendix A, Figure 2.5 and 2.6. The Figure shows that the non freehold property rights index
was relatively stable during the pre-colonial period. No formal laws were enacted and passed
which infringed enjoyment of rights of the people but such rights were limited to user right and
rights of access. Given the limited rights people enjoyed during the pre-colonial period, the non-
freehold index is assumed to start at some non-zero scale.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of Non-freehold Property Rights in Kenya, 1884-2010
Land grabbing by British settlers and the deterioration of the indigenous customary land rights
(1885-1930)
53
In 1885, Kenya became a British protectorate35 following the Berlin Conference that divided
Africa among European powers. During the very early days of imperial rule, the question of land
appropriation was a major concern to colonial administrators because the status of Protectorate
did not carry with it any title to land. To resolve this conundrum on a legal basis, the British
government imported the 1882 Property Act of India to the East Africa Protectorate in 1897.36
This enabled the enactment of the Land Regulations of 1897 and the East Africa Acquisition of
Lands Order in the Council of 1898 that became the stepping stones of the development of the
settler economy in the East Africa Protectorate (Okoth-Ogendo, 1991). The former authorized
the commissioner to issue certificates of occupancy renewable after 21 years, while the latter
stipulated that all land was unowned unless proven otherwise—i.e. unless held under private
ownership—and as such was under the sovereignty and dominion of the British Empire.
The question of the economic sustainability of the railway was another major preoccupation for
the Foreign Office—concerned with the recovery of the 5.5 million pounds spent on the construc-
tion of the railway network. The settlement of European farmers was thus encouraged to ensure
the Treasury received a return on Britain’s investment in the railway. The idea was that settlement
would foster local development and provide a constant flow of commodities to be transported to
the coast for export. However, the existing property rights regime in the Protectorate was con-
sidered unattractive by potential settlers. In 1902, the promotion of European settlement became
an official policy (Ochieng and Maxon, 1992) with the promulgation of the Crown Lands Ordi-
nance. The Ordinance proclaimed that all land in the Protectorate was Crown Land, and as such
belonged to the British government. In addition, wherever Africans vacated or deserted the land,
that land would be considered waste and revert back to the Crown. The alienated land would sub-
sequently be allocated to European settlers who could acquire ownership titles or simply lease the
35Although Kenya was declared a protectorate, the understanding of British Authorities in the protectorate was that
British Crown could deal with land in the territory in such manner as he or she pleased. The legal interpretation of the
order that declared Kenya a protectorate is that there were no indigenous peoples in the territory, and if there were,
their rights were totally irrelevant to Great Britain’s plans for expanding its empire (Ndungu, 2006). Yet, this was
constitutionally incorrect because according to the British law, unless the Crown established an original title to land,
normally as a consequence of sovereignty, it was illegal to make grants of land in fee or under any form of tenure
recognized in British law Sorrenson (1968)
36This Law was originally enacted by the British government to expropriate land in India but was later used in other
protectorates and colonies.
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land on the basis of a 99-year term—instead of 21 years as formerly provided by the Ordinance
of 1897. In conjunction with the East Africa (Lands) Orders in Council of 1895, 1898, 1901, and
the land regulations of 1897, the 1902 ordinance provided a comprehensive legal framework that
governed agricultural, commercial and residential land tenure in the Protectorate. It did not allow,
however, the settlers to hold land for speculative purposes and gave the commissioner the powers
to repossess any land that was not fully paid for.
The land rights of the indigenous people were further undermined by the extension of the Property
Act of India of 1882 to the protectorate in 1897, and the enactment of the East Africa Acquisition
of Lands Order in Council of 1898. This Order in Council declared that all land was unowned
unless proven to be otherwise, and as such was under the sovereignty and dominion of the British
Empire. The exceptions were those lands that had property titles giving ownership to private
persons. This was a greatest challenge for the native people especially the Masai people who
practiced a nomadic way of life and rotational farming, because of the high risk of expropria-
tion. Okoth-Ogendo (1991) notes that this legislation set in motion the development of the settler
economy in the East Africa Protectorate and resulted in the demise of the African economy.
During the period 1900 and 1903, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1901, the Crown Lands Or-
dinance of 1902, No.21 and Land Rules and regulations of 1903 were passed in an attempt to
further strengthen the Crown’s authority over the expropriated lands. The non-freehold index ex-
hibits a sharp decline during this period because these laws deprived indigenous people of their
rights to land and made them tenants at the will of the Crown. The Crown Lands Ordinance of
1901 authorized the Commissioner to sell, grant, lease or dispose of Crown lands37 in the Pro-
tectorate. The Ordinance further permitted the Commissioner to issue temporary certificates of
occupancy to Africans on their own land because all land under non-freehold had been declared
Crown land. Moreover, when Africans ceased to occupy their land, it could be sold or leased as
if it was unoccupied land without any consent of any tribal chief or the owner of land38.
37The East Africa (Lands) Order in Council, 1901, defined Crown lands as all public lands within the East Africa
Protectorate which at that time were subject to the control of his/her Majesty, and all such lands were expropriated
through the application of the Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1882.
38The fact that African were only tenants at will of the Crown is clearly reflected in a number of cases decided
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Between 1908 and 1914, formal segregation in land ownership between British settlers and in-
digenous people was introduced through the enactment of the Crown Lands Bill of 1908 and the
Land Title Ordinance of 1908. These proclamations gave the Governor (as the commissioner
was then called) the power to reserve land from sale, lease or other disposal of land which in his
discretion was required for the use or support of members of the native tribes of the protectorate.
However, the Governor had power at any time to cancel any gazette of such reservations at his
discretion (section 85 of the Ordinance). The arbitrary powers given to the Governor under these
statutes threatened the land rights of indigenous people. This is reflected in Kenya’s lower scores
on our index during this time.
The lowest score on the index during the protectorate period, occurs between 1915 and 1920. This
mainly reflects the passing of the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance, No.22 and the Kenya Annexation
Order in Council of 1920. The Kenya Annexation Order in the Council declared Kenya a British
Colony with consequence that all land was then formally under the jurisdiction of the Crown39.
With these two pieces of legislation, any right to land by an individual native was formally extin-
guished. Their land use, management and produce were affected by the Production and Livestock
Ordinance, No.3 of 1926 and the Agricultural Produce Export Ordinance, No.44 of 1921 which
were used to regulate the production, grading and storage of African produce. These Ordinances
limited the production of livestock and crops, and controlled what crops could be produced by
indigenous people. They thus prevented African property development.
As argued by Bromley and Cernea (1989), the willingness of the colonial state to legitimize and
protect different property regimes is partly explained by the state’s perception of the importance
of the citizens holding different types of property rights. Since promotion of the indigenous
population’s landholding was in conflict with the development of the settler economy, which was
the colonial state’s priority, it was no wonder that the customary property regimes central to the
against Africans when they made claims for their lands which were expropriated. For instance, in the case of Ole
Njogo vs. Attony General (1913-1914).
39The Crown Lands presumably included even land on which huts were built with their appurtenances and land
that lay fallowKinyatti (2008). The protectorate status has seldom prevented the British Government from establishing
institutions that enabled it to expropriate land from indigenous people for white settlement.
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local populations, economy were grossly undermined.
Land Reforms: A move towards the improvement of indigenous property rights (1930-1960)
Towards the end of the 1920s, the British Colonial Office recognized that the settlers would not
have security over the expropriated land which had been allocated to them unless some form of
stable property was established within the African land holdings. This necessitated the British to
pass laws that could improve African’s land rights and can be seen as a strategy pursued in order
to silence them. During the same period, the birth of land politics in which Africans voiced their
land grievances through organized opinion also added pressure on British Colonial Office to pass
land laws meant to improve African land rights. As the pressure mounted, the Native Lands Trust
Ordinance, No.9 and the Native Tribunals Ordinance, No.39 were passed in 1930. These statutory
instruments provided for the security of tenure and protection of the rights (i.e.occupational rights)
of natives in the reserves. They also created the Central Board (Land Trust Board) to control and
administer matters relating to land in African reserves.40 However, all land in those reserves
remained Crown land. An important feature of these laws was that different tribes for whom land
had been reserved had a right of perpetual succession, subject to the power of the Governor.41
The passage of these land laws led to a slight improvement in the rights enjoyed by indigenous
people and this is reflected as higher scores.
Between 1935 and 1942, a number of amendments to the land laws were made that were meant
to improve the rights of the indigenous population in the reserved lands ( i.e. the Native Lands
(Amendment) Ordinance, No.36 of 1934; the Native Lands Trust (Amendment) Ordinance, No.28
of 193842 and No.51 of 1939; the Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, No.27 of 1938. These
amendments followed the recommendations made by the Morris Carter Land Commission that
was set to make inquiry into various land issues in Kenya.43 The amendments empowered the
40The Board never had African representation and consisted entirely of the Europeans
41See section 8, section 15 and 15A of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, No.9 of 1930 and Part II of the Native
Trust Ordinance.
42Section 68 of this ordinance declared that “in respect of the occupation, use, control, inheritance, succession and
disposal of any land situated in the native lands, every native tribe, group, family and individual shall have all the rights
which they enjoy or may enjoy by virtue of existing native law and custom or any subsequent modification thereof...”
43The inquiry included the following matters: (i) the working of the 1930 Native Lands Ordinance, (ii) the needs of
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Governor to make available certain areas of Crown lands for African use then and in time to
come. Furthermore, they set precise boundaries for land reserved for natives and that reserved
for British settlers, thus formally making provisions for segregation based on racial and ethnic
groupings. A large number of Africans were to be formally confined to the newly formed “native
reserves” and control of such reserves was removed from the Crown and vested in the Native
Lands Trust Board. However, all native rights outside the “native reserves” were extinguished44
and the ultimate authority concerning land matters within the jurisdiction of the Board was con-
ferred on the Governor. The passage of these laws led to further improvement in the rights of
indigenous people hence an improvement in our non-freehold property rights index. Nonetheless,
natives could not enjoy their full property rights since during that period Kenya Ordinance No.28
of 1938 was passed to provide for compulsory reduction in the number of stock, flocks or herds
in any of the native lands because the British felt that if Africans owned large flocks within the
limited reserve areas, they would agitate for larger tracks of land expropriated to British settlers.
Between 1943 and 1951, the British consolidated their colonial rule against a tide of compet-
ing political and land claims made by various tribes. The agitation for land rights resulted from
severe population pressures and limited land resources in the native reserves and the continued
dissatisfaction of natives who were barred from owning land in the “Highlands”- areas that were
considered fertile and conducive for agricultural purposes. The squabbles on land issues culmi-
nated in the 1952 Mau-Mau45 revolt, which signaled that land issues could no longer be ignored.
But until the revolt erupted, the British Colonial Office did not pass any land law that could affect
land rights. This is reflected in our index which at that time remains relatively flat at the 1938
level.
the native population, present and prospective, with respect to land, whether to be held on tribal or individual tenure,
(iii)the desirability and practicability of setting aside further areas of land for the present and future occupation of
communities, and bodies or individual natives of recognized tribes, (iv). the nature and extent of the claims exerted
by natives over land alienated to non-natives, and the making of recommendations for the adequate settlement of such
claims whether by legislation or otherwise.
44See section 3 of the Native Authority Ordinance, No.20, 1940.
45The Mau-Mau was an armed local political movement directed principally against the colonial government and
the European settlers. The movement was Kikuyu-dominated although it is commonly believed that it represented the
nationalist struggle against colonial rule.
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In response to the Mau-Mau revolt, the British Colonial Office passed the Swynnerton Plan in
195546 and the Agricultural Ordinance, No.8 of 1955. Both the Swynnerton Plan and Agricultural
Ordinance were perceived as strategies to address land agitation since it was perceived that land
agitation emanated from insecurity of land in the “native reserves” and poor utilization of land by
natives47. These two instruments essentially provided the comprehensive extension programme
aimed at intensifying agricultural production directed principally at native farmers. They further
recommended an individualized form of land ownership (freehold tenure) in the native lands48
based on the English model. The Plan laid the basis for consolidation of fragmented holdings or
the enclosure of communal lands, through which some African farmers were to be provided with
“economic size” farm holdings. The individualization of title and the creation of private property
rights in the native lands was supposed to provide farmers with security of tenure and help solve
the problems of scarcity and accessibility of land. Due to these legal instruments, our index scores
improves further starting in 1955. This improvement continued until 1960 when the index reaches
its peak during the colonial period.
Following the Swynnerton plan, Kenya entered into a period of major land reforms. The aim of
land reforms was to provide individualization of tenure and strengthen security of tenure under
the customary system. A number of land statutes and rules were enacted and passed. The most
important of these laws were: the Native Lands Registration Ordinance, No.27 of 1959 and the
Land Control (Native Lands) Ordinance of 195949. These laws guaranteed individual land owner-
ship in native land areas and introduced a measure of control over land transactions in the newly
registered areas. The Kenya Native Areas (Amendment) Order in Council of 1958 provided that
upon registration of individual titles to farms in native lands such farms cease to be vested in the
Trust Board and become exclusively owned. The Native Lands Registration Ordinance, No.27 of
46The plan was drawn up by the East African Royal Commission in 1955 and named after R.J.M. Swannerton who
was the then Deputy Director of Agriculture in Colonial Kenya.
47For instance, the background to the plan argued that if Africans could be provided with private land ownership
and assistance to intensify their agricultural production, they would be able to make sufficient returns from their lands
and abandon their demand for redistribution of land held by Europeans
48see Paragraph 12 of the Swynnerton Plan.
49This Ordinance is also known as the Land Control (Special Areas) Ordinance, No.28 of 1959.
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195950 and the Land Consolidation Act of 1959 provided for demarcation, adjudication and con-
solidation of areas in the native reserves and introduced a system of registration which drastically
changed the legal status of the land registered. The land reform statutes converted customary
tenure system something similar to freehold system with the effect that all rights enjoyed under
this customary system were equivalent to those enjoyed under the European property law system.
Sections 22, 27 and 89 of the Native Lands Registration Ordinance of 1959 articulated that the
right of occupation under native law and custom, if shown in the register was deemed converted
into tenancy from year to year51 and if it was not shown in the register, it was extinguished52. The
law provided further that first registration could not be challenged, even if it had been obtained
fraudulently53.
The land reform process also led to the passing of the Land Order in the Council of 1960 that
provided for the conversion of (Native) Leasehold into freeholds, and for the acquisition of land in
the Highlands by Africans or the post-colonial State through sale on a willing-buyer, willing-seller
basis. The passage of this Ordinance led to the observed improvement in the index of land rights
under customary tenure between 1960 and 1962. In 1963, when Kenya gained independence,
individualization of land tenure had taken center stage and all legal and policy frameworks were
geared towards entrenching the status quo.
However, the following limitations are worth noting regarding the land reform process and laws
passed in 1959. First, Gatheru (2005) notes that most Africans were too poor to buy land, there-
fore the majority of the people who were actually settled were not the people whose land had been
expropriated. Instead a group of elites with vested interests in the continuity of colonial property
and political processes had emerged while millions of Kenyans remained landless squatters in
their own country. Second, Ndungu (2006) argues that the reforms exacerbated land conflicts and
landlessness in the country as a few elites registered land that did not actually belong to them.
Once land was registered, the registration could not be challenged even if it was fraudulently
50This Ordinance was later renamed the Land Registration Ordinance for Special Areas.
51see section 22 of the Ordinance
52see section 27 of the Ordinance
53see section 89
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registered. This created the phenomenon of Absentee Landlords and squatters54. Third, the re-
form programme revealed the true extent of landlessness and aggravated the situation of those
who were already landless but accommodated under customary tenure. This was because their
privileges along with other customary rights not noted on the register were extinguished by the
process of registration. Finally, the registration firmly placed African holdings within the prin-
ciples of European property law thereby creating an estate much larger in quantum held by few
African elites than Europeans during the colonial period (Okoth-Ogendo (1991)).
The Non-freehold property rights regime after independence (1963-2010)
The post-independence era can be separated into three periods corresponding to the adminis-
tration of each of the Kenyan presidents: Kenyatta (1963-1978), Moi (1978-2002) and Kibaki
(2002-2010). At Independence in 1963, Kenya inherited and adopted the entire set of all colonial
land laws that had been enacted to address the interests of the British settlers. The independent
Government made superficial amendments to those laws, such that Ordinances were simply re-
named Acts, Crown was substituted with President, Crown Land was renamed Government Land,
and where Crown referred to the British Monarch as an institution, it was substituted with Gov-
ernment.
The independent government had little incentives to change the colonial laws, for several reasons.
First, the newly elected government had a desire to grab part of the land formally known as native
reserves, Crown land and that formally owned by British settlers, and give it to a few political
elites and their associates or those with political connections. So conversion of non-freehold
to individualized tenure holding was seen as a strategy to achieve these self interest motives.
Second, political leadership was convinced by the capitalist mode of production to an extent that
it considered traditional systems of land tenure inefficient and acting as a disincentive for farmers
to develop their holdings. In fact, this conviction was grounded on the Swynnerton Plan of 1955
54The term “absentee landlords” refers to persons who seldom if ever use land of which they are registered owners
and such land, if it is managed at all by agents who may not have been validly appointed by the registered owner and
many agents are thought to be self-appointed with no legal authority over land, while the term “squatters” refers to a
person who occupies land that legally belongs to another person or institution without the owner’s consent.
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which had become the main land policy instrument from which most land laws were derived. The
Swynnerton Plan had argued that customary tenure was an obstacle to agricultural development
and that customary rules of inheritance could destroy the benefits of consolidation. It also posited
that under customary tenure individual farmers had little incentive to develop their holdings. It
was hoped that the security of title conferred by registration would create a land market that would
enable farmers owning plots not viable or unworkable fragments to sell them to those who would
be in a position to develop them more effectively. This would then create a landed and a landless
class, a process which Roger Swynnerton called a normal step in the evolution of a country (see
Coldham, 1978).
In pursuit of this self-interested motive and the desire to promote capitalism in the economy, in
1963, the Registered Land Act, No.25 of 1963 was passed along side the Independence Con-
stitution of Kenya. While the Constitution guaranteed protection of all rights including property
rights, the Registered Land Act governed land formerly held under customary law and encouraged
further individualization of tenure in line with the agronomic arguments mooted in the Swynner-
ton Plan. Specifically, it provided that “the registration of a person as the proprietor of land shall
vest in that person absolute ownership of that land” and of a lease “shall vest in that person the
leasehold interest described in the lease”.
In 1965, further new set of laws were passed that gave the President absolute powers over land.
Such absolute powers were to enable him alienate land to his affiliates. These new statutes how-
ever restricted the non-freehold land rights of local communities in particular, hence the observed
deterioration in the property rights index. The first new set of laws passed following indepen-
dence included the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No.28 of 1964 and the Constitution
of Kenya (Amendment) Act, No.14 of 1965, which provided that with abolishment of regions in
1964, all land that was formerly vested in the councils was relocated to the Government of Kenya,
and that the President or any person authorized by the President could make grants or dispossess
any estates, interests or rights in or over land that was vested in the Government of the Republic
of Kenya, and that the Commissioner of Lands was authorized to administer the trust land. These
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Amendments centralized land administration in Kenya without the consent of local communities
(Ndungu, 2006).
Property rights continued to be eroded in 1967 as the legislature passed the Land Control (Special
Areas) Act No.34 of 1967 and Agricultural (Amendment) Act of 1963. These two Acts were
meant to control all transactions on land under control areas55. The Land Control Act limited the
transfer, exchange, partition or disposal of any land in a land control area, and provided that such
transactions were subject to the approval of the Land Control Board. The Land Control Board
had the authority to give the final decision on any land application and its decision could not be
questioned in court. The Land Control Act also contained a segregation clause that any sale of
land conditional on approval of the Board had to be made only to citizens of Kenya and not to
any foreign individual or company. The Agricultural land Act gave the minister all powers to
determine ownership of agricultural lands and regulate planting of cash crops such as coffee and
tea. These crops could neither be planted nor taken out without a ministerial permit. This Act
remains one of the most authoritative land use legal documents. During the same period, the Land
Acquisition Act, No.47 of 1968 was passed to make provision for compulsory acquisition of land
for public benefit.
In 1969, the government recognized that most pastoral groups were not satisfied with the English
model of tenure system which the government had adopted. Such a colonial legacy aggravated
them because they believed colonial government did not understand the real nature of pastoral
cultures. In response, the Government passed the Land (Group Representatives) Act, No.36 of
1968 which recognized “group ownership” of land. Although the Act seemed to protect and
recognize group ownership, it reflected a preference for individualized tenure in an attempt to
demarcate communal land holdings into separate units or group ranches. The intention of the
Act remained that land should be held communally in accordance with applicable customary law
and practices. The group ranches were meant to overcome the problems of overstocking and
overgrazing associated with communal pastoral lands where resources are free and subject to
55Land control areas were former native trust lands
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misuse. This was the first time that customary tenure was given formal recognition in the written
laws. The Land Adjudication Act, No.35 of 1968 also strengthened the index as it provided for
demarcation and registration of titles under trust land. However, Southall (2005) notes that the
group ranches scheme was abused by elites and persons registered to hold the ranches in trust for
the community invariably resorted to selling pieces of land, to the community’s detriment.
In 1978 after president Moi was sworn in as the president of Kenya, substantive changes to the ad-
ministration of land law were introduced. The series of legislative amendments passed weakened
customary tenure rights. The amendments were meant to strengthen the powers of the president
and his administrative organs on land use matters and allocation without necessarily changing
the provisions of the previous laws. They included: (1) the Land Control (Amendment) Act,
of 1981, (2) the Magistrates Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act of 1981 and (3) the Trust Land Act
(Amendment) 1982.
Furthermore, Moi’s regime witnessed amendments to the Chief’s Authority Act and the Local
Government Act of 1963. These two pieces of legislation provided Chiefs and Local Government
Officials with extensive policing powers on land issues. The Chief’s Authority Act conferred
on administrative officials the power to issue orders regulating and prohibiting land use. The
Act for example allowed Chiefs to require persons to plant any specified crops for the support
of themselves and their families if the area concerned is suffering from or is threatened with a
shortage of foodstuff. The Local Government Act also conferred on local authorities far reaching
powers to regulate land use on the trust-land under their jurisdiction. The Act conferred on the
authorities powers to alter boundaries, and to order compulsory expropriation of land for public
use. Country Council by-laws made under section 201 empowered Country Councils to prohibit
or regulate the performance of certain activities on land.
Upon the return to a multiparty democracy system in 1992, a positive shift occurred in the le-
gal framework directed at reducing the arbitrary powers of the president in land matters and to
re-establish the powers of the land commission to deal with issues of land. The amendments to
the Constitution of Kenya passed in 1992, 2001 and 2002 positively affected land rights under
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the non-freehold tenure. These amendments further reinforced protection of property rights and
re-established Trust Boards. In 2007, the National Land Policy was drafted following the recom-
mendations of the Ndungu Land Commission of 2002. The 2007 draft Land Bill gave recognition
to customary land tenure rights and set out clear procedures to be followed in times of adjudi-
cation, demarcation and conveyancing of land held under customary tenure. Finally, the New
Constitution of Kenya of 2010 reaffirms existing rights that any Kenyan may acquire and own
land anywhere in Kenya. The Constitution introduced a limitation on the same right which affects
non-citizens, non-citizen companies and other non-citizen bodies. All these groups may not own
land absolutely. The land acquired by non-citizens may only be held under a lease (i.e. Article
40 (1)). It reaffirmed that it is illegal for the government to arbitrarily deprive any persons of
their property, whether the right to land held is registered or not, whether the right is one of full
ownership or less than ownership (such as in the form of an customarily accepted right to access
an area for pastoral use), and whether the owner is an individual, family, corporate association,
group or community.
The Constitution further gave stronger protection to all interests in land including Community
Lands (current Trust Lands) (Articles 40 (2) and 63 (4)). It however sustained the right of the
State to take a person’s property if needed for public interest, but only on the basis of prompt
payment of full and fair compensation. The holder or lawful user of the land is also guaranteed
access to a court to challenge the legality of the proposal or the amount of compensation being
offered. It further made it explicit that compensation must be paid not just to titled owners but
also to those who occupy land in good faith but do not hold title (this includes occupants on Trust
land, and lawful occupants on government land. It could also include urban squatters of long-
standing living on government land in cities, or in parks and reserves and other areas). However,
the 2010 Constitution did not extend constitutional protection of property to those who are found
to have acquired their land in an illegal manner. This is at odds with the current situation whereby
under the Registered Land Act, those holding land under first registration are protected against
challenge, even if they are known to have obtained such lands by fraud.
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Furthermore, the constitution introduced an important limitation on what constitutes public inter-
est. The 1963 Constitution and other laws (Land Acquisition Act) defined public interest broadly
(as most Land Acquisition laws do) and enabled the government and Country Councils to take
away people’s land on the presumption that this appropriation is for some local public benefit.
Article 66 of the 2010 Constitution limits this by requiring the parliament to enact a law to ensure
that investors/investments in property provide benefit to local communities and their economies.
Freehold Property Rights
Figure 2.3 plots the overall freehold property rights index and its sub-components are shown in
Appendix A, Figure 2.7 and 2.8 . The Figure shows that freehold ownership of land in Kenya
dates back to the 1880s, although no formal legislation was provided to govern such freehold
rights during the pre-colonial era. Historical evidence shows that prior to 1887, certain tribes in
Kenya (i.e. the Kikuyu tribe) already had private rights over their land resources (see Overton,
1988 and Coray, 1978). Hence, our index starts counting at some positive value of the rating
scale.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of Freehold Property Rights in Kenya, 1884-2010
Land grabbing by British settlers and the evolution of freehold property rights (1885-1920)
With no formal legislation governing freehold land rights, the British Colonial Office introduced
a formal set of laws to regulate land rights through the adoption of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act
of 1890 that gave recognition to the creation, acquisition and conveyance of Crown land in the
protectorate, and recognized the conveyance of ownership or lease through issued title deeds for
settlers. Subsequently, the land regulations of 1894 (which were later amended to land regulations
of 1897) were enacted by the Imperial British East Africa Company. These regulations were
meant to provide for freehold land ownership of the British settlers within the Sultan’s dominion.
For the land outside the dominion, certificates of occupation for a period of 21 years, which later
were extended to 99 years were provided.56 In 1889, the East African Order in Council was
56Specifically the regulations provided settlers with leasehold certificates for a period not exceeding twenty one
years but renewable. No fixed rent was specified on them. Grazing leases were also issued which defined that not more
than 20 000 acres could be held in one block, and the annual rent was half an Anna an acre. On agricultural land,
leases of not more than 2000 acres might have had a rent of 1/2 anna an acre for the first five years....homesteads were
of 100 acres at a rent of 4 annas an acre for the first years, during which time occupation was compulsory.
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passed, which introduced English law into the system and promulgated a set of land regulations.
Here therefore our freehold index starts to rise.
Between 1895 and 1902, there was a complete transition in the protectorate from mere holding of
certificates of occupancy to complete freehold ownership of land by the settlers and formalization
of land registries. Our index scores therefore rise in this period. In response to the demands of the
British settlers for security of tenure under freehold system, the colonial office enacted the Crown
Lands Ordinance of 1901 and the Crown Lands Ordinance, No.21 of 1902. The purpose of these
two sets of legislation was to govern alienation of land for agricultural, commercial, residential
and other purposes for British settlers. These laws were applied in conjunction with the East
Africa (Lands) Orders in the Council of 1895, 1897,1901 and the land regulations of 1897 to
alienate land to British settlers and provide them with security of tenure.
From 1902 onwards, British settlers could acquire freehold title and long leases over land in the
protectorate as provided by section 4 of the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance, No.21.57 Despite the
dispensation by this legislation of freehold tenure, the British settlers considered it repugnant to
the sanctity of title because it did not allow individuals to hold land for speculative purposes58. It
also prohibited grants of land in actual occupancy of Africans and gave the commissioner powers
to repossess any land for which no full payment had been made.
The settlers applied further pressure on the authorities to provide an improved legal framework
for the freehold tenure system. In response, the colonial office passed the 1908 Crown Land
Ordinance and the Land Titles Ordinance of 1908 with the aim of providing further improvements
in the legal framework for freehold tenure arrangement. These Ordinances made land a tradeable
good by making a provision for holding of titles to land and established a land Registration Court
and provided for adjudication of land claims. This meant that British settlers could secure the
land they had expropriated from indigenous Africans. This favourable legal framework attracted
57This ordinance gave the commissioner the power to sell freeholds in Crown Land to any purchaser in lots not
exceeding 1000 acres and for any sale above this figure, the consent of the Secretary of the State was to be solicited.
58see section 5 of the 1902 Ordinance
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settlers from Britain, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. By 1914, there were about 1,000
settlers in Kenya.
In 1915, the index rises sharply following the enactment of the Crown Lands Ordinance No.22 of
1915 which set the stage for what settlers saw as a secure foundation for organization of their set-
tlement. This Ordinance extended the 99 year-lease to 999 year-lease thus stimulating a new wave
of immigration. It provided for a comprehensive registration of titles and removed the restrictions
on the number and size of farms a person could purchase. This allowed de facto land acquisition
for speculative purposes. The 1915 Ordinance reaffirmed that land not occupied by European set-
tlers was Crown Land and subject to Governor’s power of alienation and demarcated the land into
“scheduled areas” (for European settlement) and “non-scheduled areas” (for African Reserves).
By doing so, it gave statutory recognition to the practice of land reservation in the Highlands to
Europeans, and created “natives” reserves away from areas scheduled for European settlement.
Finally, the Registration of Titles Ordinance No. 26 of 1920 was passed. and superseded all
existing legal regimes throughout the country. Land titles issued under the new Ordinance were
deemed conclusive evidence of absolute and indefeasible ownership. This legislation set the stage
for what settlers finally regarded as a secure foundation for the organization of their settlement.
The freehold property rights during the Colonial Era (1920-1963)
In 1920 Kenya was declared a British colony. With status of a colony, the door was open for
constitutional advance in any direction and at any pace that the British government could choose
and the colony came under the British Settlement Act of 1887. Following the declaration of
colonial status, the Registration of Titles Ordinance No.26 of 1920 was passed. This Ordinance
superseded all existing legal regimes throughout the country, and a certificate issued under the
new Ordinance was declared conclusive evidence that a person named a proprietor of land had
absolute and indefeasible ownership thereof. The period between 1920 to 1929, marked the first
phase of the organization of native reserves to make way for further European settlement and
the legal framework enacted thus far had provided the property system tailored to the needs of
free enterprise in that there was a degree of freedom from state intervention. In 1927, the Hilton
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Young Commission made a land recommendation which provided for the setting of boundaries to
demarcate land for Europeans and Africans, and this strengthened freehold, which is reflected in
the index.
The status of freehold land rights continued to improve between 1930 and 1933 owing to the
passage of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, No.9 of 1930 that proclaimed that land in actual
occupation by Africans was the only land declared Crown lands while that in settlers’ occupation
remained freehold. The period between 1935 and 1942 saw further improvements in the index
as a result of the promulgation of the Crown Land Ordinance, No.27 of 1938 (Amendment); The
Kenya (Native Lands Trust) Ordinance, No.28 of 1938 (Amendment) which repealed the 1930
Ordinance; the Kenya (Highlands) Order in Council of 1939; the Kenya (Native Areas) Order
in Council of 1939 and Farmers Assistance Ordinance No.18 of 1936. This set of legislation
was meant to implement the Morris Carter Land Commission’s recommendations of 1933. These
laws strengthened the legal effect of the dual land policy as White Highlands were reserved for
Europeans and Native Reserves for Africans.
In 1944, the British Government started a programme of settling ex-World War II soldiers in its
colonies and it established the European Settlement Board to be responsible for this programme
in Kenya, thereby marking the second European settlement in the country. This was followed
by the adoption of the Chattels Transfer Ordinance, No.24 of 1930 and the passing of Land
Control Ordinance, No.24, 1944 to provide for expropriation and alienation of unused land in
European-owned land in Kenya Highlands. This increased uncertainty over freehold land rights
is represented by a slight decline in our freehold index. However, Okoth-Ogendo et al. (2008)
note that this uncertainty did not last for a long period.
The period between 1953 and 1963 was the last period for establishing legal infrastructure for
freehold tenure in Kenya prior to independence. This period saw once again an improvement in
the index which reflects the passage of the Swynnerton Plan of 1955 which supported individual-
ization of tenure in the economy. The Plan led to enactment of a number of laws to support the
land reforms recommended by the Plan. Among the laws enacted during this period were, the
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Kenya Native Areas (Amendment) Order in Council, 1958; The Native Land Registration Ordi-
nance, No.27 of 1959 ( or the Land Registration Special Areas); the Land Consolidation Act of
1959, The Land Control (Native Lands), 1959; The Land Registration (special Areas) Ordinance,
No.27 of 1959; the Land Order in Council of 196059; Agricultural (Amendment) Ordinance,
No.47 of 1960; The Kenya Land Ordinance of 1960; the Kenya Land Order in Council of 1960
(section 15); the Land Control (Special Areas) Regulations of 1961; the Development and use of
Land (Planning) Regulations of 1961; the Government Lands Act of 1960. These laws largely
strengthened tenure holding under freehold and supported land reforms meant to make way for
individualization of land ownership.
Freehold property rights during the post-independence period
In 1965, the administration of land was placed in the hands of the president through the Consti-
tution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.14 of 1965. This was followed by the Land Control Act,
No.34 of 1967 which became substantive law to control all transactions related to agricultural
land in Kenya and repealed the land regulations of 1963 and all other laws that controlled land
prior to 1967. In 1968, the Land Planning Act and the Land Acquisition Act were promulgated.
The former Act provided that no land development could be undertaken without the consent of
the Central Authority in areas where the Act applied. The latter provided for the compulsory
acquisition of land for the benefit of public interest. This provision was also embodied in sections
75, 117 and 118 of the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.28 of 1964 and the Consti-
tution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No.14 of 1965. The compulsory acquisition of land further
weakened freehold property rights as reflected in our index.
The period between 1978 and 1989 saw further decline in our index as a number of amend-
ments of the post independence regime began to take their toll. The 1979 Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment) Act, No.5 strengthened the compulsory acquisition of land by government. This
was followed by the passing of the Magistrates Jurisdiction Amendment Act of 1981 which vested
59See Also the Conversion of lease Regulations, Legal Notice No.631 and the conversion of Lease rules, Legal
Notice No.632 of 1960
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in councils of elders the administration of land, adjudication and setting of boundaries on land
and a Land Control Act of 1981 (Amendment) which established Land Control Board to further
strengthen control of all transactions on land. This legislation resulted in erosion of freehold
property rights which can be observed by a decline in our freehold property rights index.
Starting in 2001, our index improves reflecting the passing of the Constitution of Kenya, 2001
(Amendment) and the Land control (Amendment) regulations of 2001 which repealed some strin-
gent regulations on land use and resuscitated protection of property rights under freehold own-
ership. This improvement continues until 2010. The improvement was also due to the creation
of Kenya Land Policy in 2007 which governed land issues in a more holistic manner and the
enactment of the New Constitution of Kenya in 2010 which reaffirms existing rights over land.
2.5 Political Instability Index
To complement our work on the measurement of de-jure institutional indicators, we compute a de-
facto political instability index. It must be noted that this index is outcome based and it captures
the notion of the occurrence of socio-political unrest in the economy. Our interest in computing
political instability index comes from its claimed relationship with institutions, particularly po-
litical institutions. The literature on institutions claims that political instability could lead to an
institutional transition like the one witnessed in the move from communism in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and which the Arab spring may yet deliver. This is because when the detached elite
group which often places little weight on collective interests is faced with a threat of losing power,
it becomes tempted to choose a path of reform by institutionalizing constraints on the power of
the future incumbents (Besley et al., 2013). On the other hand, Aisen and Veiga (2010) argue that
political instability is likely to shorten policy maker’s planning horizons leading to sub-optimal
short term macroeconomic policies. It may also lead to a more frequent switch of policies, cre-
ating volatility and thus negatively affecting macroeconomic performance. Barro, 2000 supports
this argument and shows that politically unstable countries tend to grow more slowly than stable
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ones. Dupas and Robinson (2012) identify two other causal channels through which instability
affects growth: First, the uncertainty associated with political instability may discourage physical
capital accumulation and investment. Second, violent civil conflict which results from political in-
stability disrupts productive activities. We believe that provision of political instability index will
help validate or refute some of these claims. Nevertheless, measurement of political instability
remains a challenge. Evidence from the political science literature shows that political instability
is a multidimensional phenomenon which cannot be captured by just one variable60.
This literature however has not reached consensus as to the appropriate elements to include
when measuring political instability. Our political instability index captures the following sub-
components: (1). Annual number of Political Fatalities, war related fatalities including genocides
on general public (x1); (2). Annual number of politically motivated arrests (x2); (3). Annual num-
ber of political detentions (x3); (4). Annual number of political parties and publications banned
(x4); (5). Number of declarations and renewals of state of emergency per year(x5); (6). Number
of riots, strikes and demonstrations (x6); (7). Number of reported cases of politically-related
property damages per year (x7).
2.5.1 Scaling and Rating of Political Instability Index
Our scaling and weighting criteria follows Zaaruka and Fedderke (2011b) and Gwenhamo et al.
(2008). We however include other components which we believe are part of political instability.
These include the number of reported cases on damaged property due to political violence, polit-
ical uprisings and number of riots, strikes and demonstrations. The value on the range for each
sub-component of the index in a year represents different values pertaining to an actual occurrence
of an attribute captured by the sub-component. Since, the index is de-facto in nature, occurrences
of some of the sub-components are disproportionate which necessitates standardization in scal-
ing (see Table 2.2 in Appendix).The scaling is performed on a range from 0 to 30 points, where
60(See Rummel and Tanter (1974),Tanter (1966), Feierabend and Feierabend (1966),Morrison and Stevenson (1971)
and Habib and Zurawicki (2002))
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30 represents the most unstable economy characterized by conflict, political fatalities, genocides
on general public, politically motivated arrests, political detentions, banning of publications and
political parties, state of emergency, riots, strikes and demonstrations and 0 represents a com-
plete absence of instability. The overall index in the case of political instability is composed of
sub-components which are given different weights depending on their relative importance in an
index as well61. In constructing each index, the sub-components each which has the highest score
of 5 points after normalization, are then summed up to give the overall status of the status of the
index across time. The choice of weights were based on an earlier paper by Zaaruka and Fedderke
(2011b) that had used factor analysis in choosing appropriate weights for the political instability
index. However we aknowledge a caveat that the political instability index has actually summed
up too many issues some of which are more important than others and those that result from our
inability to gather all defacto data to be used in the development of this composite indicator.
2.5.2 Political Instability during the Pre-Independence Era
Political instability has played out in different forms throughout Kenya’s history. During the colo-
nial period, instability often took the form of violent attacks to expropriate land, assassinations,
politically motivated arrests and detentions. Figure 2.4 plots an instability index for Kenya over
the period 1880 to 2010. The index shows that the country experienced several episodes of polit-
ical and social instability since the British invasion of 1888. The British invasion met with fierce
anti-colonial resistance from the indigenous population which resulted in a number of battles.62
These battles resulted in a number of casualties which reflects as increased instability in the econ-
omy. By 1915, the settlers demands for labour had drastically increased and the colonial state
enacted laws that acted as instruments of forced labour and applied violent means to enforce their
labour policy. However, when natives resisted such laws and the colonial rule in general, further
battles were fought which further increased instability in the protectorate. The fight between the
61see Table2.2 for weights of sub-components.
62Note that these battles were fought between different tribes in the country since Kenya was not yet a unified
country.
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Giriama and British colonialists provides a good illustration of such resistance. The Giriama peo-
ple refused to be coerced into the colonial scheme of development and to be made a workforce of
British capitalist (settlers). They refused to pay taxes, to work as colonial porters or be turned into
mercenaries in the imperialist army or to work on settlers plantations. The British responded by
using armed forces, thus killing many civilians (Kinyatti, 2008). This early anti-colonial warfare
led to a loss of a number of lives, and property among the indigenous population.
Figure 2.4: Evolution of Political Instability in Kenya, 1884-2010
Between 1920 and 1945, was a period of stability. The formation of the anti-imperialists move-
ments such as the African political organizations, trade union movements and other anti-colonial
movements intensified but such movements held back their resistance until the late 1940s.In 1952,
a key watershed revolt erupted led by the Mau-Mau group. The Mau-Mau uprising escalated in-
stability in the economy until 1963. The period was characterized by armed revolutionary move-
ments, guerrilla warfare, political detentions, death sentences, armed attacks and a number of
75
massacres and genocides such as Hola Massacre63 and Lari Massacre64).
2.5.3 Political Instability during the Post-Independence Era
During the first republican government (1963-1978) under Kenyatta’s administration, Kenya con-
tinued to experience instability. A number of political assassinations of prominent political lead-
ers such as Pio Gama Pinto, Tom Mboya, John M Kariuki, Ronand Ngala, and Arwings Kodhek
occurred and these threatened the stability of the country. During the same period, the instability
was also compounded by political demonstrations and violence as a result of the expulsion of
some members of legislature who broke away from the ruling political party-KANU and formed
an opposition party- the Kenya Peoples Union (KPU). These public demonstrations saw civilians
killed by the security forces. .
Political instability further intensified during the Moi administration (1978-2002). During that
era, public demonstrations; pre-election and post election violence; detentions without arrest;
assassinations; massacres and uprisings against the one party state intensified. This was a period
of general lack of respect of the rights of citizens by the state as the president exercised his
powers under one party state to detain and harass any person who opposed his authoritarian rule.
The exercise of this power, provided for under the Public Order and Public Security Law became
evident after an attempted military coup in 1982. For instance, a number of lecturers, students,
and ordinary citizens were detained for opposing government policies. Thousands of innocent
civilians were killed in the Wagalla Massacre65 and the Saba Saba (7:7) uprising for a return
to multi party democracy. Public gatherings were banned, and the political turmoil continued
until 1990 (Wanjala and Kibwana, 1997). It was during this period that John Robert Ouko was
assassinated.
63The Hola Massacre took place in Hola detention camp and more than 1158 prisoners were beaten to deathElkins
(2005).
64The Lari Massacre took place at the Lari District and a thousands of civilians (estimated at more than 5,000) were
killed by the British police forcesAnderson (2005, see).
65More than 5000 people of the Somalia Kenyans were brutally killed by Government armed forces.
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With mounting pressure from the Donor community and continued protests in the 1990s, the
country returned to multiparty democracy. However, instability continued as the 1992 and 1997
elections saw outbreaks of attacks and election violence over contested election results. These
contested elections left hundreds of people dead or injured, and thousands of others displaced
from their homes (Lunn et al. 1998). Between 1998 and 2002, the economy experienced relative
stability. In 2007, political instability resurfaced due to post election violence that erupted follow-
ing the 2007 contested presidential elections. The 2007 post election violent protests left more
than 1,000 people dead and many more citizens injured and more than 3,000 women raped and
property damaged while at least 350 000 were internally displaced (Republic of Kenya, 2008)).
The 2007 post election crises demonstrated the fragility of Kenya’s political stability and raised
questions about the strength of institutions in ensuring peaceful political transition.
The sporadic yet recurrent episodes of social unrest, civil conflicts, detentions, and violent protests
that often transformed into ethnic clashes and inter-community conflicts have been blamed on
the “divide and rule” strategy inherited from the British rule. These have also been ascribed
to contested property rights and the skewed post-independence land redistribution (Wakhungu
et al., 2008). Post colonial instability frequently resulted from political patronage systems, and
increasing horizontal inequality66, as well as deprivation of the population of essential services
and repression of political opposition (Wakhungu et al., 2008). The implications of these sporadic
yet recurrent episodes of political instability in Kenya from 1800 years ago, on households and
social economic development in general, remain unexplored.
2.6 Comparison of Institutional Indices
2.6.1 Correlation between our indices and widely used institutional indices
Bollen (1990) argues that testing for the correlation between newly constructed indices that cap-
ture diffuse concepts such as political and property rights, and indices widely used in the literature
66This is defined as inequality between social, political or ethnic groups
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is essential in establishing their reliability. We therefore compute the Spear-man correlation co-
efficients to investigate the extent to which our measures of (i) Property Rights (Freehold and
Non-Freehold), and (ii) Political Rights and Civil Liberties (PrCL) correlate with the Heritage
Foundation Property Rights index, the Freedom House indices for Political Rights and Civil Lib-
erties, and the Polity IV index of political rights and civil liberties. It must however be noted that
the Kenya index is build up from a careful examination of the central institutional changes and
the subsequent events that occurred in the country, following a much different methodology than
those of the other indices. Ex-ante it was not clear that different indices would be correlated. Sec-
ond, our index is transparent about the events that drive it, making interpretation of subsequent
analysis much more clear. For instance, the passing of the Swynnerton Plan of 1955 which sup-
ported individualization of tenure in the economy, the Kenya Native Areas (Amendment) Order
in Council, 1958; The Native Land Registration Ordinance, No.27 of 1959 ( or the Land Registra-
tion Special Areas); the Land Consolidation Act of 1959, led to an improvement in the freehold
property rights index from a score of 71 observed in 1950 to a score of 83 observed in 1960. Table
2.1 presents the correlation results.
Despite the criticisms levied against the conventional measures of institutional indicators, our
results surprisingly show high correlation with such indicators for the time span for which they
are available. Indeed such high correlations could be regarded as a validation of such indicators.
These correlations also point towards efficacy of our newly constructed institutional indicators
based on durable qualities of institutions. Nonetheless, in terms of time coverage, these conven-
tional indexes remain inadequate and fail to be used to unravel issues of persistence of institutions
which require the use of dataset with a long time span.
The results show significant correlation of 63 percent and 77 percent between our political and
civil liberties indicators and the political rights and civil liberties from Freedom House. The cor-
relation between these and Freedom House indices is also significant and positive, which supports
the view that civil liberties and political rights are mutually reinforcing and, to a certain extent,
indivisible. This provides justification for inseparability of civil liberties from political rights in
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our newly constructed indicators. Our political and civil liberties index also correlates well with
the Polity IV index with a significant correlation coefficient of 74 percent. Turning to the prop-
erty rights index, the freehold index correlates well with the Heritage Foundation Property Rights
Index with a correlation coefficient of 81 percent. Our property rights indices are also highly
correlated with each other. The correlation between freehold property rights and non-freehold
property rights is positive and strong while that between political rights and civil liberties and
freehold property rights is also positive but less than the correlation with non freehold property
rights.
The high correlations achieved in this study point towards some verification of the conventional
indicators especially for Kenya for the period in which such indicators were computed. However,
this research does not claim that the criticisms levied against the widely used indicators are invalid
as that will require computing indicators for other countries. What the correlations really imply
in this context, is simply that there is some efficacy in our newly constructed indicators.
The foregoing argument notwithstanding, the correlation between the property rights indicators
and the political rights and civil liberties measures supports the arguments raised in literature
that the two sets of indicators are not mutually exclusive. Improvement in political rights and
civil liberties has implications for protection of non-freehold property rights in this economy.
The negative correlations between some rights indicators and political and civil liberties are also
noted. Such negative correlations imply that during the period under review, the two rights moved
in opposite directions. This is plausible given that during that period political rights of citizens
were not respected, and the government continued to promote a freehold system of land holdings














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter presented a new set of de-jure institutional indicators for Kenya for the period 1880
to 201067. It discussed the evolution of these institutions over time. The motivation for the
construction of the new indicators is the criticisms levied against the existing conventional in-
stitutional measures, in particular the criticism that they do not capture permanent characteristic
of institutions, as implied in the works of Douglas North. It addressed this weakness by using
laws that govern immovable property in Kenya for the period under consideration. The indica-
tors presented cover a longer time horizon which provides an opportunity to analyze in a Time
Series context, the dynamics of economic growth and development. From the discussion on the
evolution of institutions in Kenya, three important points are worthy of note. First, the exist-
ing property rights institutions in Kenya were largely shaped by the legal framework introduced
since 1885 when Kenya was declared a British protectorate. Under British rule—protectorate
period (1885-1920) and colonial period (1920-1963)—an extensive legal apparatus designed to
expropriate much of the land and redistribute it to the white settlers—at the expense of the in-
digenous populations—was enacted. These laws introduced and promoted the freehold property
rights system for the benefit of the settlers while undermining pre-existing non-freehold systems
which were based on indigenous customary laws. Thus, Africans were often displaced to make
way for Europeans and had to settle in marginal areas known as “native reserves”. However,
even their rights to land usage in those native reserves were squarely limited by the discretionary
powers of the Governor. This policy of land grabbing was the origin of many grievances about
resources between the Natives and the settlers which the government attempted to quell with little
success. The Natives’ mobilization and agitation over the injustices of land expropriations cul-
minated in the Mau-Mau revolt in the early 1950s. In response to the revolt, the British colonial
office enacted laws that promoted free tenure holdings (individualization of tenure) in the native
reserves. It also created settlement schemes both to diffuse tension and ensure that the colonial
67Note that the new set of institutional indicators constructed in this paper correlate well with existing indicators.
This points towards efficacy of these newly constructed institutional indicators based on durable qualities of institu-
tions. These can perhaps counter criticisms of conventional institutional indicators.
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land-holding structure could be preserved more or less intact After 1963, the newly independent
Kenya made little effort to fundamentally change the colonial laws that governed land rights. The
situation deteriorated further as the executive—under Kenyatta and then under Moi—exercised
unchecked powers over land matters and control over any resource in the economy. It was not un-
til the advent of democracy in 1992 that some of the most restrictive laws were repealed. During
the third regime of the post independence period under the political administration of president
Kibaki, some notable improvements were made in legislation to protect the property rights of
people. Despite these improvements in the legal framework, the problem of land allocation has
not been addressed and remains one of the sources of conflict over resources in this economy.
The foregoing discussions have shown that amendments to legislation carried out in Kenya be-
tween 1982 and 1990 were intended to concentrate power in the Executive, undermine the func-
tioning of the other arms of the government and independent offices and entrench an undemocratic
and authoritarian system of government. The system of checks and balances envisaged in the In-
dependence Constitution was clearly weakened. The creation of a one party state was intended to
stifle dissenting voices in Parliament. The judiciary was subjugated through removal of the secu-
rity of tenure provisions for the judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The assault on
freedom and political rights under Moi’s presidency turned Kenya into an authoritarian country,
and that this led to agitation for reforms which were headlined by agitation for the introduction
of a multiparty state. Politicians who had been excluded from mainstream politics through ex-
pulsion from KANU or by being rigged out during the infamous queue voting elections of 1988
joined the international community and religious leaders to exert considerable pressure for polit-
ical reforms. This chapter argued that despite these pressures, political leaders and their interest
groups opposed the constitutional reforms by all means including force, since such reforms went
against their interests. The delay in such reforms led to the breakdown of governance in Kenya.
Such breakdown which inevitably led to the post-election crisis of 2007. This post-election crisis
expedited the emergence of the new constitution which reaffirms the political and civil rights of
all Kenyans.
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Figure 2.5: Sub-components of non-freehold
property rights for Kenya, 1884-2010 (A)
Figure 2.6: Sub-components of non-freehold
property rights for Kenya, 1884-2010 (B)
Figure 2.7: Sub-components of freehold prop-
erty rights for Kenya, 1884-2010 (A)
Figure 2.8: Sub-components of freehold prop-
erty rights for Kenya, 1884-2010 (B)
Figure 2.9: Sub-components of political rights
and civil for Kenya, 1884-2010
Figure 2.10: Sub-components of political
rights and civil liberties for Kenya, 1884-2010
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Persistence of Institutions and
Causality between Institutions and
Economic Development in Kenya
“Once a set of institutions comes to dominate society it tends to persist for long periods of time though the
institutional path can certainly change in the context of major critical junctures. ”
– James A. Robinson (2010: page 2)
3.1 Introduction
THE literature on institutions and economic development has advanced three main propo-sitions. First, that institutions that were established by the European imperial powers in
their colonies during the colonial era have shaped the current state of institutions in these former
colonies. Second, that such institutions have had lasting effects on these countries’ economic
development even though these countries attained their independence from the European colonial
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powers several decades ago (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 2006). Third, that political institu-
tions in particular, are the main cause of these countries’ developmental problems(Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012).
The first proposition also dubbed “the persistence of institutions hypothesis 1” is understood in
this context to refer to the possibility that the effects of institutions may persist over long time-
spans even after those specific institutions have long been changed or evolved in some way 2. In
Robinson (2010)’s parlance the argument goes like: “Once a set of institutions comes to domi-
nate a society it tends to persist for long periods of time though the institutional path can certainly
change in the context of major critical junctures”. This proposition finds its basis in the seminal
works of Acemoglu et al. (2001); Engerman and Sokoloff (2000). According to these authors,
Europeans colonizers established institutions that were not conducive to investment and develop-
ment (they were extractive, in their terminology) in places where they could not settle because
they faced high mortality rates. Such extractive institutions did not foster the process of economic
development and have persisted to the present-day, and continue to stifle the process of economic
development of these former colonies. While in countries where colonizers settled because they
faced less settler mortality rates, they created durable institutions that were conducive to private
investment and promoted economic development. Notwithstanding its general acceptance, this
proposition has neither been empirically tested, nor discussed from a historical perspective in the
context of these former colonies, in particular in Africa3.
The assumption of institutional persistence has also given rise to a number of other important
research questions that have remained outstanding in the institutions-development discourse as
emphasized by Acemoglu and Robinson (2008). For instance, why are some rules persistent while
others are not? Why do some political leaders create and strengthen institutions that promote
1This claim has served as the basis on which the proof of the primacy of institutions over other determinants of
economic development is based (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2008).
2 (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, 2006; Robinson, 2010; North, 1993, 1990; North et al., 1971) for theoret-
ical view on institutional persistence
3The only paper that has attempted to provide evidence from both historical and econometric perspectives, in
support of institutional persistence is Acemoglu et al. (2001) using Gurr’s historical data on political institutions.
La Porta et al. (1998); ? only attempt to provide such evidence from a historical perspective. However the paper also
investigated the developed countries.
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long-run economic development, such as security of property rights while others neglect such
institutions or destroy those that already exist? The current development discourse has been
grappling with these questions, especially for developing countries.
The second claim is that institutions have stifled the process of economic development of the
former colonies.This claim suggests that there is causality running from institutions to economic
development in these countries. This claim has remained controversial in the literature. The con-
troversy arises with regard to whether causality is uni-directional or bi-directional. One view from
the literature asserts that it is institutions that drive the process of economic development. Ac-
cording to the proponents of this view, political institutions such as democracy and other checks
on government are the main mechanisms for securing property rights that eventually stimulate in-
vestment in human and physical capital, and therefore economic growth and development. They
assert that differences in economic performance of countries around the world today are due to
colonial rules that created completely different institutional development trajectories, Acemoglu
et al. (2001) view institutional development as a causal mechanism through which colonial in-
stitutions influences economic development4. The burgeoning empirical works that support this
view often assume uni-directional causality. That is, they assert that causality runs from institu-
tions to economic development, ignoring the possibility that economic development could change
institutions. A contrasting view in the literature following the seminal works of Lipset (1959)5
argues that it is development that leads to better institutions (Chang, 2011, 2006)6. According
to this line of argument, a minimum threshold level of economic development and human capital
is the basic requirement necessary to sustain democratic institutions and economic institutions.
The proponents of this line of thinking further posit that such a minimum threshold could even be
acquired through policies pursued by dictators (Glaeser et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2003).
The last proposition closely relates to the first two and emanates from the recent compelling work
4see alsoEngerman and Sokoloff (2000); Glaeser et al. (2004)
5Lipset (1959) advanced the hypothesis that became famously known as the Lipset hypothesis.
6However Chang (2011) notes that the paper by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is a partial exception in the sense that it
recognizes the two way nature of the relationship at a theoretical level although it goes on to conclude through the use
of instrumental variable that empirically the causality runs from institutions to development.
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of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)7. It argues specifically that where inclusive political institu-
tions were established, they influenced inclusive economic institutions, that in turn affected the
long-term economic development and prosperity of the former colonies. Conversely, where ex-
tractive political institutions were established, they gave rise to extractive economic institutions,
that led to economic failure of the former colonies. On the empirical front, this proposition sug-
gests some kind of causality running from political institutions to economic institutions, yet it has
not been empirically tested in the institution-development literature8. In Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012, 2008, 2006)s’ view, political institutions such as democracy and other checks on govern-
ment are the main mechanisms for securing property rights that eventually stimulate investment
in human and physical capital, and therefore stimulate economic growth and development.
Despite their wide acceptance in the institutions and development literature, there is a paucity of
empirical tests that examine the first two of these propositions. Only the third claim has received
some attention. However such work has concentrated on developed countries using cross country
analyses and a panel of countries. The cross country and panel studies tend to generalize the
causal relationship between institutions and economic development across countries (Przeworski,
2004). The problem of such generalization is that by grouping countries that are at different stages
of institutional development and economic development, one fails to address country specific
effects of institutions on economic development. The methods applied in such analyses fail to
address the potential biases induced by the existence of cross country heterogeneity, which, if not
accounted for, may lead to inconsistent and misleading conclusions. Brock and Durlauf (2001)
note that the assumption of parameter homogeneity in panel estimates that describe the effects of
institutions on economic development across countries is not plausible (see also Durlauf, 2000;
Evans, 1998). For instance it is difficult to justify that a change in the level of civil liberties
has the same effect on economic development in the United States as in Kenya. Chang (2011)
contends that the relationship between institutions and development is almost certain to differ
7Although it is Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) who popularized this proposition, the seminal works of North
(1993, page 13) had already noted that political institutions influence economic institutions.He postulated that eco-
nomic institutions (property rights) are specified and enforced by polities, and that without an in-depth understanding
of the way polities evolve it is not possible to understand the way property rights evolve.
8To the best of our knowledge, no other study empirically tests this claim
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across countries. He therefore suggests that “Time Series evidence may offer better insights than
can cross-section studies, which lump every country from Swaziland to Switzerland do”9.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter examines three related fundamental propositions that
emanate from the institutions-development discourse from a Time Series perspective for one
African country-Kenya. The research provides the empirical evidence for a number of claims
about Kenya’s lack of economic development. The specific set of questions addressed are: (a)
Is there evidence of persistence of institutions in Kenya10?; (b) Do political institutions cause
economic institutions?; (c) What is the direction of causality between institutions and economic
development in Kenya?
Kenya is selected for this study because it is one of the colonies in Africa where the British
colonialists settled and therefore becomes a natural laboratory to test these propositions. If the ar-
gument developed by Acemoglu et al. (2001) that where imperial colonialists settled they created
inclusive institutions is valid, then Kenya should have been endowed with robust and growth-
enhancing institutions. Yet Kenya has suffered from lack of economic development. This is
evidenced by its poor socio-economic performance with real GDP per capita income estimated
at US$882, an estimated 50% of the population living below the poverty line and life-expectancy
at birth reaching 54.5 years (United Nations Development Programme, 2010). All these socio-
economic indicators place it among the poor countries with low human development indexes.
The country has also experienced recurring social, ethnic, political and economic conflicts over
land resources, and grapples with increasing inequality. It also has high corruption levels sus-
tained by an entrenched system of political patronage. Some scholars have argued that Kenya’s
development problem cannot be divorced from its institutional history as reflected in the quote
below11:
“...In many ways, these factors are inherently linked to the colonial inheritance, ...the
9See Chang (2011; page 483)
10Empirical evidence in support of this assumption does not exist in the literature for developing countries. This
study makes the first attempt to test rigorously such an assumption
11see also Hornsby (2013)
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disappointing record of economic development cannot be divorced from its historical context.
Thus, the impact of the colonial legacy on the path of development that would be embarked
upon cannot be neglected ”Fahnbulleh (2006, p.5).
This chapter contributes to the institutions-development literature by first testing empirically the
assumption that institutions are persistent-“The Persistence of Institutions Hypothesis”. The re-
sults from this test provide an empirical validation of this assumption. They show that both eco-
nomic institutions (property rights) and political institutions (political rights and civil liberties) in
Kenya have persisted from the colonial era to the present day (1885-2010). A second contribution
to the literature is an assessment of the direction of causality between institutions and economic
development for Kenya over the post independence period (1960-2010)12. A third contribution to
the same literature is a test of the interdependence and causality between institutions, in particular
the hypothesis by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that political institutions determine economic
institutions. This proposition is here called “ Political vs. Economic Institutions hypothesis”.
3.2 Theory
3.2.1 Persistence of Institutions Hypothesis
As highlighted in the introduction, the institutions-development literature claims that institutions
persist although they change. The central question that emanates from this claim is why do
institutions persist? North and Thomas (1973b) in their first attempt to respond to this question,
assert that persistence of institutions may be due to path dependence, the transaction costs of
changing them, inertia built into culture, and the slow change of beliefs and ideologies. Acemoglu
et al. (2001) build on this first intellectual insight and provide three further possible reasons why
institutions may persist. First, they argue that this may be due to the sunk cost of establishment of
12Only the post colonial period is examined for this test due to the paucity of macroeconomic data that dates back
to the colonial period
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institutions and the transactions costs of enforcement. In this spirit, the setup of institutions (such
as private property rights which place restrictions on government power and respect of private
property) is usually costly since it requires the formation of a sizable bureaucracy and sacrifices
while the reputation of these institutions is being built. Therefore once these costs have been born
by the previous elites, it may not be beneficial for the current elites to switch from this set of
institutions to extractive institutions per-se. In contrast, when the current elites inherit extractive
institutions, they may not want to incur the costs of setting up the institutions that would constrain
them, instead they would prefer to exploit the existing institutions for their own gains.
Second, and in support of Bates (1981), their persistence may be due to the investment incentives
(or the lack thereof) of the elites that come to power and their size. Accordingly, if the ruling elites
are few, each would have a larger share of the resources of the country hence the continuity of the
extractive institutions. In contrast, if there are investment opportunities for such elites, they would
opt for institutions that protect private property. At the same time if political elites that come to
power do not possess comparative advantage in investment activities, then they would be less will-
ing to enforce private property institutions. This point is consistent with the historical evidence
from a number of African countries that shows that after these countries attained independence,
the ruling political elites who were never involved in productive activities during the colonial rule
favoured extractive institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001).Third, such persistence may result be-
cause the ruling elites have made irreversible investment and would therefore support institutions
that protect private property.
The assumption that institutions are persistent is based largely on informal institutions13 (North,
2008;North, 1990). However many institutionalists such as Greif (2006) argue that formal insti-
tutions persist when they are consistent with and supported by informal norms, and that the most
durable institutions are norms. Greif (2006) argue that institutions persist when they are internal-
ized that they are self-enforcing. Therefore the central question is the role of informal institutions
vs. formal institutions in the institution persistence debates, and what interaction exists between
13The informal institutions in our context are defined as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created,
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels (Brinks, 2002; Taylor, 1992)
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formal and informal institutions within the persistence of institutions literature such that one can
infer persistence from legal institutions ? First it must be recalled that social and political actors
respond to the mix of “formal and informal constraints” . Recent studies suggest that informal
institutions such as clientelism, patriamonialism, and ethnic politics-all of which were common
place in Kenya, at times reinforce formal institutions (see Lauth (2000); Taylor (1992)).
Helmke and Levitsky (2004) develops a typology of four basic patterns of formal-informal insti-
tutions interaction: Complementary, accommodating, competing, and constitutive. These authors
argue that complementary informal institutions coexist with formal institutions such that actors
expect that the rules that exist on paper will in fact be enforced. These type of institutions gen-
erally “fill in the gap” left by formal institutions and address the problems or contingencies that
are not explicitly dealt with in the formal rules. Accordingly, the accommodating informal insti-
tutions are defined as the “second best” strategy for actors who dislike outcomes generated by the
formal rules but are unable to change or openly break these rules. These type of informal institu-
tions at times enhance the stability or sustainability of formal institutions by dampening demands
for change. These authors define competing informal institutions as those that structure actors
incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules: to follow one rule, actors must
violate another. Examples of these institutions include clientelism, patriamonialism, clan/ethnic
politics and other perticularistic institutions (O’Donnell, 1996). In the context of Kenya as ar-
gued elsewhere in the thesis, the formal institutions were reinforced by informal institutions in
particular the competing and accommodating institutions. The informal institutions (i.e. ethnic
politics) permitted sustenance of formal institutions that were largely shaped along clientelism
and patriamonialism. The abuse of state machinery and wide spread vote fraud pursued through
formal institutions was backed up by political players knowledge that they had majority vote from
their ethnic groups. Evidence of this close interaction between formal institutions and informal
institutions in Kenya is reflected in a number of events in which heads of parastatal enterprises, the
military, police and security apparatus were appointed along ethnic lines and then backed up by
corresponding legal formal institutions (Widner, 1992). Public goods provision (i.e. roads con-
struction) was done along ethnic lines yet backed up by legal framework (Burgess et al., 2013).
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Given our argument that formal institutions in Kenya closely tracked behaviour of political agents
and the interaction between formal and informal institutions in the country, this paper will first
test empirically if indeed institutions have persisted in Kenya using de-jure formal proxies. It will
explore the reasons for such persistence. It aligns theoretically with the framework proposed by
North and Thomas (1973a) that persistence of institutions is implied in path dependence. Thus
a test of path dependence remains largely a test for persistence of institutions. The concept of
path dependence was developed by Arthur (1994) and David (1994, 1985). It refers to situations
where the formation of current economic or institutional outcomes are shaped by the path of
earlier outcomes and not simply by current conditions. In that sense, history may have a lasting
effect on shaping current economic or institutional outcomes. According to Page (2006) path
dependence may arise due to: increasing returns to scale, self-enforcement, positive feedback,
and lock-in effects .
Page (2006) further provides rigorous definitions for the concept of path dependence, which en-
ables this study to test the assumption of persistence of our newly constructed institutional vari-
ables.Two distinct concepts that relate to the issue of path dependence are of interest: Outcome
dependence and equilibrium dependence. First, a dynamic process is outcome dependent if the
current outcome yt is determined by past outcomes yt−s where s = 1, ..., t. In Page’s parlance, an
outcome dependent process is said to be phat dependent when the history of outcomes matters
but not the sequence (order) in which that history has occurred. On the other hand, an outcome
dependent process is path dependent if the sequence of events in history matters. Secondly, the
data generating process (the distribution function) that transforms past outcomes into current out-
comes is equilibrium dependent if the limiting process or distribution does not converge to a
unique probability distribution function.
3.2.2 Political Institutions vs. Economic Institutions Hypothesis
In their latest book, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) make the compelling proposition that broad-
based/inclusive political institutions are a prerequisite for building the kind of economic institu-
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tions from which growth can translate into sustainable development. Using historical examples
to support their argument on why some nations fail and others succeed, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012) theorize that the political institutions which they claim cause economic institutions are the
root cause of these two outcomes. These authors further theorize that such political institutions
can be divided into two groups-extractive institutions and inclusive institutions. By extractive in-
stitutions, they refer to the type of institutions that are exploitative while the inclusive institutions
are those that allow many people to be included in the process of governance and the exploitation
process is usually absent. This hypothesis has not been empirically tested as it is fairly recent.
This study makes the first attempt to test this proposition in the context of Kenya. It adopts a
simplified causality approach in assessing whether there is a causal link coming from political
institutions to economic institutions.
3.2.3 Institutions vs. Economic Development Hypothesis
The economic theory on the role of institutions on economic development following the seminal
work of Douglass North has emphasized the importance of property rights institutions and po-
litical institutions in particular, in driving the process of economic development (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012; Rodrik et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001; En-
german and Sokoloff, 2000; North, 1990, 1987a). This causality coming from institutions to
economic development is premised on the argument that institutions provide the basic economic
incentive structure that stimulates investment in the key proximate causes of development: Hu-
man capital, physical capital and technological change. The overall economic incentive structure
itself is built on the assumption that sound institutions lower transaction costs thereby accelerate
the rate at which exchange takes place among economic agents(Fedderke and Klitgaard, 2013).
Aron (2000) echoes this argument and further elaborates that transaction costs are higher when
property rights or the rule of law are not reliable. Under such situations, he points out that firms
typically operate on a small scale, perhaps illegally in an underground economy, and may rely
on bribery and corruption to facilitate operations. He further points out that transformation costs
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too can be raised substantially because long-term contracts cannot be enforced hence firms are
bound to rely on short term contracts. The contractors use cheap technology which is often in-
efficient and uncompetitive. He concludes therefore that when institutions are poorly defined or
if there are few formal institutions, economic activities are restricted to interpersonal exchanges.
In such cases, repetitive activities and cultural homogeneity facilitate self-enforcement. Hence,
the basic structure of property rights that encourage long-term contracting appears essential for
the creation of well functioning markets and economic growth and development. The foregoing
arguments tend to corroborate the the theory that the direction of causality comes from institu-
tions to economic development. On the empirical front, this causal link has been defended and
ascertained to be both strong and robust (Fedderke and Klitgaard, 2013; Rigobon and Rodrik,
2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001).
However, some scholars argue for the reverse link. The basis for this opposite argument is the
Modernization theory following the seminal contributions of Lipset (1959). According to this
theory, economic development brings with it the requirement for institutional evolution, and that
if development is to be sustained, institutional development will itself be unavoidable (Fedderke
and Klitgaard, 2013). The burgeoning amount of empirical studies based on cross country anal-
yses has attempted to assess the validity of this theory. The evidence from these studies finds a
direct causal link coming from development to institutions. Thus providing support for the mod-
ernization theory (see Boix, 2011; Benhabib et al., 2011; Barro, 1991). However, a recent paper
by Acemoglu et al. (2008) claims not to find any causal effect of income on various measures of
democracy for instance. These authors argue that the asserted strong correlation between the two
breaks down when they control for time and country fixed effects using postwar data (1960-2000)
in their sample of countries. They posit that both democracy and higher income are caused by un-
derlying changes in institutional arrangements and specific historic events. This alternative view
they call “critical junctures hypothesis”(see Acemoglu et al., 2009).
However, Heid et al. (2012) criticise Acemoglu and Robinson (2008)’s methods in that they do
not take into account the persistent nature of both democracy and income. They argue that when
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such persistence is taken into account, they establish a strong link between the two variables in the
postwar period for a sample of 150 countries, and that their estimates are robust across different
model specifications and instrumental sets. Given these strikingly different views, the question
that arises is whether the causality between development and institutions holds at country specific
level? If it does, from what direction does the influence come?
3.3 Empirical Methods
This section presents the methods used to test the basic claims and the corresponding questions
posed in the foregoing section. These are-that institutions are persistent, that there is causality
between institutions and economic development, and that political institutions cause economic
institutions. However the estimation of empirical models in the thesis is potentially subject to
the problem of endogeneity of explanatory variables because of the likely feedback effects be-
tween institutions and economic development measures. It is reasonable to argue that institutions
and economic development outcomes are jointly determined, therefore subjecting our empirical
outcomes to some degree of bias. To address the problem of endogeneity bias in our empirical
analysis, we adopt a common approach used in time series literature of using the lag of vari-
ables as instrumental variables within an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Models. The broader
argument to support the use of internal instruments (lag of variables) is that it may be impossi-
ble to find highly convincing instruments for variations in institutions and measures of economic
development. As suggested by Clemens et al. (2012), the use of first differencing approach in
which explanatory variables enter in their lagged form is recommended and identification comes
from variations within the country overtime. This approach helps overcome reverse causality. We
however acknowledge that this approach is not without criticism.
3.3.1 Methods To Test Persistence (Path Dependence) of Institutions
Claim 1: The Colonial Institutions have Persisted in Kenya
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To test this claim, this research follows Freeman (2012) and uses the univariate Time Series
models in the framework of path dependence developed by Page (2006). Freeman (2012) shows
that a linear Time Series model with constant coefficients embodies all concepts associated with
outcome dependence, and phat dependence if variables under consideration exhibit cointegration.
That is to say a typical unit root test can be used to detect both an early outcomes dependence
and phat dependence process of a set of variables. Indeed, the random walk model yt = yt−1 + εt




εt−i implies that the variable yt depends on early outcomes
y0 and the sum of past shocks which are all equally weighted so that the sequence of history
is irrelevant. In addition because the variance of the outcome is usually time dependent in the
case of a random walk, the limiting distribution of outcomes will typically not converge so that
the random walk is also equilibrium dependent. Thus, all variables that exhibit non-stationary
behaviour are outcome dependent and phat dependent (see Page 2006:97).
Both the Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS) test and NG-Perron tests are used
to investigate whether institutions are path dependent. The NG-Perron test is performed to check
robustness of the results. The choice of these tests is based on the argument that they circum-
vent some of the problems inherent in the standard ADF test such as the weak power and size
distortions (Elliott and Stock., 1966).







ψ j∆ydt− j + εt (3.1)
Under this test, the data is detrended such that ydt = yt − β
′
θ̄
Dt where Dt contains deterministic
terms (i.e. trends and constants). Our null hypothesis is that π = 0 in equation (3.1)which implies
that our institutional series is a non-stationary against an alternative of stationary process. Table
3.1 reports the statistics from these two tests.
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3.3.2 Methods to Test Causality Between Institutions, and Institutions and Eco-
nomic Development
To test the remaining two propositions-that there is causality between institutions and economic
development, and that political institutions cause economic institutions, this research employs
the standard causality test proposed by Granger (1969) and Granger (1969, 1988) and discussed
in Geweke et al. (1983). This test is based upon the estimation of autoregressive or vector au-
toregressive (VAR) models. This test is chosen over other alternative techniques because of its
favourable response to both large and small samples (Granger, 1988). Granger (1969, 1988)
show that if the two Time Series are individually integrated of the same order, I(1), then there
exists causality between them at least in one direction. They further show in what is known as the
“Granger Representation Theorem” that such cointegrated variables could be modeled as a VAR
process in terms of the levels of data, I(1) or in terms of their first difference, I(0) with an addi-
tion of error correction term, (ECMt−1) to capture the short-run dynamics. However, if variables
are I(1) but not cointegrated, causality test cannot be derived correctly unless the variables are
transformed into stationary series.
Therefore the Granger (1988) causality test is performed on the I(1) variables (that is those that
exhibit cointegration) (see equation (3.9) and (3.10) for specification). For the variables that
are differenced (I(0)), the error correction term is included in the regression during the causality
testing as it is shown in equation (3.15) and (3.16). This second step is performed principally to
provide the robustness checks for the results.
However, there are two caveats that have emerged in the econometric literature regarding the con-
clusions drawn from the application of these tests in practice. These are that they are fragile due
to the ad hoc choice of the lag length, and that they are likely to suffer from spurious causality
due to the absence of cointegration (Oxley and Greasley, 1998). In the light of these caveats,
the three stage procedure as outlined in Oxley and Greasley (1998) is followed. To this end, all
variables are first tested for the order of integration using the commonly used tests of stationarity-
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the Dickey Fuller (DF) test and the Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DFGLS) test. The
second test is applied to check the robustness of the results from the first. In the second step,
and conditional on the results from the stationarity test, the cointegration of the variables in the
bi-variate equations is investigated using the Johansen cointegration test and the ARDL Bounds
test where applicable. In the third step, the error correction term from these results where coin-
tegration exists is taken and incorporated it into the model of short-run dynamics. Finally, the
standard causality type test with lagged error correction term is performed where appropriate.
Testing for Cointegration: the Johansen VECM Approach
To test for cointegration between the variables of interest, two approaches. These are the sys-
tem based approach proposed by Johansen and Juselius (Johansen, 1991; Johansen and Juselius,
1990) and the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (PSS) Bounds Test approach proposed by Pesaran et al.
(2001). The system based approach is used for all variables that are integrated of the same order
and the PSS approach for those that are integrated of different orders, the I(0) and I(1) vari-
ables. The system based approach is preferred to the commonly used single–equation Engle and
Granger (1987) two-step procedure, and the single-equation conditional error correction model
(ECM) test proposed by Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) because it turns out to have less power
distortions in small samples which makes it superior to other tests that tend to have smaller sample
size distortions (Haug, 1996 cited in Herzer et al. (2008)). However, it requires that all variables
be integrated of the same order. The Bounds test relaxes this restriction and allows for the test
of cointegration between variables integrated of different orders. Specifically, the test has the
additional advantage of yielding consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients that are asymp-
totically normal irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0). Therefore, the
latter test is applied in case of the Institutions-Development relationship since GDP per capita
growth is integrated of order zero, I(0) while institutional indicators are integrated of order one,
I(1). This notwithstanding, each method has specific advantages and disadvantages given partic-
ular assumptions about the data generating process.
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Under the Johansen test of cointegration, the trace test is used because of its superior power in
small samples Luutkepohl et al. (2002). Specifically, the reduced rank of the Π is tested where
r > 1, i.e. there is more than one cointegrating relationship present in the data against the null
hypothesis of one cointegration vector14. In cases where more than one cointegrating relationship
is found, we take theory-guided approach following Pesaran and Shin (1998) to impose the just-
identification restrictions and these restrictions help identify the unique cointegrating vectors in
our set of variables.
Testing for Cointegration: the ARDL Bounds Approach
The bounds test procedure also known as the PSS F-test was developed by Pesaran et al. (2001)
and has been proposed in the economic literature for investigating long-run association among
time-series variables that are integrated of different orders15. This test is based on the Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the Conditional Unrestricted Error Correction Model (UECM)
for cointegration analysis. It relies on the F-statistic generated from the cointegration equation
which is compared with the critical F-statistic documented by Pesaran et al. (1996). In its gener-
alized form, the test is performed on equation (3.4) and (3.5) which are derived from the ARDLof
order (p,q1,q2, ...qk) given in equation (3.2):






wt + εt ; t = 1, ...n (3.2)
where,yt is the dependent variable, c0 is the constant term, xit are the independent variables, L is
lag operator, and wt is the sx1 vector of deterministic variables including intercept terms, dummy
variables, time trends and other exogenous variables with fixed lags, φ(L, p) = 1−φ1L−φ2L2−
φ3L3− ....φpLp and βi(L,qi) = 1−βi1L−βi2L2−βi3L3− ...βiqLq
14See Appendix to this Chapter for the mathematical exposition for the VECM
15 see Pesaran et al. (2001) for a comprehensive description of this technique
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The conditional unrestricted error correction model version of the ARDL model is presented in
equation (3.3) and is obtained by taking the first difference of equation (3.2) and retaining a set of
variables in wt :










wt + εt ; t = 1, ...n (3.3)
where4 is the first difference operator, t is the trends, the coefficients ηi and θi express the short-
run dynamics of the model’s convergence to equilibrium, and Zt−1 = (y′t−1,x
′
t−1) expresses the
variables under consideration in level form. The error term εt could be partitioned into (εyt ,ε ′xt)
and the long-run multiplier matrix as Π=
 πyy πyx
πxy πxx
. Then under the assumption that πxy = 0,
it follows that:










wt + εyt ; t = 1, ...n (3.4)










wt + εt ; t = 1, ...n (3.5)
From equation (3.5) since πxy = 0, there is no dynamic feedback from the level of yt to xt in the
long-run. In other-words, {x}∞t=1 in the long-run is weakly exogenous to {y}
∞
t=1. However, the
possibility that {y}∞t=1 Granger causes {x}
∞
t=1 in the short-run is possible.
The PSS F-test, tests for the absence of any level relationship between yt and xt by testing for
the exclusion of lagged variables yt−1 and xt−1. This test is based on the hypothesis that πyx = 0,
under the sequential treatment of all variables in the specification as the outcome variables. The
rejecting of the null hypothesis establishes the existence of a level relationship, hence the rejection
of the weak exogeneity for the y−variable specified under the test. In the present case, the PSS
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F-test is operationalised by considering the Conditional Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)













The order of augmentation is determined by the need to ensure that the error term is free of
any systematic variation in order to extract the long-run relationship. The null hypothesis of “no
long-run relationship” is specified in equation (3.7) and is tested against the alternative hypothesis
given in equation (3.8) using the standard Wald test or the F-statistic:
H0 : ϕ1 = ϕ2 = 0 (3.7)
H1 : ϕ1 6= ϕ2 6= 0 (3.8)
However, this F-statistic has a non-standard distribution and it is influenced by whether the vari-
ables are I(0) or I(1). To circumvent this weakness, Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulate the two asymp-
totic critical values to be used. The upper bound critical value of F denoted by FU assumes that all
variables are I(1) and the lower bound critical statistic denoted by FL assumes that all variables are
I(0). If the estimated F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical F-statistic (F̂ > FU), we
reject the null hypothesis of “no long-run” relationship between level variables and conclude that
there is a long-run relationship between the variable of interest. On the other-hand if F-statistic
computed is lower than the lower bound critical value proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) (F̂ < FL),
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of “no long-run” relationship between variables of interest. If
F-statistic computed falls between these critical values (FU > F̂ > FL), the result is inconclusive.
However, Narayan (2005) notes that the critical values provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) cannot
be used in small samples since they were generated for large samples sizes ( i.e. 500 and 1000
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observations and 20 000 and 40 000 replications respectively). He then tabulates the critical val-
ues for smaller samples of size 30 to 80 observations, using the same GAUSS code as Pesaran
et al.,(2001). The critical values he reports are smaller than those generated and reported by Pe-
saran et al. (2001). Therefore given the small sample size used in this chapter (50 observations),
the analysis is based on the critical values provided by Narayan (2005). During the estimation
process, political regime shifts is controlled for through the use of the impulse dummy variables.
Impulse dummy variables are used because they enable the three political transition periods to
be characterised corresponding to the transition from the Colonial regime to Kenyatta’s regime,
from Kenyatta’s regime to Moi’s regime, from Moi’s regime to Kibaki’s regime. Thus 1963=1
and zero otherwise; 1978=1 and zero otherwise; 2002=1 and zero otherwise respectively. These
transition periods represent different policy and institutional discharges by different regime lead-
ers which could potentially affect the other macroeconomic variables in the model. The ordinary
least squares (OLS) is then applied to equation (3.6) in order to test for the existence of a long-run
relationship among the variables by conducting an F-test for the joint significance of the coef-
ficient of the lagged levels of the variables. Next, the causality test is run for all equations of
interest. The causality procedure followed is outlined below.
Causality Test Model Specifications
Claim 2: Institutions affect Economic Development in Kenya
The above claim states that there is a causal link between institutions and economic development.
The literature on this link has presented mixed results as discussed in the previous sections. More
specifically some authors have argued that development/income leads to better institutions (the
Modernization hypothesis) while others see the link coming from institutions to both income and
democracy (the Critical Juncture hypothesis). The standard causality test employed here to test
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this claim is based on the following set of equations16:








θ2iYt− j + εt (3.9)








β2 jIt− j + vt (3.10)
where εt and vt are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated random disturbances; Yt is the measure of
economic development at time t; It is the measure of the quality of institutions at time t; n,m,q
and r are lag lengths chosen on the basis of minimizing the Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPE)
following Giles et al. (1992). The specific hypothesis tested is:
H0 : θ11 = θ12 = θ13 = ...= θ1n = 0 (3.11)
H1i : θ1i 6= 0 at least one θ1i 6= 0 f or i = 1, ...,n (3.12)
Therefore the rejection of the null hypothesis implies that I Granger causes Y (I⇒Y ). Similarly,
Y Granger causes I (Y ⇒ I) if the following null hypothesis is rejected:
H0 : β1 j = β12 = β13 = ...= β jn = 0 (3.13)
H1 j : β1 j 6= 0 at least one β1 j 6= 0 f or j = 1, ...,q (3.14)
The second test that serves also as the robustness check is based on the differenced data series.
As it is argued earlier, according to Granger (1988) if the cointegration system of the two series
can be expressed in the ECM representation, then there must be causality ordering in at least one
direction. Hence, the long-run causality test between institutions and economic development is
implemented by estimating the following bi-variate error correction model:
16see also Zhang (2001); Hansen and Rand (2006, for the use of these methods) for similar specifications
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θ2i∆It− j +δECMt−1 + εt (3.15)








β2 j∆DeltaYt− j +ΦECMt−1 + vt (3.16)
where: ECMt−1is the one period lagged error correction term captured from the cointegration re-
gression; Yt is the measure of economic development (the real GDP growth per capita (RGDPpc))
at time t; It is the measure of the quality of institutions (both the political rights and civil liberties,
and property rights-freehold rights and customary rights) at time t; ε1tand ε2t are uncorrelated
white noise residuals; α1 and α2 are constants;θ1i,β1 jand θ2i,β2 j are coefficients of lagged de-
pendent and explanatory variable respectively; n,m,q and r are the lag length of variables chosen
on the basis of minimizing the Akaike’s Final Prediction Error (FPE) following Giles et al. (1992).
Since ∆logYt and ∆logIt represent the first difference of variables, they must be stationary and the
right hand side must as well be stationary provided that_ε1t and ε2t are stationary. Thus equation
(3.15) and (3.16) represent a bi-variate VAR in the first differences of variables augmented by the
error correction term ECMt−1. The test for the long-run causality between variables of interest
is implied through the significance of the t-statistics of the lagged error correction term while
the short-run causality is inferred through the F-statistics which is estimated following the Wald
procedure by comparing the residual sum of squares under the unrestricted model with the residual
sum of squares under the restricted one.
Specifically, the hypothesis tested is:
H0 : θ21 = θ22 = θ23 = ...= θ2n = 0 or δ1 = 0 (3.17)
H2i : θ2i 6= 0 at least one θ2i 6= 0 f or i = 1, ...,n or δ1 6= 0 (3.18)
Therefore the rejection of the null hypothesis implies that ∆I Granger causes ∆Y (∆I ⇒ ∆Y ).
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Similarly, ∆Y Granger causes ∆I (∆Y ⇒ ∆I) if the following null hypothesis is rejected:
H0 : β21 = β22 = β23 = ...= β jn = 0 or Φ = 0 (3.19)
H2 j : β2 j 6= 0 at least one β2 j 6= 0 f or j = 1, ...,n or Φ 6= 0 (3.20)
Claim 3: Political Institutions drive Economic Institutions in Kenya
As noted earlier this proposition follows directly from the recent works of Acemoglu and Robin-
son (2012); North (1993). It states that political institutions cause economic institutions. That
implies that there is at-least one directional causality flowing from political institutions to eco-
nomic institutions. To test this hypothesis, the same strategy is followed here to the one discussed
under claim II. The variables included in the test however are only institutional variables. This
strategy is implemented on the following set of equations:








θ2iPrclt− j + εt (3.21)








β2 jFhprt− j + vt (3.22)
where εt and vt are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated random disturbances; Fhprt is the measure of
quality of economic institutions at time t; Prclt is the measure of the quality of political institutions
at time t; n,m,q and r are again lag lengths chosen on the basis of minimizing the Akaike’s Final
Prediction Error (FPE) following Giles et al. (1992). The hypothesis to be tested is specified as
under claim II. The test is also performed on the differenced variables as specified in equation
(3.23) and (3.24) below:








θ2i∆Prclt− j +δECMt−1 + εt (3.23)
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β2 j∆Fhprt− j +ΦECMt−1 + vt (3.24)
where: ECMt−1is again the one period lagged error correction term captured from the cointe-
gration regression; Fhprt is the proxy for the quality of economic institutions (property rights
variable) at time t; Prclt is the variable that captures the quality of political institutions (political
rights and civil liberties) at time t; ε1tand ε2t are uncorrelated white noise residuals; α1 and α2
are constants;θ1i,β1 jand θ2i,β2 j are coefficients of lagged dependent and explanatory variables
respectively. The long-run and short-run causal relationship is inferred in the same manner as
discussed under proposition II above.
3.3.3 Variables, Data and Stylized Facts
This study uses an annual dataset on real GDP per capita growth for Kenya and a set of the insti-
tutional indicators to test the claims discussed in the foregoing section. The data on real GDP per
capita growth is obtained from the World Development Indicators for 2012. Data on economic
institutions is proxied by the freehold property rights index and customary rights index, and that
on political institutions is proxied by the political rights and civil liberties index. These indicators
are computed from the formal legislative history and legal framework17 governing immovable
property (land), and that which affect citizen’s political rights and civil liberties in a society re-
spectively. The computation procedure for the latter dataset is explained in the previous chapter
and in Letete et al. (2011). All variables span a 50-year (1960-2010) period. The use of property
rights as a proxy for economic institutions is well established in the new institutional economics
literature18 followed in this study. Similarly, the use of political rights and civil liberties as a proxy
for political institutions also finds support in the same literature (Fedderke and Klitgaard, 2013;
BenYishay and Betancourt, 2010). However it is worth highlighting the two basic premises on
which it is based. First, these indicators as argued in BenYishay and Betancourt (2010) are the
17Formal legislative history and legal framework here refer to Acts of Parliament, Amendments, and Proclamations
to already existing statutes as well as proclamations and parliamentary approved directives issued under the aegis of
enabling legislation.
18Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012); Besley and Ghatak (2009); Fedderke et al. (2001); Acemoglu (1995); North (1987a)
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fundamental indicators of the prevalence of the rule of law in a society. Second, the prevalence of
the rule of law itself is a key factor determining the rate of economic growth and development of
an economy in the longterm.
The evolution of these institutional indicators over time is discussed in detailed in the previous
chapter. The only variable that merits a brief discussion is real GDP per capita growth. Fig-
ure (3.1) plots real GDP growth for Kenya and that of Sub-Saharan African (henceforth SSA)
countries (5-year moving average) during the five decade of the post-colonial rule.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of GDP per capita growth in Kenya and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1963-2011
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During the first period (the Kenyatta regime) Kenya achieved commendable economic growth
compared to the rest of the SSA countries. During this period the real GDP growth per capita grew
at 3 percent per year on average. As the population growth continued to exceed growth in incomes,
real per capita growth declined. Thus the growth acceleration of the early years of independence
was followed by deceleration between 1980 and 1990. In this period, the economy realized
negative per capita growth rates and this marked the period of stagnation. During this period,
the economy faced a number of macroeconomic challenges such as the balance of payments
crisis. This period was also characterized by lack of respect for the rule of law and the collapse
in both political and economic institutions. It was during this period that a number of policy
reversals were observed in the economy. Moi’s regime became the failed regime. Real growth
per capita recovered in 2002 following three decades of stagnation and crisis. However, growth
recovery that occurred during Kibaki’s regime was not sustained as the economy suffered once
again the negative per capita growth rates in 2007 following the post election violence. Given
these dynamics in growth performance, the question is whether weak institutions could explain
this growth path. I will turn to this question under the analysis of causality between economic
development and institutions.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
3.4.1 Are Institutions Persistent?
The first issue addressed is whether institutions are indeed persistent. Table (3.1) presents the
results for the test of persistence of institutions. The statistics for the DFGLS are reported for
the level of variables denoted by Z, and for the first difference of variables denoted by ∆Z. The
statistics for the first difference are reported for NG-Perron test since the aim of using this test was
only to verify that indeed our variables are first difference stationary. The DFGLS test statistics for
all the variables expressed in the level form are below the 95% critical values suggesting that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root. However, the first difference of all the institutional
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variables turn out to be stationary. The DFGLS statistics are greater than the 95% critical values
indicating that we reject the hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity) for the first difference of
variables. These findings are supported by the NG-Perron test.19 These results indicate that all
our institutional variables are integrated of order one (i.e. ∼ I(1)).
The test statistics show that all the institutional indicators exhibit the non-stationarity characteris-
tic, which suggests the existence of path dependence. The non-stationarity of various institutional
series implies that the institutions are both outcome dependent and phat dependent. This implies
that the level of institutions observed today depends on the past realization of institutions. Hence,
the key contemporary institutions in the independent Kenya State have been shaped by Kenya’s
colonial past. Despite numerous amendments to these institutions during the post independence
period, they have shown a great deal of resilience and persistence. This result justifies the propo-
sition that although institutions change, they are persistent over time. These results are robust to
alternative econometric models used-be it DFGLS or NG-Perron test.
These results are of interest for two reasons. First, it is to the best of the author’s knowledge,
the first econometric attempt to test the hypothesis of institutional path dependence in the case
of Kenya. Second, it provides strong support in favour of this assumption which has been made
time and again in the institutions-development literature. An example is Acemoglu et al. (2001)
who use the argument of the persistence of institutions to justify their instrumentation strategy.
Although one observes some volatility on political institutions as reflected in figure 2.1 in the
previous Chapter, such volatility is one time event that we also control for using a dummy variable.
Therefore the possibility of having dummy variables dummying out the episodes of institutional
19The NG-Perron test relies on four statistics, MZα , MZT , MSB and MPT . The first two of these statistics are
negative and the other two are positive (see Table 3.6). Therefore for us to decide whether there is unit root, we
compare the two positive statistics and the two negative statistics with the 95 percent critical values provided by NG-
Perron. If the computed negative and positive statistics are less than the NG-Perron critical values, we reject the
hypothesis of unit root and conclude that the variables are stationary. Table 3.6, shows that the computed negative
statistics for all variables are less than the NG-Perron negative critical values and the computed positive statistics for
all variables are less than the positive critical values hence we reject the unit root hypothesis and conclude that our




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































change and creating bias in favour of persistence is less likely. Nonetheless, such possibility is
acknowledged.
The standard vector error-correction model (VECM) is also used to examine further if the insti-
tutional variables exhibit equilibrium dependence. Freeman (2012) notes that according to Page
(2006)’s framework, there are two possibilities of equilibrium dependence: (1). outcome de-
pendence and non-equilibium dependence and (2). outcome dependence and equilibrium depen-
dence. The concern here is with the later dependence. The cointegrating term ΠZt−1 = αβ ′Zt−1
from the equation 3.31 highlighted earlier and reproduced below for ease of reference embodies
both early outcomes dependence and phat dependence due to the presence of unit root through
variable in Zt−1. This is similar to the random walk case discussed earlier. In this model, sequence
outcome dependence (in the sense that the order of history matters) is also present since the short
run dynamics hinge upon time-varying weights Γi where i = 1, ..., p−1 (Freeman, 2012).




Γi∆Zt−i +µ +ut (3.25)





which prevent ∆Zt to end up in a rest point. As a result, equilibrium dependence is possible even
in the long run equilibrium. In other words, if the rank of the π matrix is zero, the system amounts
to a set of independent, first order integrated variables which implies the existence of an indepen-
dent set of phat dependent processes for which the respective initial values of the variables do not
decay. However, if the rank (r) of π is greater than zero but less than n, there are r cointegrating
vectors. That is there are r moving equilibria between the phat outcome dependent variables.
To test for phat outcome dependence, we divide the sample into two periods-the colonial period
(1884-1960) and the post colonial period (1963-2010) because they represent two distinct phases
in the history of Kenya. However the phat outcome dependence relationship is still tested for
the full sample (1884-2010). Table (3.2) reports the trace statistics and the maximum eigenvalue
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statistics for various combinations of the institutional indicators for the sub-samples. The Table
shows that political institutions (prcl) and economic institutions ( f hpr and n f hpr) display some
form of long-run relationship during the colonial period (1884-1960) and during the post colonial
period. These results imply that these indicators were equilibrium outcome dependent. This was
particularly so between political rights and civil liberties (prcl) and non-freehold property rights
(n f hpr). Thus in the long run, these institutional indicators could be represented in the form
of a stable linear equilibrium association. It needs to be recalled that the test of institutional
persistence is implied by both phat dependence and equilibrium outcome dependence.
The results in Table (3.2) completes our tests for institutional persistence. But why did institutions
persist in Kenya? The persistence of institutions in Kenya could perhaps be understood through
the events that took placed during the transition from the colonial rule to self-rule in 1963. During
this transition period, the imperial government had in place a planned strategy that would safe-
guard their interest in the economy. This strategy aimed at preserving the interests of the settlers
and was operated through collaboration with a few political elites who took over from the imperial
powers. The institutions that were in place which protected the minority white settlers were never
changed, especially those governing land resources. Large tracks of land were taken over through
the willing buyer willing seller policy in which Kenya used the British money to acquire those
pieces of land from the departing settlers. Having acquired land for themselves, the independence
government had little incentive to change the structure of laws governing property rights. They
also wished to grab land held under native reserves, and that which had been expropriated by the
British settlers, and give it to a few political elites and those with political connections.
Secondly, the new political leadership was self interested and convinced by the capitalist mode of
production. It therefore considered traditional systems of land tenure inefficient and considered
that it acted as disincentive for farmers to develop their holdings. They needed to protect their
investment in land resources, and therefore they promoted individualized tenure holdings in the
economy. This argument finds support in the theory that persistence may result from the invest-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































it was argued that if the ruling elites are few, each would have a larger share of the resources of
the country, hence the continuity of the extractive institutions. In contrast, if there are investment
opportunities for such elites, they would opt for institutions that protect private property. At the
same time if political elites that come to power do not possess comparative advantage in invest-
ment activities, then they would be less willing to enforce private property institutions. Indeed it
is not surprising that the Kenyan political elites promoted private property in land resources.They
had investment in land resources which they had acquired for themselves following the end of
imperial rule and the white settlers’ departure. Immediately following independence they sup-
ported agriculture with huge subsidies that were also meant to benefit themselves (Bates, 1981).
In terms of political institutions, persistence is observed in an opposite direction where the ruling
elites created once again a repressive state similar to that observed during the colonial period.
Although just before independence political institutions had improved, they deteriorated a few
years following independence. The repressive colonial structures were resuscitated. A repressive
system of governance then followed. The rights of citizens were not respected by the indige-
nous ruling elites. This reversal of fortunes in democratic principles might have had a bearing on
economic development in this economy.
3.4.2 Do Political Institutions cause Economic Institutions?
The second issue addressed is whether there is evidence of causality between political institutions
and economic institutions20. Friedman and Friedman (2002) argue that the two institutions are
mutually reinforcing. In their view, an expansion of political rights-more “democracy”fosters
economic rights which in turn tend to stimulate economic growth. This view is buttressed by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) in their recent influential book in which they argue that broad-
based political institutions are a prerequisite for building the kind of economic institutions from
which growth can translate into sustainable development. However, the growth retarding aspects
of democracy have also been stressed (see Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). From the test of
20See Sirowy and Inkeles (1990),Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for complete survey on these debates.
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phat dependence presented in the foregoing section, it is clear that there exists causality among
institutional indicators at-least in one direction. This causality is confirmed using the standard
causality tests outlined in the previous sections in equations (3.21), (3.22), (3.23) and (3.24).
Six ECM models with two lags (two for each period) are estimated, as well as six VAR unre-
stricted models with two lags. The results from these models are shown in Table (3.3), (3.4)
and (3.5). These Tables present the error correction term (ECMt−1) with its significance value and
F-statistics for the different bi-variate results from different rights combinations. The causal in-
ference in the latter column of these Tables summarizes the results. For the period 1960-2010, the
results show the presence of long run causality between the political institutions measured by po-
litical rights and civil liberties (prcl) and the economic institutions measured by freehold property
rights( f hpr). This uni-directional causality runs from political institutions (prcl) to economic in-
stitutions ( f hpr). No reverse causality is detected coming from economic institutions to political
institutions. This result lends support to the hypothesis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that
political institutions cause economic institutions.
During the same period, the research finds strong evidence of bidirectional causality between
economic institutions measured by non-freehold property rights and political institutions proxied
by political rights and civil liberties. This evidence shows that political institution (prcl) drove
economic institutions (n f hpr) and the latter in turn drove political institution during the post
independence period. These results are not surprising given that during this period, both rights
worsened. The relationship between political institutions and non-freehold rights has not been
a subject of discussion in the literature since measuring non-freehold property rights has been
difficult. For the full sample (1884-2010), the study finds an association between political institu-
tions and freehold economic institutions with strong causality coming from economic institution
to political institutions. However the reverse causality remains very weak as this does not pass the
robustness check using the level model. This result appears contrary to the claim by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012) that it is political institutions that cause economic institutions. It therefore
provides the first caution that sometimes the reverse causality could hold hence the economic lit-
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erature needs to consider all possibilities under different circumstances. This study however fails
to find any long-run relationship between political institutions and economic institutions (mea-
sured by non-freehold property rights) during this period. For the colonial period, the results in
Table (3.5) do not show any causal relationship between these rights indicators. This result is
expected given that this was the time of expropriation and the white settlers did not promote the
rights of citizens. There was often divergence in the rights held by white settlers and those held
by the natives.
Causality Results
The results reported in Table (3.3) and (3.4) show that there is a stable positive long run rela-
tionship between political institutions (prcl) and economic institutions ( f hpr) during the post
colonial era. This relationship is statistically significant which also connotes the presence of
equilibrium dependence (path dependence). The results are plausible given that the laws passed
during the post colonial period affected both indices equally. Thus deterioration of land rights
in both systems occurred at the same time. This relationship is supported by the evidence21 that
from the 1950s onwards, the colonial and post-colonial administrations sought to pursue dras-
tic reforms to change the non-freehold tenure system into a privatized freehold regime with the
objective of furthering the capitalistic mode of production. Specifically, this research finds the






It also finds a stable bi-causal relationship between non-freehold property rights (n f hpr) and
political institutions (prcl). This relationship is presented in equation (29) and (30) respectively:
21See the following laws which were enacted to promote free-holding in the customary land holdings: The Native
Land Registration Ordinance, No.27 of 1959 ( or the Land Registration Special Areas); The Land Consolidation Act




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































However, during the colonial era, the development of the freehold property rights came at the
erosion of non-freehold property rights and political rights and civil liberties. The erosion of
non-freehold property rights undermined the process of economic development of the indigenous
agricultural sector while promoting that of the European settlers(Sorrenson, 1968). The results
in equation (3.26) and (3.28), verify Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)’s assertion that political
institutions cause economic institutions. This claim is found to hold for the African country
under study. It is however, noted from equation (3.27) and (3.29), that there is the possibility for
economic institutions to cause political institutions. This possibility is in line with the claim by
Friedman and Friedman (2002) that the two institutions are mutually reinforcing. In their view,
an expansion of political rights-more “democracy”fosters economic rights which in turn tend to
stimulate demand for more political rights and civil liberties and in the process promote economic
growth.
3.4.3 Institutions and Economic Development-Causality Revelations from Alter-
native Proxies
The third issue addressed is whether the direction of causality between institutions and measures
of economic development runs from institutions to economic development or vice versa? In ad-
dressing this issue, we use a dataset for the post-independent period because of the paucity of
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dataseton macroeconomic variables before independence. The study again starts by investigat-
ing the Time Series properties of the variables at hand and the cointegration test is performed
between them using the ARDL cointegration technique discussed earlier. The purpose of testing
for stationarity before running any regression is to avoid spurious regressions. The cointegration
analysis is a preliminary test of causality since the existence of cointegration between two Time
Series variables that are individually integrated of the same order, I(1), implies the existence of
causality between them at least in one direction (Granger, 1969, 1988). Table (3.1) shows that
all the institution variables are non-stationary. This is supported by the standard unit root tests
that shows that the DF-GLS computed statistics is lower than the DF-GLS critical value statistics
at a 5 percent level of significance, which suggests that all the variables are integrated of order
one. This implies that the hypothesis of unit root cannot be rejected at this level of significance
hence our variables are non-stationary. In addition, we test real GDP per capita and real GDP per
capita growth for stationarity and find the former is found to be non stationary hence integrated
of order one, I(1) while the latter is stationary, hence integrated of order zero, I(0). The results of
this test are presented in Table (3.6). The Table shows that unit root test statistic for RGDPPC is
lower than the DF-GLS critical value statistics at 5 percent level of significance. Hence we can-
not reject the hypothesis that RGDPPC has unit root. However the first difference of RGDPPC is
stationary as shown by the DF-GLS that is greater than the DF-GLS critical values at a 5 percent
level of significance. This implies we reject the hypothesis of unit root for the first difference of
RGDPPC. At the same time the unit root test for real growth rate (RGDPg) shows that DF-GLS
computed statistics is greater than the DF-GLS critical values at a 5 percent level of significance
hence the rejection of the hypothesis for unit root for RGDPg.
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Table 3.6: Results for Unit Root Tests
DF-GLS Ng-Perron





RGDPPC 1 −0.53 −3.59∗∗∗ −16.13 −2.77 0.17 1.76 I(1)
RGDPg 1 −3.29∗∗∗ ... ... ... ... ... I(0)
Notes: Asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively
∆= first difference. Variables are as defined in Table 2.7
The DF-GLS critical statistics are -2.59, -1.94 and -1.61 at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively.
Ng-Perron critical values at 1% level of significance are -13.8; -2.58; 0.174 and 1.78,
while at 5% are: –8.10; -1.98; 0. 23 and 3.17 for MZ, MZt, MSB, and MPT respectively.




Having tested the stationarity of variables, a test is carried out for cointegration between the
institutional variables and real GDP per capita and real GDP per capita growth . The results of
these tests are presented in Table(3.7). The results based on a bounds test show the existence
of a long-run relationship (cointegration) between our institutional indicators and measures of
economic development. Since the estimated F-statistics (i.e. 6.28; 7.89 and 5.87) in the three cases
tested fall above the 5% critical values provided by Narayan (2005) for a sample size between 40
and 80 , the null-hypothesis of “No cointegration” between variables of interest is rejected. It is
concluded therefore that there is cointegration between the variables and hence causality runs in
at-least one direction. Therefore the claim that institutions have affected the process of economic
development in Kenya cannot be rejected. The next step is to formally test for this direction
of causality between variables. The results for the causality between institutional variables and
economic development indicators are presented in Table(3.8).
Causality Results
Do Institutions drive Economic Development in Kenya? To address this question, further in-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































presents the results of causality between measures of institutions and economic development indi-
cators. The Table shows that there is at-least uni-directional long-run causality between freehold
property rights and real economic growth in Kenya. The significance of the error term indi-
cates that this long-run causality runs from freehold property rights to economic growth but not
vice-versa. The deviations from the long-run equilibrium between freehold property rights and
economic growth are corrected by more than 100 percent in the short-run. The significance of the
Wald-test statistics further supports the rejection of the null-hypothesis that the coefficients val-
ues of the lags of the freehold property rights variable are equal to zero. This further supports the
hypothesis of the long-run causality running from freehold property rights to economic growth in
Kenya. This implies that improvement in the status of freehold property rights is likely to lead
to investment hence economic growth in the long-run in the country. The research also finds the
long-run uni-directional causality running from the non-freehold property rights to real economic
growth. The significance of both the error term and the Wald statistics when real economic growth
is explained by non-freehold property rights institutions indicates that there is causality running
from non-freehold property rights to economic growth in the country. Similarly, long-run causal-
ity is found to run from political rights and civil liberties to real economic growth. However the
association between political rights and civil liberties, and economic growth is not robust as it
fails to satisfy the robustness checks based on the level series. Nonetheless, these results sup-
port the findings from Fedderke and Klitgaard (2013) that institutions in the form of rights have
an influence on output across a number of countries and this association differs from country to
country. The results also support the institution-development hypothesis that institutions drive the
process of economic development. These findings carry important implications in that securely
anchored political rights on average are likely to render more specific freedoms such as property
rights more credible, and hence effectively drive economic growth. The findings imply further
that under best rights dispensations, there are significance efficiency gains to be made that could











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.5 Summary and Conclusion
This Chapter has provided the first application of the newly constructed indicators computed in
the previous Chapter. The research first tested the theoretical assumption that institutions are per-
sistent. The results from this test show that institutions are time variant: The property that implies
institutions are indeed path dependent or persistent. This result validates this commonly held the-
oretical assumption which is often used when modeling institutions in institution-development de-
bates. Second, causality between different types of institutions-political institutions and economic
institutions was tested. The results from this test show the presence of long run causality between
political institutions measured by political rights and civil liberties (prcl) and economic institu-
tions measured by freehold property rights( f hpr) during the post independence period. This uni-
directional causality runs from political institutions (prcl) to economic institutions ( f hpr). This
result lends support to the hypothesis by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that political institu-
tions cause economic institutions, which in turn cause long-term growth and development. When
economic institutions are measured through non-freehold property rights, we find strong evidence
of bidirectional causality between non-freehold property rights and political institutions proxied
by political rights and civil liberties. This evidence shows that political institutions (prcl) drive
the non-freehold economic institutions (n f hpr) and the latter in turn drives political institutions
in Kenya. The relationship between political institutions and non-freehold rights has not been a
subject of discussion in the literature since measuring non-freehold property rights has been dif-
ficult in empirical work. When the test of causality is performed on the full sample (1884-2010),
weak causality is found running from economic institutions to political institutions. However this
weak reverse causality does not pass robustness checks using the model with variables in their
level form. Although this result appears contrary to the claim by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)
that it is political institutions that cause economic institutions, the large sample size used in this
study might have distorted the results due to the presence of structural breaks although these were
controlled for. These results have strong implications for the analysis of the relationship between
economic institutions and political institutions, and on whether countries that reform their eco-
132
nomic institutions first are more likely to experience economic growth dividends than those that
reform their political institutions first. The results presented in this chapter show the possibility
that the reverse causality could hold hence the economic literature and institutional reformists
need to be cautious and consider all different possible associations before recommending any
policy reform. On the basis of the results from this paper, this thesis argues that the poor eco-
nomic development path in Kenya is a result of the continuation of colonial structures in the post
colonial state by the ruling elites.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
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The VECM and Johansen Procedure for Testing for Cointegration
The Johansen system procedure is based on a Vector Error Correction model (VECM) derived
from the following Vector Autogressive (VAR) model, say of order p:
Zt = A1Zt−1 +A2Zt−2 + ...+ApZt−p +µ +ut (3.30)
where Zt is a vector of n variables (institutional and economic variables), Ais (with i = 1, ..., p)
denote a set of p vectors of n parameters each, µ denotes deterministic elements, and ut represents
an n× 1 vector of standard normal white noise errors. For all variables that are integrated of
order 1, the model is specified as a vector error-correction model (VECM) to avoid spurious
correlations:




Γi∆Zt−i +µ +ut (3.31)








A j. If the coefficient matrix Π has reduced
rank r such that 0< r < n, then there exist two n×r matrices α and β with Rank(α) =Rank(β ) =
r such that Π = αβ ′ and the vector β ′Zt−1 is stationary. In such a case, there are r cointegrating
relationships. The vector β ′Zt−1 characterizes the long run equilibrium, while matrix α can be
interpreted as the speed of adjustment towards the long run equilibrium. The matrix of parameters
Γi reflects the short run dynamics.
To determine the number of cointegrating relationships, Johansen (1991) proposes two likelihood
ratio tests: (i) the trace test which tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the
alternative hypothesis of n cointegrating vectors, and (ii) the maximum eigenvalue test which, on
the other hand, tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors against the alternative hypoth-
esis of r+1 cointegrating vectors.
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Table 3.9: Cointegrating Vectors: Long-run Relationships Among Institutional Indices
Cointegration Vector post colonial period colonial period
1 2 3
FhPR 1.00 1.00 -2.3∗∗∗ 0.39
... [1.06] [0.20]
NFhPR -1.17∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -1.97∗∗∗ 1.00
[0.13] [0.14] [0.42] —
PrCL .. (rest) 1.00
(0.00)
ECM1 -0.10∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.04∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.0018] [0.004] [0.02]
ECM2 -0.03∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗
[0.005] [0.007]
ECM-error correction term; Variables are defined in Table 2.7.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Foreign Direct Investment and
Institutions in Kenya: Are Institutions
A Binding Constraint?
“We find that institutions are a robust predictor of FDI and that the most significant institutional aspects are linked to
property rights.”
– Ali A.Fathi et al. (2010)
4.1 Introduction
SINCE the early 1980s, the search for the long-term drivers of economic development hasled many African countries to significantly ease restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI), and to aggressively offer tax incentives and subsidies to attract foreign capital1. Despite
such incentives, FDI net inflows have at best been disappointing with investment only taking place
1The motivation for doing so was their firmly held belief that FDI would promote their economic growth and
long-term economic development
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in the natural resource endowed economies such as Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. A large
number of the other African economies (including Kenya) lost the race for FDI. This raises two
obvious interrelated questions: First, why are these developing countries not able to attract FDI?
How important is FDI to the process of economic development of these countries?
In response to the first question, the emerging literature by the New Institutional Economists fol-
lowing the seminal works of Douglass North (1993, 1990, 1973,1970) claims that these countries
fail to attract FDI due to weaknesses in institutions and/or the lack of their enforcement (Rigobon
and Rodrik, 2005; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2003). This literature singles out the protection of
property rights, and political institutions in particular, to be the main binding constraints on FDI
in developing countries. This literature argues that property rights in developing countries are
informally defined and weakly enforced (Stiglitz, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001). In the light of
these assertions developing countries are advised by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions
to get institutions right. That is, to develop and protect private property rights, attain good gov-
ernance and democratize in much the same way that the triptych of "liberalization, privatization,
and stabilization" was the mantra of the 1980s (Xu, 2011; Rodrik, 2008; Stiglitz, 2001). In
this context the role of the state is recognized to be to codify and protect such rights. This is
regarded as an essential precondition for economic development. African countries in particular
are advised to undertake market-oriented reforms. They are told that such reforms should focus
mainly on institution building (Stiglitz, 2001). The proposed market-oriented reforms are seen as
ultimate solutions to the African economic problems because they provide the incentive structure
for foreign investors to channel their capital into these countries2.
However, the evidence in support of the influence of property rights on investment is often based
on either cross country analyses or analyses of a panel of countries outside Africa (see Saleh,
2004, for summary evidence). Rodrik (2008) notes that such evidence is uninformative because
it ignores the influence of institutions (property rights) at a country level despite the recognition
that developing countries are different from the advanced economies. He further argues that
2These issues are particularly considered pressing given the relatively poor performance and lack of development
financing in Africa.
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because countries are heterogeneous, the kind of institutions that work in one country might not
necessarily work in another and developing countries might need “appropriate” institutions. By
“appropriate institutions” reference is made here to those institutions that are country and context
specific. Thus the quality of institutions in one country cannot be regarded a prototype model
for other countries to emulate. In addition, Rodrik (2007:15) argues that while competitiveness-
enhancing institutions have the same functions across economies-namely, the protection of private
property-their form is context specific, and history dependent. In the light of Rodrik’s arguments,
an exploration of the influence of property rights institutions on economic outcomes at the country
specific level is warranted. Chang (2011) endorses this argument. The country case studies
will validate or refute generalized suppositions on the influence of property rights on investment.
Some countries in Africa, such as Angola, Tanzania and Nigeria have received more foreign
investment than others in recent times, despite their similarity of their property rights institutions.
This provides further justification for country specific case studies that may help explain these
differences in FDI flows.
It is against this backdrop that this chapter addresses the two basic questions posed at its opening.
In particular, it assesses the validity of the claim that the property rights institutions are a binding
constraint to FDI. Kenya is used as a case study for this exercise. The section also addresses the
question of how important FDI is to Kenya’s economic development. The focus is on FDI rather
than other forms of capital because it is claimed to involve long term commitment, and may have
far reaching effects on the growth of host nations due to technology spillover and innovation
(Dunning, 2001; Barrell and Holland, 2000)3.
For a number of reasons Kenya provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the influence of property
rights institutions on FDI. First, Kenya was a settler economy which, according to Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) should possess benign institutions that protect private property
because, in colonies where colonisers settled, they both demanded and helped construct inclusive
institutions. Yet, despite its legacy as a settler colony and the adoption of macroeconomic policy
3FDI is also considered less prone to crises as opposed to short term credit and portfolio investment, because direct
investors, in general, have a long term perspective when investing in a host country Lipsey (1999).
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reforms and incentives to stimulate FDI, the Kenyan economy continues to face a disappointing
record of FDI net inflows. The failure of Kenya to attract FDI raises the policy question of
whether strengthening property rights institutions will reverse the poor performance of FDI, and
place the economy on a sustainable path to development. This paper therefore set out to explore
this important research question.
The questions raised in this paper are of great importance not only for Kenya but for other African
countries which still have a disappointing record of foreign direct investment and economic devel-
opment. Indeed the level of investment in African economies in general remains well below that
of the fast growing economies of Asia and Latin America. The low level of investment raises an
obvious possibility of augmenting domestic investment with foreign investment. This has been
clearly reflected in a number of policy documents across a number of African economies. For
instance, Kenya’s vision 2030-the country’s strategic document that outlines its ambitions for its
developmental path, stresses the need to enlist foreign capital flows in support of this vision4.
The impetus to enlist foreign capital stems from the fact that most fast growing economies such
as those of South Korea and Singapore, had their investment to GDP ratio well above 30 percent
during their growth episodes. Second, the low productivity levels in Kenya and other African
countries have given increased importance to the potential of technology and skills transfer as a
spill-over advantage of FDI.
Prospects for increased capital flows are linked to the ability of a country to create a conducive
environment for such investment and reduce uncertainty that perhaps affects investor’s decisions.
It is therefore imperative to provide evidence that can guide policy formulation and the process
of institutional reforms based on an assessment of whether FDI responds to institutional factors
in Kenya. This is more important in relation to this economy which has often been written off as
riddled with conflict, corruption and weak institutional environments in general.
The results from this paper show that foreign direct investment is highly responsive to the quality
4This document proposes 10 percent economic growth per year that will place the economy on a middle income
level and such growth is believed will come through enlisting FDI in addition to domestic investment mobilization
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of institutions in Kenya, to an extent that a unit percentage change in the quality of institutions
leads to more than one unit percentage response in FDI. Thus, an improvement (or deterioration)
in institutional quality has a direct positive (negative) effect on FDI in Kenya. The result fur-
ther indicates that this relationship is robust to inclusion of other factors which influence FDI.
Similarly, the results show that weak macroeconomic policy management (captured by the lev-
els of external debt) negatively affect FDI. Thus, high debt levels reduces incentives of investors
to invest in the Kenyan economy. The results further show that political instability negatively
affects FDI in Kenya although this effect remains insignificant in the presence of other macroe-
conomic variables and institutional indicators. In conclusion, the paper argues from this evidence
that property rights protection is a significant driver of FDI hence long term income in Kenya.
This insight extends the earlier results from cross country regressions and confirms the scope for
institutional reforms that might drive long term growth among other African countries.
The contribution to the institutions and economic development literature in this chapter is three-
fold. The first contribution is the construction of a theoretical model to demonstrate the link be-
tween the quality of property rights institutions and foreign direct investment decisions to invest
in a developing country. Second, this study tests empirically the role of property rights institutions
with regard to FDI into Kenya. Third, it contributes to this literature by assessing the extent to
which FDI leads to the economic development of this economy. This work is related to the recent
work on economic development that emphasizes the role of institutions for achieving higher in-
come levels. However, as pointed out by Alfaro et al. (2007), there is little systematic evidence on
the specific mechanisms of how institutions affect economic development. The results from this
investigation show that property rights institutions affect FDI in Kenya. This in turn implies that
foreign investment might be one of the missing links through which institutions affect long-run
development in African countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: The following section provides a historical
overview of foreign direct investment , economic policy and institutions in Kenya. Section three
provides a brief review of the literature on foreign direct investment and the factors that are iden-
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tified to be its main drivers. Section four provides a simple theoretical model of investor decision
making under institutional uncertainty. From this is derived the basic proposition that is tested in
the section that follows using Time Series data for Kenya for 1970 to 2010. Section five presents
an econometric model specification to test the basic proposition from the theoretical model. Sec-
tion six presents estimation results and a discussion of these results. The final section provides
some concluding remarks and discusses policy implications of the findings of the paper.
4.2 Overview of Foreign Direct Investment and Policy Reforms in
Kenya
4.2.1 FDI During the Period of Growth Acceleration
Foreign Direct Investment has always been at the centre of the Kenya’s industrial and economic
development strategy. In the 1960s, just after gaining independence during Kenyatta’s adminis-
tration, Kenya showed its ambitious goals at attracting FDI. This was done through the enactment
of the Foreign Direct Investment Act of 1964 that gave foreign investors the right to repatriate
their profits, loans and interest on loans and part of proceeds from the sale of assets. This Act
was followed by the publication of the “the Sessional Paper No.10 on African Socialism and its
Application to Planning in Kenya (Kenya, 1965)”, in which the government further strengthened
protection of FDI and laid the foundation for a market driven economy. These policy instruments
were designed by government to lure foreign investors into the economy to an extent that the
economy became the prime choice for foreign investors seeking to set up in both the Eastern and
Southern Africa during that period.
As reflected in Figure 4.1, during the 1970s up-to the early 1980s, Kenya had FDI net inflows that
were above the inflows of its neighbouring East African Countries and the Sub-Saharan Africa
average. The stock of FDI and net inflows into the economy supported an expansionary eco-
nomic period of more that six percent GDP growth. This rate of growth came mostly from the
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manufacturing sector that accounted for about 33 percent of GDP. The growth in manufacturing
was propelled by inflows of FDI that went into the heavily protected import-substituting indus-
tries. These included manufacturing of footwear, leather, rubber, petroleum, industrial chemicals,
paints, soft drinks, cement and metal products (Bigsten and Kimuyu, 2010; Bigsten, 2001).
Ikiara and Ndirangu (2003) support the claim made by Bigsten and Kimuyu (2010) but further
state that such growth resulted from the dynamism and prudent macro-economic management;
increased protectionism and a stable political and economic environment that were attractive to
both domestic and foreign investors. Bigsten (2001) acknowledge that, the import substitution en-
sured domestic availability of products previously imported. He admitted though that it distorted
industrial development in Kenya by encouraging the creation of excess capacity, low technical
efficiency and subsequent inability to penetrate external markets.
Figure 4.1: Net FDI Inflows to Kenya and the Other Selected African Countries (% of GDP-1970
to 2011)
The import substitution strategy was pursued alongside an expansionary fiscal policy and the
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“indigenisation policy” in which the government attempted to transfer ownership of businesses
and the economic resources to natives. The results of the “indigenisation policy” became obvious
towards the late 1970s when net inflows of FDI started falling. This policy scared away potential
foreign investors in the Kenyan economy (Figure 4.1). The sluggish net inflows of FDI coupled
with the administrative balance of payment controls worsened the balance of payment crises of the
1970s. Faced with the shortage of foreign exchange in the economy, the government intensified
administrative controls by imposing further higher tariffs, stricter import licensing procedures and
widespread price controls as a solution to the balance of payment problem.
As crisis after crisis hit the economy, the Kenyan authorities continued to tighten the price controls
instead of liberalizing the economy. Ndung’u (2003) notes that the authorities believed at that
time that controls were an easier way to deal with the repercussions of expansionary policies
and balance of payments crises.These were specifically placed on financial and foreign exchange
markets transactions (i.e foreign exchange transactions, ceilings on domestic rates of interest and
selective restrictions on bank borrowing) and on trade transactions (i.e. importation and licensing,
export taxes, domestic retail and producer prices) and on labour market transactions (i.e. wage
guidelines). One of the consequences of these policies was a further decline in FDI net inflows
and a drastic reduction in the share of manufacturing exports. These shrank from forty percent
(40%) of the value of manufacturing output in 1964 to about 10% in the mid-1980s (Ndung’u and
Ngugi, 1999).
4.2.2 FDI During the Period of Stagnation and the Muted Reforms
The period between 1980 and 1990, under president Moi’s administration, introduced a number
of policy reforms and incentives meant to hasten the recovery of foreign investment in the econ-
omy. These reforms were pursued under the Structural Adjustment Programmes based on the
Washington consensus ideology that dominated development theory and policy in the 1980s and
1990s. These reforms corrected the structural problems, macroeconomic imbalances as well as
market distortions inherited from the two decades of import substitution policies. These reforms
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were expected to stimulate investment and economic recovery. The following strategies were
introduced as part of the incentives to stimulate investment, the export processing zones charac-
terized by massive tax exemptions for FDI5, export compensation schemes, a duty/VAT drawback
scheme and “Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs)”. These treaties exempted foreign investors from
paying taxes on dividends, royalties, interest and management fees in both contracting states but
set limits on the withholding rate allowed in the country where the income arises6. All DTTs
allowed for tax credits for tax paid in the partner country. A number of international agreements
were also entered into to provide market access for the products from exporting FDI industries in
Kenya. These agreements included for instance the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of Eastern and
Southern Africa of 1983, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
agreement of the same year. Yet the net inflows of FDI did not recover until the 1990s.
In 1994 the economy received a once off inflow of FDI following the privatization of state owned
enterprises and the country’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992. Moi’s administration how-
ever did not have credible commitment to implementing the policy reforms. It is perhaps prema-
ture to conclude at this stage that policy reforms failed to stimulate investment since the provision
of FDI incentives occurred in an economy that was characterized by a fixed exchange rate regime;
closed capital account; huge fiscal policy deficits with increasing indebtedness and selective price
controls; and loss of monetary policy control as evidenced by rising inflation levels due to excess
liquidity. Ndungu’ (1993) notes that the market distortions in the Kenyan economy failed to pro-
vide efficient signals to either domestic or international economic agents. Thus FDI remained at
its low level with fewer inflows coming into the economy throughout the 1980s.
In the early 1990s, the Government of Kenya realized that the reforms that were undertaken did
5The tax exemptions covered from exemption from all existing and future taxes and duties payable under the
Customs and Excise Act and Value Added Tax Act on all export processing zone imports for use in the eligible
business activities of the EPZ enterprise, exemption from registration under the VAT Act, exemption from the payment
of income tax for the first 10 years from the date of first sale, followed by a rate of 25 per cent for the subsequent
10 years and the standard rate thereafter, exemption from the payment of withholding tax on dividends and other
payments made to non-residents for the first 10 years, exemption from stamp duty, exemption from any quotas or other
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports, with the exception of trade in firearms, military equipment or other
illegal goods (see the Export Processing Zones under the Export Processing Zones Act (1990) and the subsequent
Amendments.
6These limits are typically higher than what Kenya applies in its general regime, except for management fees.
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not succeed in putting the economy on a sustainable path to economic recovery. Net inflows
of FDI remained sluggish. In 1993, the government implemented further Neo-liberal reforms.
These included a market liberalization and stabilization package supported by the IMF under the
umbrella of the Structural Adjustment Programme. This reform package removed most of the
administrative controls purporting to protect local industry from competition and consumers from
high prices. In 1993, the exchange rate regime was changed from fixed to the crawling peg and
finally to a fully flexible regime. Under this regime market exchange rates were determined by
market forces. The official and the interbank exchange rates were harmonized. There was also
provision for foreign exchange retention accounts in commercial banks. This series of reforms let
to the gradual relaxation of exchange controls on foreign exchange transactions and eventually to
the full liberalization of the exchange market for commercial transactions.
However, the outcome in the short term was a rise in the rate of inflation and inflationary ex-
pectation. Several possible factors accounted for this outcome: excess money supply, a severe
shortage of foreign exchange; price decontrol in the presence of inadequate supply of essential
commodities; strong rise in consumer demand due to excess liquidity in the economy. This was
accompanied by increased spending in the run-up to the 1992 elections (electoral greasing and
financial scams at the Central Bank) which further worsened the situation of excess liquidity. In
addition, import licenses were removed and import tariffs became the main trade policy instru-
ment. Tariff structures were simplified gradually following the initial reforms in 1993. Despite
these measures, FDI net inflows did not recover until the country entered into a privatization pro-
gramme that saw a once-off inflow of FDI into the privatization projects in 1994 (see Figure 4.1).
This once off inflow of FDI was followed by a decade of sluggish FDI.
4.2.3 FDI During the Period of Recovery and the Institutional Reforms
Although Kenya returned to multiparty democracy in 1992, the new institutional reforms for the
promotion of FDI started towards the end of 2000 during Kibaki’s administration.The following
statutes were passed: the Industrial Property Act (2001), the Trade Marks Act, and the Copyright
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Act (2001). This set of statutes was meant to govern the allocation and enforcement of property
rights and trademarks. Patent protection can be granted for inventions under a traditional patent
system for utility models (“inventions” related to shapes, structures or assemblage of articles),
industrial designs and innovations (novel and industrially applicable arrangements of possibly
traditional components in an assembly that results in a new solution to a technical problem, i.e.
mostly production processes).
Further institutional reforms to improve the investment climate were implemented in 2005 follow-
ing recommendations made by the UNCTAD/JBIC Bluebook Initiative. These reforms included
the lifting of compulsory screening of FDI and minimum capital requirement, and reviewing the
process of awarding work permits. They also included the introduction of deadlines and penalties
for excessive delays in the payment of VAT refunds by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA). The
reforms introduced guidelines for transactions in agricultural land, and established a performance
benchmarking project for the manufacturing sector. Finally, an investor-tracking and aftercare
capacities were developed at KIA. These institutional reforms saw an increase in FDI from 2006
which however was undermined by the political upheavals following the 2007 general elections.
On the governance front, the government passed the Public Officer Ethics Act and the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Act in mid-2003. These Acts were meant to control corruption
among public officials and to restore investors’ confidence in the economy. The passing of these
statutes followed decades of corruption and poor governance, and the deterioration of public
services that started in the 1980s. The World Bank’s survey of investors carried out in 2007
showed that corruption and the poor economic climate were the major impediments to renewed
FDI flows to Kenya. Over 38 percent of investors surveyed during that period claimed corruption
to be a “major” or “very severe” constraint on their operations. The corruption levels in Kenya
were significantly higher than those in the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda.
In 2010, the country gained a new constitution that guaranteed the property rights of investors.
Following the enactment of the constitution, the country has realized some FDI inflows though
it still has to be ascertained if such inflows are a result of the change of the governance in the
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economy.
Given the history of the macroeconomic policy reforms and corrections of structural problems,
and the incentives provided for attracting FDI, it is natural to expect a rise in FDI if this is moti-
vated by macroeconomic factors alone. However, Kenya’s level of FDI inflows has remained well
below the Sub-Saharan African average and below that of its neighbouring East African countries
(see Figure 4.1). For more than a decade, macroeconomic stability by itself did not stimulate FDI
inflows.
Despite macroeconomic incentives, over the past three decades, Kenya has received meager FDI
inflows and a number of foreign investors have been consolidated out of the economy (UNCTAD,
2005)7. Yet, the government continues to defend the provision of tax incentives in the midst of
other competing budget priorities on the grounds that FDI will supplement low levels of domestic
investment, increase productivity levels in the economy and spur economic growth 8. The pol-
icy related question is whether Kenya should continue to offer tax incentives to attract FDI. Are
there not other fundamental structural problems which are barriers to FDI and other investment
in general in Kenya that need reforms? In other words, why does Kenya continue to be neglected
by foreign investors despite provision of tax incentives? Several conflicting assertions have been
advanced to explain low rates of FDI in Kenya. First, deterioration of economic performance cou-
pled with the inconsistent economic policy making and structural problems in the economy have
often been cited as the main causal factors for lack of FDI in this economy. Second, deteriorat-
ing public services and infrastructure and growing problems with corruption and governance and
weak protection of private property rights have been suggested as the main hassle costs/barriers to
FDI investment. The latter two factors are claimed to have increased uncertainty and investment
risk, and raised the cost of doing business. This has led to lower rates of FDI since the 1980s9.
7In 2005, UNCTAD noted that a range of foreign investors were even consolidating out of Kenya and only a few of
them had significant plans for expansion. See Figure 1, Section 2 for net FDI inflows into Kenya.
8This thinking is strengthened by the experience of a small number of fast growing newly industrialized East Asian
countries and China, which have shown that international capital finance is key to bridging the saving-investment
resource gap in low income countries. They have also shown that international capital finance can help avoid further
build-up of debt while directly promoting growth and alleviating poverty.
9It must be noted that even levels of domestic investment have remained relatively low by international standards.
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However, an empirical test for some of these claims, in particular, corruption, poor governance
and weak protection of private property rights has proved difficult due to lack of reliable data that
cover a long time.
The above claims fits well in current debates on the role of institutions in economic development
pioneered by the New Institutional Economics theorists. This thesis postulates that the protection
of private property rights and enforcement of laws against the risk of expropriation (strong legal
institutions) create incentives for markets to operate. They reduce uncertainty involved in the ex-
change of goods and services, and therefore spur investment and economic development10(North,
1987a). Alfaro et al. (2007) using colonial origin as a measure of protection of private property
rights (institutional quality) show that protection of property rights has a first order effect over
policies in influencing foreign capital flows. They find that changes in policy and changes in in-
stitutional quality affect on changes in capital flows. Similarly, Ahlquist (2006) shows that FDI is
responsive to political institutions whereas foreign portfolio investment is more sensitive to macro
level economic policy outcomes. This line of thinking argues that countries with more stable and
democratic political institutions attract more FDI. However this fails to explain why autocratic
countries such China and Singapore have been able to attract significant FDI in recently. Edwards
(1992) shows that fiscal policy proxied by government size and openness are the most important
pull factors of foreign capital flows to developing countries no matter whether or not countries
have good institutions.
Garrido et al. (2011) show that Kenya’s average investment to GDP between 1960-2008, which registered 18.5 percent,
was below the average for other low income countries (20.9 percent).
10This argument was first presented by Adam Smith’s in the 1770s as quoted above in the opening phrase of this pa-
per. Therefore the New Institutional Economics thesis has modified Adam Smith’s postulates and today understanding
the impact of risk on investment and how to mitigate such risk has remained the theorist’s central focus.
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4.3 Review of the Related Literature
4.3.1 Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries
According to the Neoclassical theory of capital, capital is expected to flow from capital abundant
countries to capital scarce countries because the returns to capital are low in capital abundant
countries relative to capital scarce countries, provided there are no transaction costs and market
frictions 11. If one considers the Neoclassical model literally with only capital and labour as inputs
and identical technologies across countries and allow capital flow freely across borders, then new
investment should take place in poorer developing countries (Zebregs, 1998; Alfaro et al., 2007;
Ahlquist, 2006). The theory predicts that capital would continue to flow to developing countries
until the returns to capital are equalized across all countries. Even though the returns to capital are
potentially large in developing countries, in practice, capital has often been observed to flow from
poor developing countries to rich countries, and thereby giving rise to a capital flow puzzle12. This
puzzle shows that the Neoclassical theory of capital does not adequately explain the distribution
of foreign direct investment to developing countries. To explain this puzzle, Lucas (1990) first
argues that the lack of foreign capital flows to many developing countries despite their potentially
higher marginal returns to capital is due to the higher political risk that characterizes many of these
countries. According to Lucas, the domestic political climate of the country is very important in
attracting foreign capital.
Following Lucas’ work, many theoretical and empirical explanations have been advanced to ex-
plain why capital does not flow to developing countries. The theoretical explanations could be
grouped into two broad theoretical groupingsAlfaro et al. (2007). The first explains the lack of for-
eign investment in developing countries is a result of the differences in economic fundamentals
11Note that this is predicted to happen under the usual assumptions of a 2x2x2 general equilibrium framework with
two countries (home and foreign), two factors of production (usually capital and labour) and two goods produced
with the same constant returns to scale production technology, zero transport costs, and commodities, which differ in
relative factor endowments, leading to international factor price differential.
12This puzzle was first noted by Lucas (1990). He compared the U.S.A and India in 1988 and demonstrated that,
if the neoclassical model predictions were true, the marginal product of capital in India should be about 58 times that
of the U.S.A. In the face of such a return differential, all capital should flow from U.S.A to India but in practice, such
flows are not observed, rather capital flows from India to the USA.
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that affect the production structure of the economy, such as technological differences, missing
factors of production, government policies and the institutional structure of the economy. The
second theory focuses on international capital market imperfections, mainly sovereign risk and
asymmetric information. The proponents of this theory argue that capital market imperfections
such as sovereign risk leads to market failure. Sovereign risk in this context is understood as a sit-
uation where the sovereign defaults on the loan contract with foreign firms, seizes foreign assets
located within its borders or prevents domestic residents from fully meeting their obligations to
foreign contracts. Alfaro et al. (2005) argue that the problem of sovereign risk stems from the fact
that repayment incentives for debtors might differ from what is in a contract between two nations
because the ability of courts to enforce a sovereign entity is extremely limited. To corroborate this
argument, Reinhart and Kenneth (2004) argue that because so many poor countries are in default
on their debts, few funds are channeled through equity, and that private lending rises more than
proportionately to wealth. This supports the view that political risk is the main reason for lack of
foreign investment in developing countries.
Microeconomic explanations for lack of FDI in developing countries include the proximity-
concentration theory of horizontal FDI13 (see Markusen, 1984; Brainard, 1997; Helpman et al.,
2004) and the comparative advantage theory of vertical FDI14 (see Helpman, 1984) view the
structure of fixed costs, relative country size, factor endowments and preferences of firms to be the
leading explanation why foreign firms do not expand their operations aboard15. The proximity-
concentration FDI theory states that, to serve a foreign market with similar products to the home
market, firms will choose to export their products when plant-level economies of scale (concentra-
tion of production) are high. They will select FDI (proximity to consumers) when transport costs
and/or firm-level economies of scale are high. The traditional proximity-concentration model pre-
dicts that, after controlling for proximity-concentration factors (such as plant-level and firm-level
fixed costs, transport costs, market sizes), FDI (relative to export) should be more prevalent in
13Horizontal FDI occurs when multinational companies (MNCs) have headquarters at home and production plants
both at home and abroad that produce the same goods(Helpman et al., 2004).
14Vertical FDI occurs when MNCs fragment different stages of production by having headquarters at home and
production plants in different foreign countries that produce different intermediate goods (Helpman et al., 2004).
15See surveys about the empirical evidences on FDI in Markusen and Maskus (2003) and Yeaple (2003).
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less developed countries because of low labour costs in these countries. Contrary to this predic-
tion, in reality, after controlling for the proximity-concentration factors, a firm’s ratio of foreign
affiliate sales to export sales decreases in the gap of GDP per capita between the foreign and the
host country concerned (Brainard, 1997). Also, the bulk of the world FDI is from developed
countries to only those host countries with similar per capita incomes (Markusen and Maskus,
2002). Helpman-Krugman (2000) developed a model of relative factor endowments of multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) to account for this country-level challenge by explaining that countries
of similar income levels are countries of similar endowments. However, this relative endowments
statement is challenged by another stylized fact. There is little evidence that FDI is related to dif-
ferences in capital endowments or in the general return to capital across countries. This questions
the power of relative factor endowments in explaining horizontal FDI and means there must be
some other mechanism(s) at work that drive inflows of FDI (Markusen and Maskus, 2001) and
(Markusen and Maskus, 2002).
The comparative advantage vertical FDI theory postulates that firms could fragment the produc-
tion process into stages with different factor intensities, and locate different stages in different
countries according to their relative factor endowments. However, empirical evidence suggests
that the bulk of world FDI is horizontal and the proximity-concentration trade-off is far more
important than the comparative advantage story in explaining world FDI (Carr et al., 2001) and
(Brainard, 1997).
FDI, Institutions and the Risk of Expropriation
According to Azzimonti and Sarte (2007) one of the main deterrents of FDI in developing coun-
tries is the risk of expropriation. These authors argue that FDI is vulnerable to the risk of expropri-
ation because once investment has been made, a foreign investor cannot prevent the government
of the host country from changing the environment in which the investment was made. Therefore
analysis centered around the protection of private property rights to mitigate the risk of appro-
priation has become central to the new institutional economics. This school of thought argues
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that the quality of institutions in the host country, and in particular, the degree of protection of
property rights, is key in determining the level of risk and expected returns to foreign investors
when they make investment decisions in non-domicile locations. This explanations implies that
the concentration of FDI among developed countries is a result of better quality institutions and
the level of economic development. By contrast, low levels of FDI in many developing countries
are due to poor legal protection of assets. Azzimonti and Sarte (2007) argue that countries, which
lack legal protection of assets are also characterized by high levels of political instability and high
rates of expropriation and this makes them less attractive to foreign investors.
Thus, the impact of the quality of institutions on foreign investment can therefore be negative or
positive depending on whether there are strong institutions or weak institutions. If protection of
property rights is weak, (weak institutions) as is often the case in developing countries, one would
expect a negative relationship between the quality of institutions and foreign investment because
weak institutions act as a tax by increasing the cost of doing business in such countries. Imperfect
enforcement of contracts might also increase uncertainty regarding future returns and thus have
negative impact on the level of investment. Whereas, in situations where the quality of institutions
(protection of property rights) is high, one would expect a positive relationship between this and
foreign investment. The institutions-based explanation of FDI is grounded in an influential study
by North (1990) which raises awareness of the role of institutions in establishing incentives for
economic activity in general and for investment in particular. Foreign investors have therefore
come to place greater emphasis on institutional quality when selecting an investment location
(see Bevan et al. 2004). However, empirical findings on the role of institutions in determining
capital flows remain inconclusive (Seyoum, 2009).
4.4 The Model
Is the quality of institutions a binding constraint on FDI in Kenya? The lack of protection of pri-
vate property rights is identified as a prime factor behind Kenya’s failure to attract FDI despite the
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macroeconomic policy reforms and foreign investment incentives that the country has provided to
lure FDI(R.W., 2010). In this section, we first construct a simple model of investment under in-
stitutional uncertainty within the real option framework following Gries et al. (2012) to illustrate
the possible link between the quality of institutions and foreign direct investment.16 This model
serves as a theoretical basis on which, to measure the results on the influence of institutions on
foreign investment in Kenya.
To begin with, the study typically assumes that FDI has three important characteristics. First,
that investment is partially or completely irreversible in that the capital costs are totally or par-
tially sunk. Second, that there is always uncertainty over future returns accruing to the foreign
firms from investment made in a foreign country. In this set-up, this uncertainty is assumed to
be principally due to the quality of institutions which could take the form of direct or indirect
expropriation, bribery, forced sale based on valuations perceived as unfairly low, or ex post re-
strictions of profits repatriation. Third, that the timing of investment is flexible and investors can
invest in their own time. They can invest immediately if they think returns from investment are
high enough to cover all investment risks or they can postpone investing to get better information
about the quality of institutions in the foreign economy. They may not invest until major uncer-
tainty in the future is cleared. In other words, investors have an option not an obligation to invest
abroad at any period in time. They also have the flexibility to abandon, expand, control, extend
and shorten the operations of their investment even after investment has been made.
Now consider a representative foreign firm contemplating the possibility of investing in a devel-
oping country (a host country such as Kenya). Assume the firm is risk neutral and may undertake
a risky investment project in the context of low quality institutions in the host country. The in-
vestment is considered risky because of uncertainty about future returns on investment. For my
purpose, institutions may be poor because the government in the host country is unable to credi-
bly commit to a future course of action on improvement of institutions and their enforcement. In
making its investment decision, the representative firm will take into account both uncertainty in
16Specifically, we modify the model developed by Gries et al. (2012) to fit our context. The purpose of their model
was to explain how firm’s investment decisions are shaped by uncertain tax policy in the context of real options analysis.
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returns and institutional quality, and will time its investment decision to maximize the expected






where Pt is the firm’s future returns from investment per unit of output at the unknown future
period in time t, at which the investment decision is made; qt is the output level at time t; C(I)
represents the initial cost of investment (initial outlay) which includes sunk costs and is constant,
and r denotes the discount rate. The profit function π(.) is a function of stochastic process P and
time t where π ≡ π(P, t). It is further assumed that returns from investment (Pt) vary over time
and follow a geometric Brownian motion with a drift:
dP = αPdt +σPdz (4.2)
where α and σ represent the constant drift which measures the deterministic growth in the re-
turns from investment and the constant volatility in returns respectively; dz denotes the random
increment of a standard Wiener process with dz = εt
√
dt. Furthermore εt follows a standard nor-
mal distribution with mean zero and variance equal to one and is serially uncorrelated (that is
E(εiε j) = 0,∀i, j and i 6= j).17
It further assumes that institutional quality directly affects the returns from this risky project
in the form of expropriation which could for instance come as bribes paid by foreign firms to
government officials in the host country. The parameter φ is interpreted as an indicator of the
quality of institutions (governance) and assumes values in the interval [0,1]. The government has
a policy handle over φ but the parameter is assumed exogenous to the investor. The host country
has strong and robust institutions when φ equals the lower bound zero and is able to commit to
17A Weiner process (also known as Brownian motion) is a continuous time Markov stochastic process whose incre-
ments are independent, no matter how small the time interval is. Specifically, if zt is a Weiner process, then any change
in z, ∆z, corresponding to a time interval ∆t is given by ∆z = εt
√
∆t, where εt is a normally distributed random variable
with mean zero and a standard deviation of one.
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their enforcement. In contrast, the host country has extremely poor institutions when φ takes the
value of one. As a result, the firm’s returns Pφ is defined as:
Pφ =

(1−φ)P if 0 < φ < 1
P if φ = 0
0 if φ = 1
(4.3)
With no loss of generality and for the tractability of the problem, we assume that the firm can
produce one unit of output flow forever with no variable costs of production such that, E(Pt) =








where r−α ≡ δ > 0. I define the risk adjusted rate of return to be r = δ +α .
4.4.1 Characterising the Equilibrium Solution under Conditions of Institutional
Certainty (φ = 0)
In order to highlight the importance of the quality of institutions on FDI, I first characterize a
baseline results describing the firm’s investment decision under high quality institutions, φ =
0. Assume for simplicity that there is also no uncertainty in returns coming from market price
fluctuations, such that σ = 0. Under this setting, the investment value is then equivalent to the
usual present value model in which expected returns are simply discounted by an appropriate risk




















P≥ (r−α)C(I) and to refrain from investing otherwise. This result simply implies that whenever
the discounted value of returns exceed the initial investment costs, the firm will find it optimal to
invest in a developing country. If the discounted returns fall short of the initial cost outlay, the
firm will not invest in such a country.
4.4.2 Characterising the Equilibrium Solution under Conditions of Institutional
Uncertainty (0 < φ < 1)
The study now turns to the more interesting case where the firm faces low quality of institutions
and uncertain returns, that is where 0 < φ < 1, and σ > 0.The foreign investor now either under-
takes the investment and earns stochastic flows of benefits, or postpones the investment (holding
the option to invest). The investor trades off the benefit of waiting for more information on the
quality of institutions before committing to the investment against the opportunity cost of waiting.
Thus the option value of waiting to invest (F(P)) indicates whether a firm decides to invest imme-
diately or to delay the investment decision and wait for new relevant information on institutional
quality. The investor’s problem is now an optimal stopping problem in continuous time. This




V (P(t))−C(I), Et [F(P(t +dt))]e−rt
}
(4.7)
18Contingent valuation is an alternative approach to solve this problem. Here, we use dynamic programming tech-
niques because this approach does not require the existence of a sufficiently rich set of markets in risky assets so that
the stochastic component of the risky project under consideration can be exactly replicated.
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Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that if the firm delays investment and holds an option, the Bellman
equation in the continuation region is equivalent to:





This equation states that over the interval dt, the returns on holding the option of investing
rF(P)dt is equal to the expected rate of capital appreciation, Et [dF(P)]. Thus, equation (4.9)
essentially describes a no arbitrage condition (Carruth et al., 2000).
Using Ito’s Lemma19 it can be shown (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) that the Bellman equation





2P2F ′′(P)− rF(P) = 0 (4.10)
Equation (4.10) defines the Bellman equation for a firm that faces uncertainty, irreversibility and
an option to delay investment. If the firm follows the optimal rule, the value of the option to
wait must satisfy the differential equation (4.10) together with the boundary conditions given in
equations (4.11) to (4.13):
F(0) = 0 (4.11)
F(P∗) =V (P∗)−C(I) (4.12)
F ′(P∗) =V ′(P∗) (4.13)
where P∗ is the optimal threshold level. Condition (4.11) states that if the return on investment
is zero, then the value of an option to invest is also zero. Condition (4.12) describes the net
19Io’s Lemma is an identity used in stochastic calculus to find the differential of a time-dependent function of a
stochastic process; it serves as the stochastic calculus counterpart of the chain rule. See the derivation and proof of the
Lemma in the Appendix.
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payoff of returns at which it is optimal to invest. Condition (4.13) features the “smooth pasting”
condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) which requires the option value to be continuous and
smooth around the optimal investment timing point.
Result II: The solution to the firm’s problem under conditions of uncertainty is that its optimal
decision will be determined by the threshold level of returns relative to the prevailing returns in
the market.
Claims:
1) Under certainty and strong institutions (σ = 0 and φ = 0), the investor’s optimal decision is
determined by the threshold P̂ = (r−α)C(I). Investment is undertaken if P≥ P̂.
2) Under uncertainty and weak institutions (σ > 0 and 0 < φ < 1), the investor’s optimal decision



































P∗ defines the minimum threshold level of returns that triggers investment. For low returns on
investment P<P∗ the foreign investor holds onto his option to invest while he exercises his option
and invests in the host country if the returns exceed the threshold, i.e. P≥ P∗. This threshold is a
function of institutional quality (φ) and other exogenous parameters of the model. How then does






The Prediction of the Model
The key prediction of the model is that a deterioration in the quality of institutions (an increase in
φ ) raises the threshold level that triggers investment. This leads to low level of FDI in a host coun-
try.This is because under conditions of institutional uncertainty, foreign investors would postpone
their investment until such uncertainty is cleared. Conversely, improving the quality of institu-
tions (a reduction in φ) promotes investment by reducing the threshold level. This implies that
when the institutional weakness improves, foreign investment would take place in a developing
host country20.
4.5 Empirical Methods and Data Issues
4.5.1 Empirical Model
To test the main prediction of the theoretical model and validate the claim that Kenya has failed
to attract substantial FDI because of weakness in institutions, the research uses the standard Time
Series cointegration and VECM causality techniques. Specifically this study seeks to discover
whether the quality of institutions has any causal effect on FDI in Kenya. If yes, to what extent?
To answer this question and test the main prediction of the theoretical model, an econometric
model based on the previous literature on the determinants of FDI is used. The basic estimable
model is specified as follows:
lnFDIt = α +β1ln f hprt +β
′
X (4.16)
Where the dependent variableFDIt is the natural logarithmic of real foreign direct investment
flows at timet. The flows of FDI are used because the recent and large changes in FDI behaviour
20However, when returns are sufficiently high many firms are willing to invest even in war-torn countries that suffer
institutional breakdown. (Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007).
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may not be apparent in FDI stock figures in most instances(see also Hansen and Rand, 2006;
Herzer et al., 2008). That is changes in stocks on a year-to-year basis could be quite small
when they occur against an absolutely accumulated base value. The net inflows of FDI is also
used because is the best measure of the country’s ability to attract FDI. This is in contrast to
Gwenhamo (2011) and Read (2008) who use the stocks of FDI based on the assumption that the
long term contribution of FDI to domestic investment, and the policy stance towards FDI may be
better reflected in the accumulated FDI stock data. Since we are not assessing the contribution of
FDI to economic development in this chapter21, the use of FDI stocks is not relevant.
4.5.2 Variables and Data Issues
This study allows FDI flows to be explained by the quality of economic institutions proxied by
the natural logarithmic of property rights institutions denoted by ln f hprt and that of political
institutions proxied by the political rights and civil liberties index, and a set of other explanatory
variables contained in the vector X . These two indices are constructed by the author and the details
of the methodology for their computation is elaborated on in Chapter (2) of this thesis22. The
freehold property rights is a de-jure index in nature computed from legal frameworks that govern
immovable property. This is done to capture North’s hypothesis of the durability of institutions.
The political institutions proxy is also the de-jure index computed from laws that were passed in
Kenya which affected peoples’ political rights and freedoms over the period under consideration.
The data is available for the period 1884 to 2010. This chapter only considers data for the post
independence period from 1970 to 2010 to match the FDI dataset, and also because the other
variables used in the model have data limited to this period.
The variables in the vector X include the logarithm of real Gross Domestic Product in constant
2000 US dollars at time t (lnRGDPt ) to account for market size; Trade openness of the economy
(OPENt) measured by the ratio of imports and exports to Gross Domestic Product (in percentage)
21This would in-fact reflect more in the stocks of FDI in the economy
22see Letete et al., 2011 for detailed methodological discussions on the computation of these indices
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23; ratio of Capital to Labour (k/l) to proxy for capital deepening in the economy; Macroeco-
nomic Policy Management measured by the ratio of Government Debt to Gross Domestic Product
(Govdebt); the real exchange rate (REER ) to proxy for the competitiveness of the economy and
the Education level of the labour force (Edut) measured by the ratio of people with secondary
school education. Admittedly, that there are potentially many factors that determine FDI inflows.
However, these cannot all be included in the regression model because of the small sample size
(T = 40 observations). This also helps us avoid the problem of multicollinearity. For this reason,
the stepwise regression procedure is used to find the best combination of explanatory variables by
deleting the insignificant variables.
An analysis of this kind requires high frequency data but such data is not available for Kenya.
This limitation prompted the use an annual Time Series data, which could affect the reliability
of the results. However, several modeling techniques are used to check the robustness of the
results. The research also accounts for some obvious problems such as the structural breaks and
regime changes during the estimation process through the use of impulse dummies24. Table (4.5)
provides the names of the variables used, their descriptions, sources and the time period for which
they were measured.
Cointegration Analysis
To establish the long-run relationship between institutions and FDI, the bounds test cointegration
approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) is applied. This approach is adopted because it does
not require variables to be integrated of the same order. Specifically, the test has the additional
advantage of yielding consistent estimates of the long-run coefficients that are asymptotically
normal irrespective of whether the underlying regressors are I(1) or I(0). In accordance with
the requirements of the ARDL technique that variables are not integrated of order 2 or beyond,
all variables are tested for non-stationarity first to determine their order of integration. This is
23The most appropriate measure to use would have been capital account openness but this is difficult to measure.
We therefore use the ratio of imports plus exports to gross domestic product.
24The results in this chapter nevertheless should still be interpreted with caution because of the general limitation
of times series data obtained from statistical agencies, which has inherent errors which are difficult to isolate from the
given dataset.
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because modeling economic Time Series in the presence of I(2) variables makes the F-statistics
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) invalid because the bounds test is based on the assumption that
the variables are I(0) and/ or I(1). Otherwise one could obtain inconsistent estimators and spurious
results (i.e. results that look statistically significant in the model yet in fact all that is obtained is
evidence of contemporaneous correlations rather than meaningful causal relations between them
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) and (Dickey et al., 1986)). If variables are integrated of the same
order, their combination could result in meaningful long-run relationships (Harris, 1992; Dickey
and Fuller, 1979and Kahn and Ogaki, 1992). Equation 4.16 is specifically estimated within the
following dynamic Autoregression Distributed Lag framework using OLS estimator:










wt + εt ; t = 1, ...n (4.17)
where ∆is the first difference operator; yt is the FDI net inflows and xt is the vector of k deter-
minants of yt namely:RGDPt , ln f hprt , OPENt , REER, Edut , Govdebt, k/l , M2/GDPt ; wt is
a vector containing other deterministic terms such as structural break dummy variables and εt is
the error term assumed to be normally distributed and white noise. The PSS F-test, tests for the
absence of any level relationship between yt and xt by testing for the joint exclusion of lagged vari-
ables yt−1 and xt−1 using the F-statistic. This test is based on the null hypothesis that θ1 = θ2 = 0,
under the sequential treatment of all variables in the specification as the outcome variables. The
rejecting of the null hypothesis establishes the existence of a level relationship, hence the rejection
of the weak exogeneity for the y−variable specified under the test.The order of augmentation is
determined by the need to ensure that the error term is free of any systematic variation in order to
extract the long-run relationship. The null hypothesis of “no long-run relationship” is restated in
equation (4.18) and is tested against the alternative hypothesis given in equation (4.19):
H0 : θ1 = θ2 = 0 (4.18)
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H1 : θ1 6= θ2 6= 0 (4.19)
However, the F-statistic used for the test has a non-standard distribution and it is influenced by
whether the variables are I(0) or I(1). To circumvent this weakness, Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulate
the two asymptotic critical values to be used. The upper bound critical value of F denoted by FU
assumes that all variables are I(1) and the lower bound critical statistic denoted by FL assumes that
all variables are I(0). If the estimated F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical F-statistic
(F̂ > FU), one rejects the null hypothesis of “no long-run” relationship between level variables
and conclude that there is a long-run relationship between the variable of interest. On the other-
hand if F − statistic computed is lower than the lower bound critical value proposed by Pesaran
et al. (2001) (F̂ < FL), one cannot reject the null hypothesis of “no long-run” relationship between
variables of interest. If F-statistic computed falls between these critical values (FU > F̂ > FL), the
result is inconclusive.
Given the small sample size (T = 40), we do not use the F-critical values provided by Pesaran
et al. (2001) instead we use those provided by Narayan (2005). This is because the F-critical val-
ues provided by Pesaran et al. (2001) cannot be used in small samples since they were generated
for large samples sizes ( i.e. 500 and 1000 observations and 20 000 and 40 000 replications re-
spectively). Narayan (2005) has tabulated the critical values for smaller samples of size 30 to 80
observations, using the same GAUSS code as Pesaran et al.,(2001). The critical values he reports
are smaller than those generated and reported by Pesaran et al. (2001). During the estimation
process, we control for political regime shifts through the use of the impulse dummy variables.
we use the impulse dummy variables because they enable the characterization of the three politi-
cal transition periods corresponding to the transition from Colonial regime to Kenyatta’s regime,
from Kenyatta’s regime to Moi’s regime, from Moi’s regime to Kibaki’s regime. Thus 1963=1 and
1978=1 and 2002=1 and zero otherwise respectively. These transition periods represent different
policy and institutional discharges by different regime leaders which could potentially affect the




The next step is to test for Granger causality between variables that are cointegrated using VECM
to capture both the short-run and long-run causal relationships25. The following VECM is esti-
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where (1− L) is the first difference operator, εt−1 is a one period lagged error-correction term
derived from the cointegration equation and ξit are the serially uncorrelated random disturbance
terms with zero mean. From Equation (4.20), the significance of εt−1 indicates the presence of
long-run causality, whereas the significance of a joint F-test on the lagged explanatory variables
25Note that even if the variables are not cointegrated, causality could still be performed on the first difference form
of vector autoregressive (VAR) to capture only the short-run causal relationships
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indicates the short-run causality. For instance, A12,i 6= 0 indicates that there is short-run Granger
causality running from property rights (ln f hprt−i) to foreign direct investment (lnFDI ft−i), whereas
A21,i 6= 0, A24,i 6= 0, A27,i 6= 0 imply that foreign direct invest (lnFDI ft−i), government debt
(Govdebtt−i) and credit to the private sector (crpst−i) Granger cause a change in property rights
institutions in Kenya (ln f hprt−i). The similar procedure can be applied to test the rest of the
relationships between other variables in the system.
4.6 Estimation Results and Discussions
4.6.1 Unit Root Tests
The standard econometric theory suggests that many economic Time Series variables are often
non-stationary (that is they have unit root): they have means, variances and covariances that of-
ten change over time. Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) and Dickey et al. (1986) argue that modeling
such variables could result in inconsistent estimators and spurious results-results that look statis-
tically significant in the model yet reflect only contemporaneous correlations rather than mean-
ingful causal relations between variables being modeled. On the contrary, if such variables are
integrated of the same order, their combination could result in revealing a meaningful long-run
relationship (Harris, 1992; Dickey and Fuller, 1979and Kahn and Ogaki, 1992). In the light
of these problems, it has become a common practice to test variables for non-stationarity before
proceeding with estimations.
All the variables are tested for the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (unit root) using the Aug-
mented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test-an approach that is widely used in empirical studies, and the
Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Squares. The latter test is performed to validate the results ob-
tained from the ADF test since this test is superior to the ADF test which suffers from low power
in small samples (Harris, 1992, and Harris, 1995). The test of non-stationarity is performed
preceding the test for any long-run relationship between variables. Table 4.1 reports the unit root
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results. The test is performed first on the model that includes the lagged dependent variable and
the constant term only. The results from this first leg of the unit root test are indicated in the table
under the columns with (τµ). The second leg of the test is performed on the model that includes
both the constant and trend. The results from the second leg of the unit root test are shown in the
table under the column with (τc+t). These tests of non-stationarity are performed at both levels
(X) and first difference (∆X) of all variables.
The results from both the DF-GLS and ADF unit root test presented in Table 4.1 consistently in-
dicate that the levels of all variables except trade openness are non stationary but their first differ-
ences are stationary. This tests suggests that FDI ft , f hprt , RGDPt , educt , Govdebtt , REERt , crpst , and K/Lt
are integrated of order one, I(1). These results further show that none of the variables is integrated
of order higher than one (I(1)). Since one of the variables (trade openness (Opent)) is integrated of
order zero while others are integrated of order one, then the bounds test approach to cointegration
is the most suitable.
4.6.2 Cointegration and Long-run Relationships
The next step is to formally test for the order of cointegration between variables using the Bounds
test to cointegration as highlighted above, and discern any long-run relationship between them.
Since the results of the Bounds test to cointegration are sensitive to the choice of lag order for
ARDL model, an optimal lag length is determined using the modified Akaike information crite-
rion and the modified Schwarz information criterion, and 2 years is set as the maximum lag order
26. Because this research is interested in the parameters of a partial FDI model conditioned on
some other variables, it tests for the long-run weak exogeneity/the direction of association be-
tween all variables in order to assess the variables that could be regarded as exogenous to the FDI
cointegrating vector 27. The importance of the exogeneity test has been pointed out particularly
26Enders (2004) suggest that 3 years is sufficiently long to capture the dynamic relationship between variables













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































well in Engle et al. (1983) who give an overview of the various definitions in the literature. Weak
exogeneity of the right-hand side variables means that no useful information is lost when one con-
ditions on these variables without specifying their generating process (Johansen, 1992). Chiying
and Pu (2004) also notes that valid inference based on a partial system can only be conducted
when the conditioning variables are weakly exogenous for the parameters of the partial system.
Standard procedures to test weak exogeneity of the conditioning variables have to be based on the
estimated cointegration vectors.
Table (4.2) presents the results for the bounds testing approach to cointegration when each of
the variables is taken as a dependent variable. The results show that the F-statistics computed is
greater than the 5% critical F-statistics when lnFDI and lnRGDP are taken as dependent vari-
ables in the equations. These results suggest an existence of long-run relationship between our
variables of interest in the lnFDI vector and lnRGDP vector. The results show further that prop-
erty index (ln f hpr), real exchange rate(REER), ratio of capital to labour (K/L), government debt
(Govdebt) are weakly exogenous to lnFDI vector and lnRGDP hence can be regarded as forcing
variables. This is detected from the fact that the F-statistic computed when each of these variables
is a dependent variable is less than the 5% critical F-statistics from Narayan (2005). The findings

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Since it has been found that FDI and its determinants are cointegrated, computation of its long-run
determinants is necessary and this enables an assessment of the extent to which property rights
( f hpr) matter for FDI in Kenya. The Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) estimator
proposed by Phillips and Hansen (1990) is employed to estimate the cointegrating relationship
between FDI and its determinants. The FMOLS is chosen because it has superior performance in
finite samples (Phillips and Loretan, 1991)). In addition it provides reliable point estimates and
test statistics (Cappuccio and Lubian, 2001). Moreover, Harbo et al. (1998) reveals in the Monte-
Carlo experiment that FMOLS is the best estimator even when the cointegrating dimensionality
is unknown. Table 4.3 provides the FMOLS estimation of the long-run impacts of property rights
(ln f hpr), real gross domestic product (lnRGDP), financial development measured by the amount
of credit extended to the private sector (lncrps), ratio of capital to labour (K/L), government debt
to GDP (Govdebt) and education of the labour force (Educ) on inward FDI in Kenya.
Table 4.3: Results for test of Long-run Relationship between FDI and Institutions
Variables Co-efficients t-Statistics p-value
ln f hpr 3.15 2.39∗∗ 0.02
lnRGDP 7.70 2.09∗∗ 0.04
lncrps 2.72 2.26∗∗ 0.03
K/L 0.02 1.94∗∗ 0.05
Govdebt -0.03 -3.68∗∗∗ 0.00
Edu 0.27 3.35∗∗∗ 0.002
REER 0.25 2.52∗∗∗ 0.031
Constant -156.43 75.86∗∗ 0.04
Trend 0.01 0.11 0.91
Notes: Sample: 1970-2010; Variables are defined in Table 2.7;
Asteriks ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively
Generally all the explanatory variables are found to be statistically significant at the 5% level
or better. In line with other studies on the determinants of FDI, these results suggest that prop-
erty rights (ln f hpr) positively affect FDI in Kenya. The results further suggest that real GDP
(lnRGDP), education of the labour force (Edu), financial development (lncrps), capital deep-
ening (ratio of capital to labour−K/L) positively affect FDI flows in Kenya. These results are
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in line with those obtained by Gwenhamo (2011) for the case of Zimbabwe, Choong and Lam
(2010); Choong et al. (2005) andBlonigen (2005) for the case of Malaysia . However, the level
of Government debt which was used in this case to proxy for macroeconomic management has
an inverse effect on FDI into Kenya. Specifically, this study finds that market size (proxied by
lnRGDP), property rights (proxied by ln f hpr) and financial development are the leading deter-
minants of FDI into Kenya. The results indicate that a 1 percent increase in domestic market size
would increase FDI by 7.7% while a 1 percent increase in the state of property rights institutions
would increase FDI by 3.15% and a 1 percent increase in financial development would affect FDI
by more that 2.7%. These results also support those obtained by Ang (2008); Tang et al. (2014);
and Aw et al. (2010) for Malaysia, and Karimi et al. (2010) for ASEAN countries and Asiedu
(2006) for African countries.
The effect of macroeconomic policy uncertainty captured by the level of external debt has sig-
nificant effect on FDI in the long-run. The results indicate that the increase in external debt
has negatively affected foreign direct investment in Kenya over the period under consideration.
This effect does not change significantly in magnitude even when we include other variables in
the model. The external debt burden increases the likelihood of balance of payment problems
thereby act as a disincentive for foreign investors to invest in the economy lest the government
imposes restrictions on profits and dividend remittances in order to stop the outflow of capital
when it faces balance of payment problems. Thus rising debt levels have the immediate impact
of discouraging foreign direct investment.
Similarly, the real exchange rate depreciation (REER), a measure of the country’s competitive-
ness, positively affect foreign direct investment in Kenya over the sample period. Possible chan-
nels through which depreciation of the domestic currency works are the “relative wage” and “pro-
duction costs” channels under which real depreciation reduces the country’s wages and production
costs relative to those of foreign counterparts. This makes the economy with a depreciated cur-
rency an ideal destination for investment (location advantage). The depreciation of the domestic
currency improves the overall rate of return to foreigners contemplating an overseas investment
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project. Despite the positive role of exchange rate depreciation, the levels of foreign direct in-
vestment did not improve drastically in the Kenyan economy because the cost of institutional
uncertainty outweighed the return from investment in this economy. Golberg (2011) argues that
substantial FDI might not be realized following real depreciation if such depreciation was antici-
pated and formed an expected cost of project finance for the FDI. Therefore given the prolonged
history of domestic currency depreciation in Kenya, it could be expected that any depreciation of
currency might have been anticipated by the bulk of foreign investors and only a few of them who
did not possess adequate information might have invested in the economy.
Table (4.3) shows that the quality of the education of the labour force (edu) has an effect on foreign
direct investment in Kenya. This result concurs with my a-priori expectation given that Kenya has
had a relatively well skilled labour force compared to its neighbouring countries which might have
been a center of attraction to foreign firms which require skills for their operations. Similarly,
real gross domestic product (lnRGDP) has a positive impact on foreign direct investment and
such impact is significant, thereby supporting the “market size hypothesis”. The elasticity of
foreign direct investment with respect to real income is 7.7, meaning that FDI responds by more
percentage change to any change in real income (gross domestic product). This result shows
that during growth deceleration in Kenya, FDI also shrunk because returns from investing in the
economy were low and could not compensate for the investment risk.
The level of financial sector development captured by the financial intermediation index (credit to
the private sector) reports a positive long-run effect on FDI in Kenya. This long-run elasticity is
only significant at 5 percent level of significance. Nevertheless, this result supports the notion that
the level of financial sector development is an important factor in attracting foreign investors. The
endogenous growth theory suggests that the level of financial sector development may influence
foreign direct investment and its impact on the diffusion of technology in the host country, thereby
increasing the rate of economic growth28.
However, the conditioning variables, openness of the economy (open), and political instability
28See Alfaro et al, (2004)
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(pinstability) reported insignificant effects on foreign direct investment, although they appear
with theoretically justifiable negative signs. These were therefore dropped from the model and
their results are not reported here. The insignificance of “Open”, may be explained by the fact
that it is a limited proxy for openness as it captures only current account openness (share of
exports and imports to gross domestic product) and the more appropriate measure would be that
which also captures capital account openness. However such a measure is difficult to construct
due to absence of a dataset that covers the 1970s29. Second, if the investment is horizontal in
nature, implying that it is meant to serve the domestic market, it might be less affected by this
measure of openness. However, restrictions of capital account and invisible components of the
current account will affect the investor’s ability to repatriate dividends and profits. Although
political instability negatively affects foreign direct investment, its effect is insignificant. Such
insignificance is warranted given that Kenya has been regarded by foreign investors to have a
reasonably stable polity relative to its neighbors such as Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania especially
in earlier years up to 200630. This does not eliminate the fact that Kenya has suffered episodes of
instability such as the 2007 post election violence, as we showed in Chapter 2.
4.6.3 Do Property Rights Institutions affect FDI in Kenya in the Short-run?
This research finds that property rights affect FDI in Kenya in the long-run. This research further
ascertains the direction of causality between property rights and FDI and other variables of inter-
est in the short-run through the Granger causality technique. Since the variables are cointegrated,
the Granger causality test is performed within an ECM framework. Table (4.4) presents the results
of Granger causality test. The one period lagged error correction terms (ECMt−1) are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level or better when the natural log of foreign direct invest (lnFDI f ),
property rights institutions (ln f hpr), real gross domestic product (lnRGDP), financial develop-
29I am aware of the various indicators such as the Chin-Ito index, Quinn Index and Potchamanawong Index, con-
structed in literature to capture capital account openness but such measures have limited time coverage and do not
provide enough variations to be used in Time Series studies.
30See Table 4.8 for Kenya’s relative political stability rank compared to other East African Countries in appendix to
this chapter
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ment (lncrps), ratio of capital to labour (K/L) are dependent variable for the ECM equation. The
results imply that there is a long-run causality running from property rights institutions, real gross
domestic product, education of the labour force, financial sector development and capital labour
ratio to foreign direct investment in Kenya. However the error correction term that appears with
magnitude above 1 implies that the deviations from the long-run equilibrium are corrected by
more than 100 percent in the short-run. In addition, the results provide some evidence of long-run
Granger causality running from foreign direct investment, property rights institutions, financial
development, macroeconomic management and capital deepening to real gross domestic product.
With regard to short-run causality, this research finds evidence of eleven uni-directional causality
relationships and one bi-directional causality. However only some of these causality relationships
have economic implications. For instance, the results reveal that even in the short-run foreign
direct investment is Granger caused by property rights institutions in Kenya. Apart from the in-
fluence of property rights ( f hpr), other variables that Granger cause FDI in the short-run are:
The education of the labour force (Edu), financial development (lncrps) and capital deepening
(K/L). Therefore foreign investors would be concerned with the state of property rights, macroe-
conomic management, the level of financial development, education of the labour force and the
level of capital deepening when choosing whether to invest in Kenya. Although real gross domes-
tic product Granger causes FDI in the long-run, it does not seem to exert any significant influence
in the short-run. Second, Kenya’s economic growth is Granger caused by foreign direct invest-
ment, property rights institutions, financial development, capital deepening and government debt.
These results validate the FDI-led growth and the Institutions-growth hypothesis in the context of
Kenya.
One other interesting result is the influence of education of the labour force on property rights
institutions. The results show that increasing the level of education of the labour force is likely to
change the status of property rights in the economy. Thus as more people acquire education, they
are likely to demand more protection of their property. This positive role of education on institu-
tions validates theoretical predictions from the political science literature which places education
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at the centre of institutional formation. This literature is virtually unanimous in its conclusion that
formal education is strongly linked to political knowledge, interest and involvement (see Mattes
and Mughogho, 2009; Dalton, 2000 and Evans and Rose (2007)) hence property rights institu-
tions. The path through which education affects property rights institutions is through political
institutions which are themselves influenced by education through three channels. First, through
the “positional path” which argues that formal education sorts citizens into differing social net-
works, situations, and classes. This affects their attitudes and behaviour in the political sphere,
promoting democratic citizenship that would then lead to demand for property rights protection.
Second, through a “socialization path” in which children are explicitly trained to see democracy
as preferable to its alternatives and at a later stage when they have gained democracy, they would
demand property rights protection. Finally, through “precognitive path” which argues that formal
education increases people’s verbal and cognitive proficiency, as well as their ability to construct
their own ideas and think critically. Comparison of the results of this study with the findings
from similar studies in the economic literature shows that they are in line with those obtained by
Tang et al. (2014) and Gwenhamo (2011). The implication of the results is that during the period
when property rights were weakening in Kenya, foreign direct investment was also shrinking, and
during the period when the economy was performing relatively well, foreign direct investment
was also increasing in the economy. Similarly, low levels of growth have reduced incentives for





























































































































































































































































































































































This Chapter has explored how the quality of institutions affect foreign direct investment in
Kenya. A theoretical model was constructed of an investor decision making when faced with in-
stitutional uncertainty in an environment characterized by weak institutions based on real option
theory to investment. Using this model, optimal conditions for investors decision making under
such environment were derived. This theoretical model showed that institutional uncertainty in-
creases the option value of investment, and therefore reduces any level of investment that could be
made in a developing economy. Firms find it optimal to reschedule their investment plans to some
future date with the hope that there will be some improvement in institutions. This implies that
the higher the uncertainty, the higher the option value to invest. As uncertainty increases in the
economy, the threshold returns that firms expect to get as a compensation for uncertainty also rises
and this results in the failure of an economy to attract investment. The lower the uncertainty, the
more likely the investment is to be undertaken immediately. That implies that there is a positive
relationship between property rights protection and the level of investment in an economy. Thus
institutional uncertainty tends to delay investment. This assumption was empirically tested using
Time Series data for Kenya from 1970 to 2010. Specifically this tested the prediction that prop-
erty rights protection positively affects FDI. The results from this Chapter present evidence that
institutional quality indeed affects foreign direct investment in Kenya. However, there are other
factors that remain important in attracting foreign direct investment. These factors include overall
macroeconomic management and political stability. The results of this research show that weak
macroeconomic policies are also disincentives for foreign investors. Based on this evidence, this
study concluded that foreign investment into Kenya is restrained by the quality of its institutions.
Similarly, the quality of institutions might have subsequently affected real growth over the period
under consideration. Two basic policy implications emerge from this Chapter. First, that improve-
ment in the quality of institutions can benefit the growth process in Kenya through its effect on
both foreign direct investment and other channels. Second, macroeconomic policy management
characterized by sustainable debt levels in the presence of good institutional environment appears
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very important to attract foreign direct investment. Political stability remains one of the most im-
portant factors that helps attract foreign capital stocks into any economy. However, caution must
be made that foreign direct investment decisions are influenced by a combination of other factors
beyond macroeconomic policy management and the quality of institutions.
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Table 4.7: Estimated Revenue Losses From Tax Incentives in Kenya (2003-2008)
Investment Incentives (Figures in Kenya Shelling (Kshs) Millions)
2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 Total
Investment Deductions 4,031 14,703 4,323 4,295 11,842 39,134
Industrial Building allowance 481 1,021 539,298 494 2,833 544,127
Wear and Tear 19,007 21,294 21,684 11,109 40 73,134
Farm world allowance 814 1,130 1,256 609 876 4,685
Mining Operations Deductions 203 715 45 70 215 1,248
Sub-Total 24,536 38,863 27,847 16,381 13,467 121,094
Trade Related Incentives
EPZ 103 1,712 5,300 6,694 5,804 19,613
MUB 20 310 937 721 96 2,084
TREO 2,989 2,537 3,974 7,591 6,149 23,590
Sub Total 3,102 4,559 10,211 15,366 12,049 45,287
Total 27,638 43,422 38,058 31,747 45,516 166,381
Revenue Loss as % of GDP 1.43 1.66 2.08 1.85 1.29
Import Duty Exceptions Granted by Kenya (Figures in US$ Million)
Value of Exceptions 800.9 1,370.8 1,626.7 2,306.2 61,046
Revenue Foregone 201.4 289.5 430.8 566.90 14,886
Total Trade Taxes 1,529.7 1,749.0 2,273.2 2,451.6 8,003.5
Percentage (%) Revenue Foregone 11.6 14.2 15.9 18.8 60.5
Source: EAC Secretariat, EAC Trade Rport 2008, 2010, p.51 and Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA). The Table shows total losses
of 25.5 Kshs billion (US$282 million) in 2007/08, and cumulative losses over the five years of KShs 166 billion (US$1.84 billion)
These losses amount to to an average of 1.7% of GDP. Over the four years, Kenya lost US$1.49 billion in import duty exceptions.
Deriving the Threshold Returns (P∗)
To solve for F(P∗), hence the optimal threshold level of P∗, we solve equation (4.10) subject to
the boundary conditions in equation (4.11)e(4.13) to determine the value of an option and finally
the threshold level of returns. The form of the general solution to differential equation (4.10)
is given in equation (4.21) with its corresponding first and second order derivatives shown in
equation (4.22) and (4.23) respectively:
Fφ (P∗) = Aφ Pλ (4.21)
F ′φ (P
∗) = λAφ Pλ−1 (4.22)
F ′′φ (P





























































































































































































































Substituting equation (4.21) into (4.12), we get:
Aφ Pλ =Vφ (P∗)−C(I) (4.24)
Given that Vφ (P∗) =
(1−φ)P






Using the smooth pasting condition shown in equation (4.13) and respective derivatives of F ′(P)





































Equation (4.27) defines the minimum critical threshold level of returns from any risky investment
that a representative foreign firm will require to invest. It is a function of institutional uncertainty
(φ) and some other parameters. The next step is to determine the value of λ so that we can do our
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comparative statics to see the influence of the quality of institutions on P∗. The value of λ is the
solution to the differential equation (4.10).
























2 +2αλ −σ2λ −2r = 0 (4.29)
Equation (4.29) specifies the usual quadratic equation under real option analysis also known as
fundamental quadratic equation (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) which when solved for the values


































We then ignore the second solution for λ̃ < 0 because it does not fulfill the optimality condi-
tion given in equation (4.11). Therefore the threshold option value of returns under institutional


























The question that follows is how then does institutional uncertainty parameter affect the value of
P∗ which serves as the firm’s investment decision guide in the long-run. To answer this question
we perform simple comparative statics on the threshold equilibrium returns (P∗). We use the total
differential theorem to find our comparative statics between P∗ and the uncertainty parameter φ












Equation 4.33 gives the change in the threshold of investment (dP∗) as a result of the change
institutional quality (dφ). Given the conditions that r > α > 0; 0 < φ < 1; σ > 0 and λ̃ > 1, then








Illicit Financial Flows and Institutions
in Kenya: To What Extent Do Political
Institutions Matter?
“Corrupt political Elites in the developing world, working hand-in-hand with greedy business people and
unscrupulous investors, are putting private gain before the welfare of citizens and the economic
development of their countries– Peter Eigen, (2002: page 2)1.”
5.1 Motivation
AT the turn of the 21
st century many African economies have continued to face the de-
velopmental challenge of illicit financial outflows2. This occurs despite these countries’
development finance gap. Reuter (2012); Ndikumana and Boyce (2012b); Cerra et al. (2008);
Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) claim that these illicit flows have undermined the process of
1see Peter (2002)
2In this chapter, the phrase illicit financial flows and capital flight are used interchangeably
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economic development in these countries. A quick historical glimpse at them shows they are
not a new phenomenon. They have been a problem since these countries gained independence
from the Imperial Powers. These outflows of financial resources are an enigma that raises several
key questions: Why do these countries experience such outflows yet they undermine their pro-
cess of economic development? Are these outflows a result of weaknesses in political institutions
(extractive institutions in Acemoglu’s parlance) that were set up during colonial rule that have
allowed maximum rent extraction by the post-colonial rulers? Are they the result of weaknesses
in political institutions that were created in the post-colonial period by the local political elites
following political transition from colonial rule that have also allowed maximum rent extraction?
How do we explain this enigma?
An explanation in economic literature advanced by the proponents of the Neoclassical economic
tradition (from now on the conventional economic wisdom) equates these flows to capital flight. It
views them as resulting from rational reallocation of capital from developing countries in response
to the favorable risk-return investment opportunities in the developed world, and investors’ desire
for portfolio diversification (Le and Zak, 2006; Collier et al., 2001; Sheets, 1996). Within
this context the risk adjusted returns on assets abroad are believed to be higher than those in
developing countries. The level of investment risk is believed to be high in developing countries
in part because of macroeconomic policy distortions such as overvalued exchange rates, huge
fiscal deficits, and unfair taxation of capital gains, and interest rate controls under financially
repressed markets. The repressed financial markets prevailed in a number of developing countries,
especially in Africa before the market liberalization reforms of the 1990s (Lensink et al., 1998;
Ajayi, 1995).
However, recent investigations have questioned this conventional wisdom. In particular, they
have pointed out that portfolio motives are by no means the primary drivers of capital from de-
veloping countries. Therefore policy advice on how to curb such flows should be directed else-
where, at causes beyond portfolio motives (Blankenburg and Khan, 2012; Ndikumane and Boyce,
2011). The modern political economy literature and the new institutional economics literature
192
have pointed out that this problem results from specific fundamental problems the developing
countries have long struggled with. These include corruption and rent seeking by political lead-
ers who have been able to extract enormous rents while in power in a seemingly unconstrained
manner. According to this literature, corruption and the lack of development are a result of ex-
tractive political institutions. Extractive political institutions refer to those institutions that do not
constrain political leaders and their elite groups; that concentrate power in the hands of a few,
and that do not provide checks and balances or “rule of law”. These institutions are claimed to
have led to pervasive rent seeking and stifled the process of economic development in developing
countries (Acemoglu et al., 2004, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2002; Clague et al., 1996; Sachs et al.,
1995)3.
Noticeably, these latter theoretical assertions seem to be consistent with several reported inci-
dences of political corruption in which many political leaders in Africa such as Mobutu, Moi and
Houphouet-Boigny were at one point alleged to possess personal fortunes equivalent to the total
foreign debt accumulation of their economies (Ayittey, 1992)4. Recently, political corruption
incidences have increased in some African countries. For instance, the IMF (2010) reported that
US$32 billion from oil revenue was missing in Angola (a quarter of Angola’s GDP)5 and more
than US$2.5 million was missing in Malawi in a scandal that became famously known as the
Cash gate scandal6. Regardless of these scandals, a number of political leaders allegedly involved
in them have often ruled their countries for decades without challenge from their populace7- a
3These claims are backed up by voluminous evidence that shows that weaknesses in institutions have stifled in-
vestment and development in developing countries (see Loayza et al., 2007; Saleh, 2004; Everhart and Sumlinski,
2001).
4These leaders also are claimed to have collaborated with government officials, private individuals and the multi-
national companies in the stealing of resources from their economies (see Ayattey,1992)
5This political corruption scandal was reported by the IMF and by Human Rights Watch, and was subsequently
acknowledged by the Angolan government. US$32 billion in oil revenue (a quarter of Angola’s GDP) could not be
accounted for. The clue to what might have happened was revealed from a 2010 US senate report into corruption and
money laundering which found Aguinaldo Jaime, who served as the governor of the National Bank of Angola from
1999 to 2002 initiated a series of suspicious US$50 million transactions with US banks. This was done in collaboration
with senior members of parliament and ministers in the government.
6This scandal was reported in Malawi in October 2013 and led president Joyce Banda to sack those ministers who
were allegedly connected to misuse of office.
7Moi ruled Kenya for 2.5 decades, Mobutu ruled DRC for 3.2 decades and Felix Houphouet-Boigny ruled the Ivory
Coast for 3 decades. Acemoglu et al. (2004) have argued that these leaders manage to maintain power because of their
divide and rule strategy.
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phenomenon that remains a puzzle.This seems to contradict the claim that the populace has the
defacto political power to change the status quo if their social wellbeing is undermined (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2012). Yet, the question is why does the populace not revolt against such
leaders?
Given the foregoing incidences of political corruption involving senior officials, it becomes diffi-
cult to accept the Neoclassical view on the causes of these flows. This view is complicated by the
fact that a number of African countries have achieved macroeconomic stability (low inflation, a
stable exchange rate. They have sustainable fiscal deficits) reduced other macroeconomic policy
distortions-high debt levels and deficits following financial liberalization. The rates of return from
the African countries also appear larger than those observed in the developed and industrialized
countries (Montiel and Serven, 2006). Here the logic is simple. If the neoclassical view was
the best explanation for illicit financial flows from the African continent, then the attainment of
macroeconomic stability and relatively favourable rates of return in these countries should have
reduced economic risk with subsequent reduction in capital outflows.Yet corruption and debt fu-
eled capital outflows have continued to characterize these countries. At the same time, if African
countries are regarded as risky environments for investment, then foreign lenders should not to
lend their money to African governments, yet they have continued to do so (Ndikumane and
Boyce, 2011). So where does this leave us?
This paper explores the political economy view as an alternative explanation to the illicit financial
outflows for one African country-Kenya. It aims to specifically answer two related questions:
Why has Kenya continued to be characterized by corruption and debt fueled capital outflows,
although these stifle its economic development. Are these outflows a result of weaknesses in
political institutions that do not constrain the powers of the executive and that have allowed max-
imum rent extraction? These questions remain very pertinent not only for Kenya but for other
developing countries that are faced with the development challenge of debt fueled illicit capital
outflows. To this end, this study assesses empirically the role of increasing powers of the execu-
tive as a proxy for the influence of political institutions on illicit financial outflows. The evidence
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from this exercise supports the view that increasing executive powers is positively associated with
illicit financial outflows. Thus weaknesses in political institutions matter for illicit financial flows
(rent extraction) from Kenya. As robustness checks, this research uses constraints on the execu-
tive from Polity IV Indicators as an alternative indicator of institutions. Using these alternative
indicators, the study finds a strong support that constraining the executives powers is likely to
reduce the magnitude of illicit financial flows from Kenya.
Kenya becomes a particularly interesting ground on which to test the influence of political institu-
tions on illicit capital outflows for a number of reasons. First, for the past four decades of the post
independence period the country has faced high corruption levels and rent seeking sustained by
an entrenched system of political patronage8. There is also some evidence of several incidences
of the reported grand corruption scandals involving the transfer of illicit money by the ruling po-
litical elites from the late 1970s to the early 21st century. Second, corruption and the illicit capital
outflows from Kenya have been a cause for a concern for a number of ordinary Kenyans who re-
main poor despite the increasing debt acquired in their names by the ruling political elites. Illicit
capital outflows and corruption are claimed to have depleted the already meager public resources
and led to sub-optimal investment, and rising debt levels, and undermined tax moral accountabil-
ity between citizens and the State. They have also added to the growing horizontal inequality
within the country (Lazzeri, 2012).
This paper does not aim to provide a comprehensive view of the determinants of illicit financial
flows from Kenya or a review of the political economy of Kenya. Thus, the discussions provided
in this paper are meant to complement rather than be an alternative to the general economic
explanations provided elsewhere (see Collier et al., 2001; Dornbusch, 1990; Cuddington, 1986,
for competing explanations).
The study fills the existing gap in the literature on the relationship between political institutions,
rent seeking and illicit capital outflows from developing countries using Kenya as a case study. To
8In 2012, the KPMG report shows that Kenya remains among the top four countries in Africa which have the
highest corruption levels
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the best of the author’s knowledge no study has attempted to demonstrate the influence of increas-
ing powers of the executive on illicit capital flows from Kenya. The only study that has attempted
to examine the factors that influence illicit financial outflows from Kenya is that byNg’eno (2000).
However, that study used the Neo-classical framework and equated illicit capital flows to capital
flight. It largely ignored the political economy and institutional explanations of such flows. It
further ignored the changing political context within which capital flight has occurred in Kenya.
This paper therefore fills in this research gap.
This paper is closely related to the papers that attempt to understand capital flight and corruption
from Africa. These include those by Yalta and Yalta (2012); Ndikumana and Boyce (2011); Ali
and Walters (2011); Fofack and Ndikumana (2010); Ndikumana and Boyce (2008); Cerra et al.
(2008); Ndikumana and Boyce (2003); Boyce and Ndikumana (2001); Lensink et al. (1998); Ajayi
(1995). The paper is also related to the papers on the political economy of corruption and the new
institutional economics such as Acemoglu et al. (2004, 2003); Alesina and Tabellini (1989). The
rest of the Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides historical context and the styl-
ized facts on illicit financial flows and the state of institutions in Kenya. Section 3 presents a
review of the related literature on illicit financial flows. Section 4 provides an econometric esti-
mation framework and section 5 presents the results and discussions. The final section provides
concluding remarks and policy implications.
5.2 Historical Context and the Stylized Facts
Similar to other African countries, Kenya continues to lose billions of dollars annually as gov-
ernment officials, individuals and corporations stash illegally acquired funds in highly secretive
foreign banks abroad. For instance, during the past four decades of the post independence pe-
riod, it is estimated that the country lost over US$6.369 billion in accumulated illicit financial
flows (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 2008). Between 2000-2006, it is alleged that it lost on average
US$686 million per year-a figure that is above the total Net Official Development Assistance it
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received, which for the year 2005 was estimated at US$652 million (Kar and Cartwright-Smith,
2008). This section discusses the evolution of this problem through the lenses of the political
economy. It shows how politicians holding defacto political power dismantle the institutions of
accountability in order to extract resources from the economy. At the same time, it accounts how
politicians following such dismantling of institutions establish patronage system of public goods
provision in order to intensify the collective action problem and remain in power and extract re-
sources from the economy. These section lists salient features underlying corruption and illicit
financial flows from the political economy framework.
5.2.1 Dismantling Checks and Balances and the evolution of Corruption in the
Kenyan State
The Kenyatta Regime
At independence in 1963, Kenya inherited a colonial model of governance with the strongly cen-
tralized state and a dominant executive. The Kenyatta administration did not change the status-quo
but dismantled the bicameral legislative system established under the Lancaster Constitution of
1962, that was meant to provide an effective system of checks and balances and accountability
in government (Slade, 1975)9. In 1964, Kenya became a republic with unicameral form of gov-
ernment in which all executive powers were vested in the president. These included the powers
to appoint and dismiss judges, including the Chief Justice, as well as Accountant General, Public
Service Commissioner and other important executive branches of government10. This abolished
the separation of powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive. Arguably this
was the most significant move in which the new elites had chosen to deviate from the model set up
by their colonial mentors, and assert their own interest11. The consequences was rampant political
corruption of the executive and the whole system of government, as will be demonstrated shortly.
9This was done through the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No.1) Act No. 28 of 1964
10see the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No.2) Act No. 28 of 1964
11Hornsby (2013) argues that this was a complete capture of the state by Jomo Kenyatta and his allies in 1962-65
and it is the single most important factor in understanding Kenya’s subsequent trajectory.
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After dismantling the system of checks and balances, the president was no longer answerable to
parliament. From that time on, he was no longer to be voted for parliament12. Mueller (2008)
notes that parliament became little more than a rubber stamp for the executive. Clearly this was
a strategic move in which Kenyatta established the patrimonial state that would benefit him and
his entourage of elites. Following these constitutional alterations, Kenyatta established informal
patron-client networks, where clients were rewarded not only with land that had been vacated
by the then departing European settlers but also with state contracts that often inflated prices to
extract resources from government. It was during the same period that the Public Service Structure
and Remuneration Commission (PSRC) set up by the president recommended that civil servants
also could engage in private business. This recommendation is credited as giving legitimacy to
official corruption in the country(Loughran, 2010; Odhiambo-Mbai, 2003). Businesses owned
by public servants and ministers started to trade with the government they were serving. This
was an obvious conflict of interest and it enabled the siphoning of state resources for personal
gain(Waithima, 2011). Part of the siphoned state resources by ministers was recycled as handouts
to their constituencies, glorified as “harambee13”(Hornsby, 2013).
Slowly an African business elite, predominantly from Kenyatta ethnic group-the Kikuyus, emerged
alongside businessmen of Indian originHornsby (2013). By the 1970s, it became evident that the
system of clientilism, corruption and connections, fueled by poverty and politics was well estab-
lished, entwined with and running beneath the formal process of government. Hornsby (2013)
argues persuasively that for these early years of independence the wealth of the state was “free
money” to be seized by those who were able to do so. Public sector positions which had been
vacated by the outgoing European settlers were up for grabs-most of which were filled by people
from the Kikuyu ethnic group. It was therefore not very difficult for Kenyatta to buy support
and appease his constituencies-particularly his own Kikuyu community. As he himself claimed at
one time when he went to Gem constituency in Nyanza in an attempt to win back the opposition,
12see the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) (No. 2) Act No. 16 of 1968
13This was a local name for self help programs established at village level and received financing from the con-
tributions of its members. However, this was misused as a political vessel for politicians who used it to win votes.
Harambee contributions were no longer just enforced on the citizens but they almost became a prerequisite for busi-
nessmen getting government contracts especially if the harambee was presided over by politicians (Chweya, 2005).
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“Kenyatta has the sugar, ... go lick his hands”14. However, Odhiambo-Mbai (2003) posits that within the
Kikuyu community, government jobs were given mainly to relatives of in power. This clientelis-
tic distribution of resources made it difficult for people to resist state corruption. The result was
resentments, particularly from the Luo ethnic group, that the non-Kikuyu were not given a share
of the jobs in the leadership commensurate with their representation in the population.
In 1975, the presidential committee chaired by Waruhiu S.N. to investigate the state of the public
service confirmed grand corruption and illicit financial flows arising from extraction of the state
resources. The committee stated that15,
“We have received overwhelming evidence to the effect that some public servants utilize government
facilities in order to benefit themselves. Some are said to tender for government supplies, and to see to
it that their tenders are always successful. Others are said to be in the habit of accepting rewards for
work that they are paid to do by the government. We have been told that most salesmen particularly in
the field of the now popular turn-key projects offer reward to public servants who thus become obliged
to see that decisions are made in favour of those who offer rewards. It has also been suggested that
in the field of purchasing, commissions are paid into bank accounts maintained by Public Servants
abroad. Reward for work that the public servant is already paid to do and receiving bribes are acts of
wanton corruption (Gok, 1980: Waruhiu Committee Report, 1980, 103.)”
Kenyatta used the patronage system and predation of state resources as a political strategy for
maintaining state cohesion. He also used preventive detention to repress the political opposition,
and the harnessed the security forces to disrupt political rallies (Geir Sundet and Moen, 2009;
Mueller, 2008).
In general, corruption leading to capital flight under Kenyatta’s regime was the result of three
related but distinct ways in which Kenyatta failed to create a functioning and effective system of
governance. First, the dismantling of checks and balances. Second, the dominance of patron-
clientilism. Third, the personalization and ethnicization of decision making in which deliberately
14Quotation from field notes of Malcolm Valentine, cited in Mueller (2008)
15This quote that follows appears in Odhiambo-Mbai (2003)
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opaque processes concealed self-interested decision making, and the predation of the state re-
sources. Branch and Cheeseman (2008) call this regime the “bureaucratic-executive” state that
establishes all powerful president who dominated Kenyan political life after independence. They
maintain that this state rested on the collusion of elites determined to protect the highly unequal
post-colonial settlement on which their wealth depended.
Moi’s Regime
In 1978, following the death of President Kenyatta, the political power shifted to Daniel Arap Moi
who was a member of the Kalenjin ethnic group but who had served in Kenyatta’s administration
as the deputy president since independence16. Moi inherited a civil service bureaucracy that
was corrupt and not accountable. His accession to power was followed by a period of growing
tension that culminated in the 1982 economic crises. “He also faced a recalcitrant Kikuyu elite,
who had tried to overthrow him before he took office, Kalenjin supporters who wanted to ‘eat’,
and a growing population waiting for perks (Mueller, 2008)”. Given these challenges, his long
term strategy was not to change the patrimonial state and the patronage system established by
Kenyatta, but rather to reinforce it. He used it for his own benefit and intensified the collective
action problem through further clientilistic distribution of state resources and state repression
tools as a way to retain power.
Moi lacked sizable ethnic political base since he came from a smaller ethnic group-the Luo. He
also faced adverse macroeconomic circumstances.His first step to consolidate political control
was to buy support through patronage financed through predation of the state’s resources. He
also attempted to weaken his enemies through deliberate draconian penalties: torture, detentions
without trial, and state repression. Following the failed coup attempt in 1982, he passed numerous
constitutional amendments, including Section 2A of the constitution which turned Kenya into a
de-jure one-party state17. This hastily passed constitutional amendment outlawed ethnic welfare
organizations, the most powerful of which had been the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru Association
16This group was smaller in numbers than the Kikuyu group
17 By 1991, the constitution had been amended about 32 times
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(KEMA). These organization were seen to be hostile to his regime(Geir Sundet and Moen, 2009).
Moi’s rules created a ‘culture of fear’,(Gimode, 2007). These rules were a further ‘breakdown of
constitutional checks and balances’, and the judiciary became an appendage of the executive
(Mueller, 2008).
Branch and Cheeseman (2008) support that the view that Moi’s strategy of using the state re-
sources to maintain his network of patronage was partly made possible through the “informalisa-
tion” of the state characterized by looting of the state resources. However, Robert Bates (2008) in
his recent framework notes that this strategy is “the long road to disorder”. He argues that it be-
gins with a decision by the executive to adopt an increasingly predatory stance, itself triggered by
some combination of falling public revenues and increased political uncertainty. Moi’s strategy of
looting the nation became even more intense when the country faced political liberalization since
it made him feel more uncertain about his future political victory.
Uncertainty about his future political term in office led him to further weaken the control in-
stitutions, such as the judiciary, the auditor general, and the systems of financial management.
Increasingly, the Presidency took on extra powers. This was a deliberate strategy to maintain
control and to ensure that the President could maneuver as he wished, unencumbered by external
controls. State institutions were increasingly seen as serving the country’s elite rather than the
people. Political patronage was pursued through public service employment, the sale of paras-
tatals, and grand corruption in public procurement and financial management18.
In the early 1990s, it became evident the large and valuable assets of the state were being exploited
by those who held of political power. Hornsby (2013) shows that access to the resources that the
state commanded and the ability to direct them for personal gain and political purposes was in fact
a fundamental driver for competitive politics in Kenya at that time. Most people had the notion
that if they acceded to power, they could use the state resources for their personal benefit. State
resources were increasingly diverted into the off-book sector of the economy in which insiders
18This also included the allocation of public land often in protected forests and public areas like urban parks and
reserved land
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extracted resources from the state for private benefits via bribery, abuses of procurement and perks
in office. Most ministers, senior politicians and civil servants became wealthy through the abuse
of their privilege to take government loans without repayment and receive payment in return for
their political support (see Hornsby, 2013; Berman and Lonsdale, 1992).
It is probable that the legitimacy of the state was higher under Kenyatta because of the general
perception of Kenyatta as the founding father of the nation but also because political awareness
had risen by Moi’s time.
Kibaki’s Regime
In 2002, following the 24 year rule of President Daniel Arap Moi, Mwai Kibaki, who had served
in both Kenyatta’s and Moi’s administrations, was elected to the presidency. He was elected on
an anti-corruption platform with the hope of ending corruption that then permeated every sector
of the country. In 2002 after taking office President Kibaki engaged Kroll and Associates (UK)-
a private investigation and security firm, to investigate the allegations made by Transparency
International that over 3 billion US Dollars was stashed abroad by the Moi administration and its
closest associates19 (Mwakio, y 19).
The report by Kroll and Associates (UK) then revealed more corruption perpetrated during Moi’s
regime20. These scandals raised intense concern among the people of Kenya, and let assertions
that foreign Aid had been used to finance capital flight by Moi’s regime and its political associates.
The pressure for Kibaki to embark on the fight against corruption was also propelled by the
economic challenges his government was facing, in particular, the balance of payments crisis that
hit the economy time and again. Given these challenges, the Government accepted for the first
time that capital flight was a problem in Kenya but disputed its magnitude (Ng’eno, 2000).
19See, for instance, “State Changes Tune on Looted Billions Abroad”,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/regions/2005/
20The full KTM report can be viewed at http://wikileaks.org/wiki/The looting of Kenya under President Moi. The
famous corruption scandals that involved capital flight from Kenya include: (1) Goldenberg Scandal, this was political
scandal where the Kenyan government was found to have allegedly subsidized exports of gold far beyond standard
arrangements during the 1990s, by paying the Goldenberg International company 35% more (in Kenyan shillings)
than their foreign currency earnings. Although it appears that the scheme was intended to earn hard currency for the
country, it is estimated to have cost Kenya the equivalent of more than 10% of the country’s annual Gross Domestic
Product and that no or minimal amounts of gold were actually exported, (2)
202
In response to these challenges, Kibaki’s Administration embarked on several anti-corruption
strategies. For instance, the provision of one month amnesty for holders of foreign assets to en-
tice them to repatriate their foreign holdings; the establishment of the anti-corruption authority
and the enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crime Act and the Public Officer Ethics
Act that required all public officers to declare their wealth. These early initiatives met with little
success as public servants refused to declare their assets unless the politicians were required to do
the same. In 2005, evidence grew that, despite its rhetoric, Kibaki’s administration had adopted
the same kleptocratic attitude to state funds as its predecessors. A number of corruption scandals
that involved the looting of government resources tarnished his administration’s reputation. An
example was the Anglo-Leasing contract in which the country lost Ksh56 billion (nearly 4.38%
of the country’s 2004 GDP) through inflated prices and non executed contracts on passport deals
entered into between the Home Affairs Ministry and the British lease finance company-Anglo
Leasing. This was a serious blow to Kibaki’s regime as it led to more scrutiny into more ques-
tionable contracts involving a number of his cabinet ministers (Wahome, 2007)21.
President Kibaki’s second term in office from 2008, witnessed further corruption scandals that
were greater than the scandals committed during previous regimes (Waithima, 2011). For in-
stance, the Triton oil scandal in which Kenya lost 7.6 billion shillings22, the maize scandal in
which the government lost Khs150 million, the free primary education scandal in which the gov-
ernment lost Khs 4.2 billion, the Navy ship scandal in which Khs 4.6 billion was lost and the
fertilizer scandal in which the government lost Khs4.3 billion, to name but a few23.
It became apparent that a number of contracts entered into between the government of Kenya
and companies in which government officials and ministers were shareholders were designed to
benefit the political elites and to finance election campaigns (Hornsby, 2013). Donors were infu-
riated by the discovery that while the Kenyan government was begging for aid, it appeared to be
21It was noted that half of the people involved in this scandal were senior members of the ruling party and half were
members of KANU
22The Triton case involved the government through the Kenya pipeline company and the Triton company. Correct
procurement procedures were not followed resulting in the government losing billions in the process (see Daily Nations
of January, 11 2009).
23See full details of these scandals in Waithima (2011)
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stealing sums of a similar size to the entire aid budget. It was for this reason that in 2005, virtually
every foreign embassy criticized the government openly over corruption. Hornsby (2013) notes
that by that time, half of the Cabinet had been named in corruption allegations. If corruption and
rent extraction were commonplace in Kenya, why did Kenya people continue to support corrupt
leaders? This question is difficult to answer but perhaps one could derive some hint from John
Githongo’s24 quote provided below that sometimes people support corrupt leaders because they
would benefit from the system. Githongo’s quote reflects clearly that people object to corruption
if it does not benefit them. If they benefit, however they will support corrupt leaders.This justifies
the earlier argument that in Kenya, people supported their leaders because of patronage provision
of public goods which, is commonly known as vote buying (“carrot”) in Kenya.
...the post independence patrimonial state has disbursed resources to favour a ruling “minority”. When
the political traumas of the post-independence era are overlaid on these economic realities driven by
patronage it creates particularly potent perceptions of inequality among ethnic groups...it’s not the
corruption in itself that people object to but the fact that it is perpetrated predominantly by an elite
from one ethnic group to the exclusion of others (Githongo, 2006,20-1).
5.2.2 Illicit Financial Flows and the Regime Change
Figure (5.1) plots illicit financial flows and political rights and civil liberties during the three
political regimes in Kenya. Political rights and civil liberties are used here as a measure of polit-
ical institutions and commitment to enforcement of the rule of law. The two vertical solid lines
represent political transitions in the economy. The first line represents the December 1969 tran-
sition from democracy to autocracy, while the second line represents the December 1992 return
to democracy. During the first regime, although illicit financial flows seems to have started to
decline, corruption was increasing, as discussed in the foregoing section. It was during this pe-
riod that civillians’ civil liberties and political rights were being eroded. At the same time the
Executive had already vested itself with overwhelming powers. Many checks and balances had
24John Githongo was formerly head of Kenya’s anti-corruption agency who was exiled after exposing graft at the
highest levels involving top politicians and government ministers.
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already been dismantled. The transition from the first regime to the second regime under Moi’s
presidency did not bring any positive change in the state of institutions of accountability. The
country became autocratic with further dismantling of checks and balances and an increase in the
powers of the president.
Figure 5.1: Real Illicit Financial Flows in Constant 2010 Prices and Institutions in Kenya (1970-
2010)
source: Author’s computation
Figure (5.1) shows that between 1984 and 1990 illicit financial flows were highest and during
that period political institution were weak, as reflected by low levels of civil liberties and political
rights protection. During the same period, other organs of government lost their independence
and the state took control of the media, further sacrificing government accountability.In 1992 the
economy returned to a multi-party system of governance and introduced a number of macroeco-
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nomic reforms, but corruption and the illicit financial flows did not cease. Moi’s regime continued
rent extraction of state resources. Corruption scandals were revealed after 2002 during Kibaki’s
regime. Even during Kibaki’s regime corruption and illicit financial flows did not cease although
political institutions (civil liberties and political rights) improved slightly . The increase in polit-
ical rights and media freedom, as well as the declining powers of the Executive, are associated
with declines in the level of capital flight (see Figure (5.1))
5.3 Review of Related Literature
5.3.1 The Neoclassical View of Capital Flight
The Neoclassical literature (henceforth the conventional view) views illicit financial flows (capital
flight) to be a result of portfolio choice decisions by utility optimizing agents. From this free
market based premises, capital flight is seen as a response to changes in an individual’s portfolio
bundle arising from the standard risk diversification motive by domestic investors or economic
agents. Two other important incentives are included as explanations: Relative risk incentives and
return differentials(Collier et al., 2001; Sheets, 1995).
Relative risk incentive involves counter-factual comparison of the after tax domestic and foreign
returns and is adjusted for factors such as expected depreciation, volatility of returns, liquidity
premiums, potentially higher taxes or perceived lower returns at home, and other indicators of
investment risk. From this comparison the net returns are usually claimed to be higher abroad
because of the differences between domestic taxes and taxes abroad. That is, expected currency
depreciation at home which affects returns, and the higher economic risk. The latter results from
the greater volatility of returns in developing countries. This conventional wisdom further claims
that capital flight is caused by the existence of market distortions and asymmetric risks in devel-
oping countries relative to advanced countries.
Domestic market distortions embraced in this market based theory include the features of the
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economy that disrupt prices as the mechanism for resource allocation. These reduce expected
returns to assets. They include: the exchange rate misalignment (both an overvaluation or an
undervaluation), government fiscal deficits and high debt levels. Other features of the economy
that can affect returns to assets include high inflation levels, government policy intervention in
markets through price controls and rent seeking, and politically motivated expropriation of assets
and confiscatory taxation.
According to the Neoclassical model, if a currency depreciation is expected, domestic wealth
owners will shift their wealth out of domestic assets holdings into foreign assets holdings. Using
the Interest Parity Condition (IPC), this model shows that depreciation of local currency makes
foreign assets more attractive while domestic assets are expected to decline in value. Alternatively,
an appreciation of foreign currency makes foreign assets more attractive and results in loss of
value for domestic assets. This thereby motivates investors to hold foreign assets. At the same
time, if domestic currency is overvalued, economic agents will expect the currency to be devalued
in the future. Holding firm to this expectation, economic agents will attempt to avoid potential
capital loss by converting their assets into foreign claims. This would then increase capital flight
(Khan and Ajayi, 2000; Khan and Haque, 1985; Alesina and Tabellini, 1989).
Similarly, high inflation rates which sometimes result from fiscal deficit financing through seignor-
age will lead to capital flight. Under the circumstances of high inflation pressures, domestic agents
engage in capital flight to avoid erosion of the value of their monetary balances by inflation. Even
when fiscal deficits are financed through bond sales, domestic residents may still expect that, at
some future date, their tax liabilities may increase as the government attempts to coerce them to
pay for the national debt. This will encourage domestic investors to move their assets to foreign
countries to again avoid potential tax liabilities again (Ajayi, 1995). Ize and Ortiz (1987) for-
malize the link between deficit financing and capital flight. These authors show that capital flight
is related to the overall financial solvency of a government, and that insolvency and default risks
created by fiscal deficit appear to be explicit determinants of capital flight.
Therefore the standard economic development models that analyze capital flight based on the
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neoclassical portfolio choice theory assume that: (1) economic behaviour relevant to capital flight
is correctly described by the expected utility maximization, (2) markets exist and are distorted,
(3) individuals agents possess the ability to compute the probabilities of investment risk globally
and on the basis of counter-factual investment models, and (4) computable probabilities can be
attached to all events (Blankenburg and Khan, 2012). The first policy implications from the anal-
ysis of capital flight using these models suggests that movement of capital seeking highest risk
adjusted returns should not be a concern for policy makers in developing countries if risks is to be
hedged. The second policy implication is that domestic market friendly reforms that correct any
market dis-equilibrating distortions, stabilize currencies, promote investment opportunities and
reduce asymmetric investment risks should reduce capital flight. Thus, capital flight should actu-
ally not exist if “rational” economic policies are implemented by the government (Jain, 1988).
5.3.2 Capital Flight and Social Controls
Empirical evidence from African countries seems to contradict the main predictions of the stan-
dard portfolio choice theory. For instance, Ndikumane and Boyce (2011) empirically find no
statistically significant effect of the interest rate differential on capital flight from Africa. These
authors conclude therefore that capital flight from African countries can not be adequately ex-
plained by conventional portfolio choice theory and there is a need for more nuanced explana-
tions. Blankenburg and Khan (2012) see capital flight as a result of the social controls in devel-
oping countries. That is, capital flight is a result of agent’s motive to escape social controls of
government. The social controls approach rests on the premise that individual control over capital
is rarely absolute or uncontested, but rather subject to social constraints-the character and extent
of which vary through time. The approach identifies governments as key players in social control,
and the underlying developmental model based on the social control approach is that of a mixed
economy or a welfare/developmental state with social interventions outside the market sphere.
The central policy implication from the social control theory with regard to control of capital
flight is not simply the promotion of markets. Rather it advocates the strengthening of existing
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social controls or the introduction of alternative, more effective administrative measures to control
private capital movements. The social control theory in principle builds on the portfolio choice
theory. However, it does not provide any evidence on the effectiveness of each government con-
trol. Nor does it provide solutions in cases the government itself, through political elites, is the one
involved in looting money out of the economy. Social control theory comes closer to the portfolio
choice approach, although it recognizes capital flight as an “inherently political phenomenon”
and a prerogative of those who are wealthy with access to foreign exchange (Epstein, 2005). The
social control theory and the portfolio choice theory only point towards causes of capital flight.
They fail fail to show why policy distortions and social controls are weak in developing countries
in general.
5.3.3 The Political Economy View of Illicit Financial Flows and Corruption
According to the political economy literature, illicit financial flows are the result of rent extrac-
tion by unconstrained corrupt practices of political rulers and their elite groups. These rulers and
elites know that even if they accumulate foreign debt, they will not inherit this the burden which
will be placed on future (possibly rival) regimes(see for example Alesina and Tabellini, 1989).
The literature argues this because under an environment characterized by weak political institu-
tions political actors have discretionary political powers. These discretionary powers allow them
authority to design and administer regulations and policies in a discretionary manner. The central
argument raised by this literature is that the exploitation of discretionary power is enabled by
weak political, administrative and legal institutions (Aidt, 2003; Andvig et al., 2001; Bardhan,
1997).
This literature argues capital flight arises through the desire to hide illegally accumulated wealth
abroad and not necessarily due to interest rate differentials between countries or macroeconomic
policy distortions as postulated under the neoclassical approach (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 2008,
2010; Heggstad and Fjeldstad, 2010). This literature explains the revolving door hypothesis (the
situation in which foreign debt and capital flight are highly correlated) as the result of extraction
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of resources by elite groups who loot their countries and conceal the proceeds abroad25. Thus,
capital flight from African countries can be understood to be a result of corruption by African
leaders and the politically connected elites.
However, the claims made above do not provide explanations as to why political leaders who ex-
tract resources from their economies continue to command significant support from their zitizens.
Second, why are such leaders not accountable to their electorate? The models of electoral ac-
countability take into account the financial rent seeking motives of political actors. These models
predict that political elites may extract rents up to a level just acceptable to a simple majority.
This prediction implies that a majority of voters in countries with high corruption levels and capi-
tal flight find them acceptable despite huge the welfare losses such corruption imposes. Because if
they were not acceptable, the majority vote would punish such political actors by not voting them
to power during elections under democratic governments. The continued reign of corrupt political
leaders for decades without any challenge from the populace implies that indeed corruption in the
form of looting is acceptable to the majority.
An alternative explanation for the simultaneous existence of corruption, capital flight and contin-
ued political power is that these political leaders do not come to power through legitimate means.
That is, they dismantle electoral processes and all other checks and balances. Thus they are able
to loot country resources which often escape jurisdiction as capital flight. Political actors often
hide money in secret jurisdictions because their opponents may expropriate their assets if the
opponents come to power. This is made possible because a large amount of the resource accumu-
lation may have been illegally acquired. In other-words such accumulation might have violated
the structure of formal laws. Under such circumstances, the legality of resource acquisition can
be questioned by incoming rulers for various motives, including expeditious political reasons. For
instance, to undermine the ability of previous ruling factions to return to power.
25It is on the basis of this literature that the view that a large portion of foreign debt (public loans) from Africa has
been used to finance capital flight out of the continent as private wealth by the ruling elites groups finds support. In
many empirical studies, these funds have been shown to escape from the public purse through looting and have been
found to be as high as 80 percent of public loans in some countries (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2010, 2008; Cerra et al.,
2008; Khan and Ajayi, 2000).
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The political economy view of corruption and capital flight is in line with the general thesis
advanced by the new institutional economic literature regarding the lack of economic development
in developing countries in general (Acemoglu et al., 2003, 2001; North, 1990, 1987b; Sachs
et al., 1995; Rodrik et al., 2002). This thesis ascribes bad economic outcomes and lack of
economic development thereof, to the extractive political institutions. In this context, extractive
political institutions refer to those institutions that do not constrain political leaders and their
elite groups; that concentrate power in the hands of a few, and that do not provide checks and
balances or the “rule of law”. These institutions are claimed to have led to pervasive rent seeking
to the detriment of economic development(Acemoglu et al., 2004, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2002;
Clague et al., 1996; Sachs et al., 1995)26. This thesis is backed up by evidence that shows
that weaknesses in institutions have stifled investment and development in developing countries
(Loayza et al., 2007; Saleh, 2004; Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001).
The institutional economics strand of literature finds support from Ali and Walters (2011) who
show that capital flight from Sub-Saharan Africa is explained by institutional factors. In particular,
these authors show that once they control for structural features, private capital outflows from
Sub-Saharan Africa is explained by factors beyond macroeconomic policy distortions. Thus they
rule out as sole causes institutional features of the individual economies and poor profitability
of investment. In a recent study examining selected developing countries, Cerra et al. (2008)
provide further empirical evidence to corroborate the notion that indeed macroeconomic policy
distortions alone cannot fully explain capital flight from developing countries. For instance, Cerra
et al. (2008) show that countries with a poor track record of macroeconomic fundamentals may
also have weak institutions. Therefore, capital flight from these countries may be a by-product
of redistributive policy tools designed by a greedy and weakly constrained executives. These
arguments are supported by Cheung and Qian (2010) who show that China’s capital flight is
explained in principle by the history of the economy.
The latter two strands of literature conclude that explanations for capital flight provided by the
26These claims are backed up by evidence that shows that weaknesses in institutions have stifled investment and
development in developing countries (see Loayza et al., 2007; Saleh, 2004; Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001).
211
conventional economic literature make no systematic distinction between the drivers of asymmet-
ric investment risks in developing countries. Second, it conflates short-term utility maximization
with structural, political, and economic uncertainties in these countries. This is accomplished
by focusing on a single motive for capital flight, namely the investor’s utility maximization in
the presence of differential policy regimes and investment risks. Thus the failure of conventional
wisdom to explain such flows weakens the effectiveness of the policy advice to deal with capital
flight from the developing world (Blankenburg and Khan, 2012).
The policy implication advanced by these latter contributions in literature is that to reduce such
flows one should focus on mechanisms to address the underlying problems. These problems in-
clude corruption and tax evasion, and capital flight is only a manifestation of these problems.
The creation of the right economic environment includes strengthening the rule of law, electoral
accountability, contract enforcement and property rights protection for agents in the economy.
These actions are seen as a solution to retain capital domestically and achieve development (Ace-
moglu et al., 2001; Alfaro et al., 2007; Shirley, 2008; Kant, 1996; Khan and Haque, 1985).
Further implications are that macroeconomic policy distortions seen as drivers of capital flight
are themselves the result of bad policies chosen by the ruling elites for their own benefit under
weakly-institutionalized polities. Thus bad policies are only a symptom of weaknesses in institu-
tions(Acemoglu et al., 2003; Loayza et al., 2007; Fatas and Mihov, 2005).
5.4 Econometric Framework
5.4.1 The Baseline Empirical Model
The key testable hypothesis from our theoretical discussions in the foregoing section is that the
amount of capital flight depends on the state of institutions in the economy. To test this hypoth-
esis, we estimate the following baseline Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) econometric
specification:
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θiInstitutionst−i + εt (5.1)
where κ t is the stock of the illicit financial flows expressed as a ratio of GDP in constant prices;
κt−i is the past stocks of the illicit financial flows scaled by GDP and this variable measures the
persistence of such flows; institutionst−i is the measure of the state of institutions proxied by the
“Extent of the Arbitrary Executive Power”. Equation 5.1 in essence captures the causal effect of
increasing arbitrary executive powers on capital flight. The coefficient (θi) gives the change in
capital flight resulting from a unit change in the extent of the arbitrary executive powers. The
choice of this model is based on the desire to capture the persistence of capital flight as argued
in the development literature (see also Brada et al., 2013; Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; Fofack
and Ndikumana, 2010; Cuddington, 1986). This is captured by the lagged values of the illicit
financial flows (κt−i) variable on the right hand site of equation (5.1). The “the persistence of
the illicit financial flows” in this context implies that the past levels of such flows have effect on
the current levels (see Lan et al., 2010; Cheung and Qian, 2010). Brada et al. (2013) argue that
the inclusion of the lagged illicit capital variable in a dynamic model could also be interpreted
as capturing the sunk costs of developing ways of moving capital offshore. Once these costs are
paid, it makes sense to take advantage of the resulting conduits for capital flight on an ongoing
basis. .
Although the empirical strategy used in this research is similar to that used by Lan et al. (2010);
Cheung and Qian (2010), it differs because it is based on the political economy theory of capital
flight discussed in the previous sections. Those authors’ approach was based purely on the port-
folio choice theory. Intuitively in their model an economy tends to experience capital flight due to
a persistent return differential net of transaction costs which is possible in the presence of capital
controls. Here, however capital flight is modeled as a function of political factors over and above
the simple interest rate differential in the absence of capital control.
Control Variables
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In order to obtain the net effect of the impact of political institutions on illicit financial flows, the
study controls for other factors including those suggested by the Neoclassical economic theory
as determinants of developing countries’ capital outflows. Lan et al. (2010) notes that although
equation (5.1) represents the simplistic way of modeling capital flight, the absence of other vari-
ables to explain this phenomenon could bias the results obtained from such an equation. Standard
practice from the economic literature of adding these variables one at a time is adopted, follow-
ing Lan et al. (2010); Cheung and Qian (2010). These additional variables serve both as control
variables and robustness checks of the baseline results.
These control variables are divided into three categories: The variables that are related to the
portfolio motive, those that are related to macroeconomic policy management, and those that
are related to the financial development of the country. Some explanation is required as to what
exactly they are meant to control for in the standard regression model. First, real GDP growth
is meant to capture the availability of domestic investment opportunities in the economy. As in
literature, outflows of capital from developing countries could be a result of the absence of invest-
ment opportunities in the domestic economy(Brada et al., 2013). This variable also measures the
prospects for growth in the economy as well as income levels which induce demand for goods,
and therefore investment. If GDP growth is sluggish, then capital is bound to leave the economy
in search of higher investment opportunities elsewhere (Lan et al., 2010; Ndikumana and Boyce,
2003). This variable therefore is related directly to the portfolio motive of capital outflows. The
other variables that are meant to capture the portfolio motive are the real interest rate differential
and real exchange rates which both measure the benefits of higher returns abroad.
For the macroeconomic policy management, we use inflation rate and the current account deficit
(Harrigan et al., 2002; Hermes and Lensink, 2001). The inflation rate is expected to reduce
expected future returns, and therefore must be positively related to capital flight. While the cur-
rent account deficit may reflect sustainability of the exchange rates and captures macroeconomic
imbalances. The deficit could fuel capital flight, and it is expected to be positively related to cap-
ital flight (Hermes and Lensink, 2001). The size of government might signal the possibility that
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government taxation may be increased in future, and cause capital flight. This is therefore used
as a macroeconomic management variable since we do not have data on fiscal deficit(see also Ali
and Walters, 2011).
Short term debt is used to capture sources of capital flight and to control for the phenomenon
known as the revolving door hypothesis or debt fueled capital flight. This is a situation under
which an increase in foreign debt, particularly public sector debt, is accompanied by a corre-
sponding increase in capital flight. This is well documented in Ndikumana and Boyce (2003) for
a sample of 30 sub-Saharan African countries.
Finally, we control for financial development by using a financial deepening indicator measured
by broad money supply as a ratio of gross domestic product, the amount of the domestic credit
extended by the banking sector to the private sector, and the financial liberalization index proposed
by Abiad et al. (2009)27. These variables are expected to reduce capital flight since in a more
developed financial sector, the Neo-classical presumption is that more investment opportunities
would arise and reduce capital flight. Finally, the level of international reserves scaled by GDP is
used, which serves as an early warning signal for currency crises hence capital flight.
With these additional control variables at hand, the extended regression equation that accommo-
dates them is specified in equation (5.2):
















Zt + εt (5.2)
where κt ,κt−i and institutionst−i are defined earlier. CIdi is a vector that contains variables that
capture the portfolio motive of capital flight such as the interest rate differential, Xt is a vector
that contains macroeconomic policy management variables (inflation, government size and debt)
and Zt is a vector that contains financial development variables (M2/GDP, Credit extended to the
private sector) and the early warning currency crises signal variable (the level of foreign reserves).
27(see Brada et al., 2013; Yalta and Yalta, 2012)
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5.4.2 Data, Time Series Properties of Data and Stylized Facts
Time series data from 1970 to 2010 is used to test the hypothesis that illicit financial outflows
are a result of weaknesses in political institutions. This is because data on illicit capital flows is
only available from 1970. Illicit financial flows as ratio of GDP is used as a dependent variable.
Data on this variable is obtained from the database of Ndikumana and Boyce (2012b). The cal-
culation of illicit flows is based on a methodology that has widely been used and accepted in the
macroeconomic literature since the 1980s in the wake of the Third World Debt crisis (see African
Development Bank and Global Financial Integrity (2013); Ndikumana and Boyce (2011); Ndiku-
mane and Boyce (2011); Fofack and Ndikumana (2010); Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2010); Brada
et al. (2008); Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008); Ndikumana and Boyce (2003); Boyce and Ndiku-
mana (2001); Khan and Ajayi (2000); Eaton (1987); Cuddington (1986); Kant (1996), ). We now
provide the methodology for computation of this data set in Appendix D1 to this Chapter. We
also use the data from Letete et al. (2011). The dataset provides data on the dejure index of the
quality of institutions measured by “arbitrary executive powers” compiled from laws in Kenya.
Details on the computation of this dataset can be found in the appendix to the paper by Letete
et al. (2011). For control variables, we use a set of data from the World Development Indicators
and IMF International Finance Statistics. Details on sources of data are provided in Table 5.4.
Time series data is often subject to varying means and covariances over time (non-stationarity).
All the variables used in this paper are therefore tested for stationarity using the commonly used
Augument Dickey Fuller Generalized Least Squares (ADF-GLS) unit root test before the model
given in equation (5.1) is estimated. The advantage of this test over other tests is that it has the
highest power and exhibits robustness to all but the most extreme breaks in variance. This is in
contrast to the original Dickey-Fuller test which has been shown to suffer severe distortion in such
circumstances. The ADF-GLS is used with and without a trend. The lag structure is determined
by the use of the Bayesian Information Criterion28. The need to test for stationarity is grounded
in the fact that the use of Time series variables that are non-stationary could result in spurious
28see Elliott et al. (1996)
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regression. That is a regression in which the OLS estimates are statistically significant, and seem
to indicate that a relationship exists between variable of interest when, in reality, there is no such
relationship (Granger, 1969).
The results from the unit root test are presented in Table (5.4.2). These results confirm that the
dependent variable which is the amount of capital flight expressed as a ratio of GDP is stationary
at level hence it is integrated of order zero. It is also noted in the Table that the following are all
difference stationary: interest rate differential; the amount of credit extended to the private sector;
short-term debt; financial deepening measured by the amount of broad money to GDP; govern-
ment size measured by total final government expenditure in GDP; real effective exchange rates;
capital controls and foreign official development aid are all difference stationary. This implies
that these variables are integrated of the first order,I(1). The other control variables, including,
inflation, real growth rate of GDP, political instability and trade openness are all stationary at

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.5 Estimation Results and Discussions
This section presents the results from the estimation of the baseline regression given in equation
(5.1). The aim is to explore whether the increasing arbitrary powers of the executive/the politi-
cians is a significant determinant of capital flight and rent extraction from Kenya for the period
1970-2010. As highlighted earlier in the discussions, Kenya suffered huge episodes of capital
flight during the period when the executive had arbitrary power. However, this seemingly positive
relationship has not been statistically tested.
The combination of the I(1) and I(0) variables that are employed in this paper to assess the
foregoing relationship, requires taking the first difference of those variables that are found to be
non-stationary at level. In the next stage, an ARDL model specified in equation (5.1) is estimated.
This estimation gives the baseline regression results that show the relationship between capital
flight and the increasing powers of the executive. These baseline results are shown in Table (5.5)
column 1. The results show that increasing powers of the executive is a significant factor in deter-
mining capital flight to GDP in a regression without controlling for other determinants of capital
flight. This significant positive association between capital and increasing executive powers indi-
cates that executive powers may be used by corrupt officials to transfer resources to themselves
and other elites in weakly institutionalized polities. Such resources are often transferred abroad
to hide them since they were acquired through illegal means(Blankenburg and Khan, 2012).
However, as highlighted earlier, the estimation of the baseline model is likely to result in biased
estimates due to omitted variables (Lan et al., 2010). To circumvent this problem, we introduce
a set of control variables one at a time, as noted in the preceding section. Introducing the set of
control variables one at a time is also meant to avoid the likely problem of co-linearity among the
explanatory variables that is possible given the level of correlations between them (see Table 5.7).
The problem of multi-collinearity is the usual increase in the standard errors of the coefficients.
These increased standard errors in turn means that coefficients for some independent variables
may be found not to be significantly different from zero, yet without multi-collinearity and with
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lower standard errors, these same coefficients might have been found to be significant and the
researcher may not have come to null findings in the first place.
Based on these considerations, we re-estimate the baseline model with additional control vari-
ables. This estimation is performed on the model specified in equation (5.2). we estimate ten
specifications of the model to mitigate the problems of co-linearity. The results from these es-
timations which control for the additional variables that are claimed to determine capital flight
from economic theory are shown in column 2 to column 11 of Table (5.5)
In all the estimations presented in column 2 through column 11 of Table (5.5), The LM-test
of serial auto-correlation is performed in the residuals from the regression model proposed by
Breusch (1978) and Godfrey (1978). The problem of auto-correlation in a regression model is
that it causes ordinary least squares to underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients. This
means that the t-statistics will usually be bigger than they should be. Consequently, this problem
could lead one to mistakenly claim that some coefficients are statistically significant when they
are not. In all the estimations here, the null hypothesis of “no auto-correlation” could not be
rejected. This suggest that these estimations were not affected by serial auto-correlation, and
therefore could be relied upon.
In all the estimations, increasing powers of the executive consistently remain positively associ-
ated with capital flight from Kenya. This statistically significant (significant at-least at 5 percent
level of significance) association between capital flight and executive powers further indicates
that unconstrained powers of the executive remain a robust determinant of capital flight and rent
extraction in Kenya. This implies even if one controls for other variables which could determine
capital flight. These results suggest that in weakly institutionalized environments, executive pow-
ers are used unduly to extract resources from the economy for personal gain. The results cement
the argument in the political economy literature raised earlier that under an environment charac-
terized by weak political institutions, the political actors have discretionary political powers that
allow them to design or administer regulations and policies in a discretionary manner. The exer-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that the exploitation of the discretionary power is enabled by weak political, administrative and
legal institutions (Aidt, 2003; Andvig et al., 2001; Bardhan, 1997).
Although the results of the three specifications reflected in column 2 through 5 indicate that the
interest rate differential is also important in determining capital flight, it loses significance when
more controls are added to the regression. This further suggests that risk return measures and
portfolio diversification motives are not the main drivers of capital flight and rent extraction in
Kenya. The history of corruption reflected in the earlier sections of this paper further strengthen
the evidence that it is neither macroeconomic factors nor portfolio motives that explain capital
flight from Kenya. The cause is is mostly corruption by leaders who extract the country’s re-
sources in a seemingly unconstrained manner. Such unconstrained leaders dismantle checks and
balances intentionally to enable themselves to extract the resources of the economy. The historical
context provided earlier shows clearly that indeed Kenyatta and Moi dismantled checks and bal-
ances. This resulted in grand corruption in Kenya which has the adverse consequence of capital
flight from the economy.
Indeed, the results show debt fueled capital flight as indicated in column 11 of Table (5.5), and
that a one percentage change in short-term debt to GDP increases capital flight by about 0.7%.
This result strengthens the arguments raised by Ndikumana and Boyce (2011, 2003); Ndikumane
and Boyce (2011) that contends that capital flight from Africa is explained by debt accumulation:
A situation that they refer to as the revolving door hypothesis.
Interestingly, the results show that capital flight from Kenya is also related to the size of govern-
ment. Column 8 through 10 in Table (5.5) show that the size of government measured by the
amount of final government consumption of goods and services is positively related to capital
flight. This result is intuitive given the history of Kenya in which public servants supplied the
government with goods and services often at inflated prices. The result strengthens the argument
that state resources were often used for personal gain during both the Kenyatta and the Moi’s
regimes (Hornsby, 2013). One of the channels through which capital flight was financed was
through government purchase of goods and services.
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Hornsby (2013) supports this result in his claim that as the number of scandals in Kenya began
to be revealed, it became apparent that contracts between the government and several companies
in which government officials and ministers were shareholders were designed to steal taxpayers
money. It was noted earlier that foreign donors were infuriated to discover that while the Kenyan
government was stealing sums of similar size to the entire aid budget.
5.5.1 Robustness Checks Using Alternative Indicators of Political Institutions
To check the robustness of the results, we use an alternative dataset on the constraints on the
executives from the Polity IV indicators. The results from the usage of this variable show that
indeed constraining the powers of the executive is negatively related to capital flight. This implies
that strengthen institutions of accountability will result in reduction in capital flight. The variable
remains consistently significant across all model specifications. The results are shown in Table
(5.3). From column 1 through column 11, constraints on the powers of the executive remain a



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This Chapter has shown that increased arbitrary executive powers is the main factor driving il-
licit financial flows from Kenya. Thus institutional quality, in particular effective constraints on
executive powers, has an independent impact on illicit financial flows. These results are fairly
robust to alternative measures of institutional quality and additional control variables. This study
has also demonstrated that macroeconomic variables and portfolio motives are by no means the
only causes of illicit outflows from the country. The empirical results provided also show strong
evidence of the revolving door relationship between external debt and capital flight. This means
that part of Kenya’s debt was used to finance illicit financial outflows by the ruling elites. Debt
fueled illicit capital outflows, and government spending fueled illicit capital outflows. This em-
pirical evidence lends strong support to the theoretical model that shows how illicit financial flows
arise from the incentives of politicians for rent extraction under an environment characterized by
weak institutions. This study also demonstrates that under weakly institutionalized environments,
leaders use selective incentives such as patronage provision of public goods, to intensify the col-
lective action problem across different ethnic groups in a society in order to remain in power and
continue rent extraction. Because of the fear of exclusion, ordinary citizens support the corrupt
leaders even when they are aware of their self-enrichment motive.
The evidence provided in this chapter has immediate policy implications: Achieving and main-
taining strong institutions is likely to reduce rent extraction and illicit capital outflows. These
implications may be relevant to the other countries that are faced with a similar problem. How-
ever this does not mean that favourable macroeconomic conditions do not matter for other types
of illicit financial outflows. Illicit financial capital outflow is a complex phenomenon involving
government, the private sector and the international community. There is a need to have a holistic
approach to the question of capital flight from African countries. Emphasis on achievement of
macroeconomic stability and favourable returns adjusted for risk might not be the only strategy
to curb capital flight since it arises also from the politicians’ incentives for rent extraction. The
control of politicians can also contribute to reducing capital flight from these countries.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
APPENDIX D1
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Table 5.5: Some examples of Corruption Scandals involving Capital Flight from Kenya
No. Name of the Scandal Amount Involved
1. Goldenberg Scandal 10% of the country’s annual GDP.
2. Helicopter Servicing Contract Sh360 million
3. Navy Ship Deal 4.1 billion (ks)
4. Contracting Hallmark International Scandal $3 million
5. The construction of Nexus US$36.9 million)
6. The Passport Equipment System Deal £20 million
7. Education Scandal $1 million
8. Grand Regency Scandal GBP5billion
9. Moi Scandal GBP 1 billion
10. 2009 Triton Oil Scandal US$98.7 million



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY FOR COMPUTING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS
This study uses the illicit financial flows for Kenya from Ndikumana and Boyce, 2010. The
data is computed following the residual based approach presented in this appendix for ease of
reference. The residual method has generally been accepted in Macroeconomic Literature as
authentic method for computing illicit financial flows. Illicit financial flows are defined to be the
difference between total capital inflows and recorded foreign exchange outflows. Thus, in a given
year t for country i, the illicit financial flows are computed as:
KFit =4DEBTADJit +DFIit − (CAit +4RESit) (5.3)
where 4DEBTADJit is the change in total external debt outstanding adjusted for exchange rate
fluctuations, DFI is the net direct foreign investment, CA is the current account deficit, and
4RESit is the net additions to the stock of reserves.
Equation 5.3 is then corrected for exchange rate fluctuations, in particular corrections for changes






(αi j,t−1∗LT DEBTi,t−1)/(EX jt/EX j,t−1)+IMFCRi,t−1/(EXSDR,t/EXSDR,t−1)
+LTOT HERi,t−1 +LT MULTi,t−1 +LTUSDi,t−1 +ST DEBTi,t−1 (5.4)
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where LTDEBT is the total long-term debt; αi j is the proportion of long-term debt held in currency
j, for each of the seven non-US currencies; EX is the end-of-year exchange rate of the currency of
denomination against the dollar (expressed as units of currency per US dollar); IMFCR is the IMF
credit; LTOT HER is the long-term debt denominated in other unspecified currencies; LT MULT
is the long-term debt denominated in multiple currencies; LTUSD is the long-term debt denomi-
nated in US dollars; ST DEBT is the short-term debt, and DEBT is the total debt stock reported
by the World Bank.
To adjust for exchange rate, the following equation is estimated:
ERADJt = NEWDEBTt−1−DEBTt−1 (5.5)
The adjusted change in debt is obtained as follows:
DEBTADJt = DEBTt −ERADJt (5.6)
since the4DEBTt = DEBTt−DEBTt−1, it follows that 5.6 is equivalent to:
4DEBTADJt = DEBTt −NEWDEBTt−1 (5.7)
Five further adjustments are made in the calculation of capital flight:these are, adjustments for
debt written off, adjustments for trade misinvoicing, adjustments for under-reporting of remit-
tances, inflation adjustments and finally adjustment for interest rates earnings.
The Trade Misinvoicing Adjustment is given as:
DXICit = PXICit − (XICit ∗CIFt) (5.8)
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where PXIC is the value of the industrialized countries exports from the African country as re-
ported by the industrialized trading partners, XIC is the African countries exports to industrialized
countries as reported by the African country, and CIF is the c.i.f/f.o.b factor, representing the costs
of freight and insurance. A positive sign on DXIC indicates exports underinvoicing.
The imports discrepancies with the industrialized countries are computed as follows:
DMICit = MICit − (PMICit ∗CIFt) (5.9)
where MIC is the African Countries imports from the industrialized countries as reported by the
African country, and PMIC is the industrialized countries exports to the Africa country as reported
by the industrialized trading partners, A positive sign on DMIC indicates net overinvoicing of
imports; a negative sign indicates the net underinvoicing.
To obtain the global totals, the two discrepancies are multiplied by the inverse of the average
shares of industrialized countries in the African countries exports (ICXS) and imports (ICMS).
Thu, gives the total trade misinvoicing as the sum of the exports discrepancies and imports dis-








Adding the misinvoicing to the initial value of capital flight, equation 5.11 is obtained:
ADJKFit = KFit +MISINVit (5.11)
From equation 5.11, an adjustment is made for the under-reporting of remittances to give:
CADJKFit = ADJKFit +RIDit (5.12)
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where
RIDit = (ARIi,2006−BPRIi,2006)∗BPRIt/BPRI2006 (5.13)
RIDit is the remittance inflow discrepancy in country i in year t; ARIi,2006 and BPRIi,2006 are the
alternative and BoP measures, respectively of remittance inflows in country i in the year 2006;
and BPRIt , and BPRIi,2006 are the BoP measures of remittances inflows to African countries as a
whole in year t and 2006, respectively.
The final step, is to adjust for inflation and interest earnings respectively:
RADJKFit =CADJKFit/PPIt (5.14)
where PPIt is the US producer price index (with constant base), and adjusting for interest earnings
using US Treasury bill rate on short term bonds (T BILL) equation 5.15 is obtained:
SADJKFit = SADJKFi,t−1(1+T BILLit)+CADJKF it (5.15)
This method further assumes that the residual of the total capital inflows and recorded foreign
exchange outflows represents the net foreign claims by the private sector, such that if CFt > 0,
capital flight exist, and if CFt < 0, capital repatriation exists. The residual method takes into
account the external debt, change in reserves, current account deficit, foreign direct investment,
and portfolio investment. The basic form of this method is specified as follows:
CFt = dDt +NFIt − (CADt +dRt) (5.16)
where CFt = capital flight , dDt = change in external debt, NFIt= net foreign direct investment,
CADt = current account deficit, dRt = change in official reserves. In effect, this approach as-
sumes that the recorded increase in external debt gives a better measure of net new foreign loans.
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However, it must be noted that this method is by no means the only method of measuring capital
flight, but it was chosen because of its close association with the questions raised in this paper
and the fact that it allows one to draw implications for capital scarcity and concomitant adverse
consequences on the economy, since under this method capital flight represents lost resources that
could have been utilized in the domestic economy to promote economic activities. The variants
of this method are discussed in Chang and Cumby (1991) and Gajdeczka and Oks (1989).
Estimates from equation (5.16) are called baseline estimates of capital flight. Beja Jr et al. (2005)
argue that data used to estimate Equation (5.16) might contain errors, in particular errors in capital
account and in the current account. Therefore some adjustments are needed to correct these errors
. In the capital account, they argue that one adjustment concerns the currency valuation effect on
external debt. Thus, since long term debt are acquired from different countries, expressed in
their own denominations, currency fluctuations will affect their respective values across periods.
Accordingly, one has to adjust the external debt taking into account foreign currency changes at
time t−1 (FXDt) to obtain adjusted external debt (dDtAdJ) at time t. Thus,
dDtADJ = Dt −FXDt−1 (5.17)
Therefore the appreciation of hard currency relative to the US dollar increases estimates for Equa-
tion (5.17). Since debt (Dt) is what is normally reported, dDtADJ captures unreported debt in-
flows. Accordingly, Equation (5.16) is re-estimated as:
CFt = dDtADJ+NFIt − (CADt +dRt) (5.18)
Estimates from Equation (5.18) are called baseline estimates with adjusted debt. The other ad-
justment concerns current account. Specifically, export and import data could be inaccurate due
to trade misinvoicing either through import over-invoicing or exports under-invoicing. As such,
capital flight also takes place through these means. Import under-invoicing represents technical
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smuggling undertaken to evade customs duties and trade restrictions, which can be reported as a
form of reverse capital flight. Exports over-invoicing may be a response to government incentives
that reward industries based on performance indicators like exports revenues. Following Beja Jr
et al. (2005) we follow the three steps procedure to compute the trade misinvoicing. The first is
to compute the exports and imports discrepancies for Kenya in its trade with its major trading
partners, such that we have:
DXt = PXt −CIF.Xt (5.19)
DMt = Mt −CIF.PMt (5.20)
where DXt and DMt are the total exports and imports discrepancies, respectively; PXt is the value
of trading partners’imports from Kenya as reported by the trade partners, and PMt is the value of
the trade partner’s exports to Kenya as reported by trade partner; Xt and Mt are Kenya’s exports
to and imports from major trading partners, respectively, as reported by the country. CIF is
the c.i. f/ f .o.b. factor to adjust exports data forecast of freight and insurance. The next step
is to calculate global exports and imports discrepancies for trade misinvoicing by multiplying
these discrepancies with an inverse of the shares of major trading partners in Kenya’s exports and
imports. The last step is to find the sum of exports and imports discrepancies from the second
step to get total trade misinvoicing; that is,
MISt = DXt +DMt (5.21)
We then add the figure obtained from Equation (5.21) to Equation (5.18) to obtain the total ad-
justed capital flight (Ad jCFt):
236
Ad jCFt =CFt +MISt (5.22)
Finally we attempt to get real capital flight by deflating Equation (5.22) using an appropriate






Noting that capital flight is like capital invested abroad and that such capital could earn some
return, we then compute the stock of capital flight capital flight, which is an accumulated stock of
capital flight and interest earnings on capital flight;
SCFt = SCFt−1(1+ rt)+Ad jCFt (5.24)
where rt is the interest rate on 90 day treasury bill of United States. Equation (5.24) is an estimate




6.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis focuses mainly on three related issues dealt with in new institutional economics and
political economy research: (i) the evolution of formal economic and political institutions over
time (ii) the causality between political institutions and economic institutions, and that between
institutions and economic development; (iii) and the role of institutions in economic development
through the channel of foreign direct investment and on the control of rent seeking and corruption
in Kenya. These issues are discussed in distinct essays, each essay constituting an independent and
self-contained chapter. It adopts the conceptual framework on institutions proposed by Douglass
North.
The first essay presents the new set of de-jure political and economic institutions for Kenya and
explores their evolution over a 130-year period (1880-2010). It addresses three related questions:
what kind of economic institutions and political institutions did the colonial settlers set up in
Kenya? Did they set up inclusive institutions or extractive institutions, in the terminology of Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2012)? How did these institutions evolve over time? Did these institutions
change after independence? This essay discusses the evolution of these institutions and shows
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the dynamic interactions between political and economic institutions, and how the equilibrium
economic institutions are shaped by political forces over time. The essay shows first that exist-
ing economic institutions (property rights institutions) in Kenya were largely shaped by the legal
framework introduced since 1885 when Kenya was declared a British protectorate. The period
of British rule included the protectorate period (1885-1920) and colonial period (1920-1963).
During this period an extensive legal apparatus was designed to expropriate much of the land
and redistribute it to the white settlers at the expense of the indigenous population . These laws
promoted the freehold property rights system for the benefit of the settlers while undermining pre-
existing non-freehold systems which were based on indigenous customary laws. Thus, Africans
were often displaced to make way for Europeans and had to settle in marginal areas known as
“native reserves”. However, even their rights to land usage in those native reserves were squarely
limited by the discretionary powers of the Governor. This policy of land grabbing was at the
origin of many grievances and conflicts over resources between the Natives and the settlers which
the government attempted to quench with little success. The Natives’ mobilization and agitation
over the injustices of land expropriations culminated in the Mau-Mau revolt in the early 1950s. In
response to the revolt, the British colonial office enacted laws that promoted free tenure holdings
(individualization of tenure) in the native reserves. It also created settlement schemes to diffuse
tension and ensure that the colonial land-holding structure could be preserved more or less intact.
After 1963, the newly independent Kenya made little effort to fundamentally change the colonial
laws that governed land rights. The situation deteriorated further as the executive—under Keny-
atta and then under Moi—exercised unchecked powers over land matters and control over any
resources in the economy. It was not until the advent of democracy in 1992 that some of the most
restrictive laws were repealed. During the third regime of the post independence period under the
political administration of president Kibaki, some notable improvements were made in the legal
framework to protect property rights. Despite improvements in legislation, the problem of land
allocation has not been addressed and remains one of the sources of conflict over resources in this
economy. This first essay contributes to the institution-development literature by filling in the re-
search gap identified by North (1993, page 1) when he stated that: “although Ronald Coase made
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the fundamental contribution of pointing out that when it is costly to transact, institutions mat-
ter, neither he nor most of his followers have explored how property rights and other institutions
come about”. This essay further contributes to the literature on the measurement of institutions
in general by providing a novel dataset on institutions in Kenya. By design, this new dataset
circumvents the major problems identified in conventional institutional indices. This essay also
contributes to the political economy literature which addresses questions centered on the creation
and evolution of institutions.
The second essay provides the first application of the newly constructed dataset on institutions
from the previous chapter. It presents empirical evidence to answer the three basic questions
of the institutions-development literature: (a) Are institutions persistent and why? (b) Do po-
litical institutions cause economic institutions? (c) What is the direction of causality between
institutions and economic development in Kenya? This essay provides conclusive evidence in
support of the theoretical assumption that is often made in empirical work that institutions are
persistent. Second, the essay provides further evidence on the theoretical claim by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012) that political institutions drive economic institutions. The essay shows that
in the context of Kenya political institutions Granger caused economic institutions during the
post-independence period. The research however notes the possibility of reverse causality from
economic institutions to political institutions and provides the caution that development scholars
and institutional reformist must be aware of this. This essay further provides some evidence on
the causality between institutions and economic development in Kenya. It shows that economic
institutions Granger caused economic growth in Kenya during the post-independence period. This
result supports the cross sectional and panel evidence that institutions are the drivers of growth
and development. The essay makes three distinct contributions to the institutions-development
literature. First, it provides evidence for the assumption that institutions are persistent and offers
explanations for this persistence. Second, it provides a conclusive test for the hypothesis advanced
by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) that political institutions drive economic institutions. Third, it
contributes to the institutions-development literature by presenting evidence on the causality be-
tween institutions and economic development for a country case study using Time series methods,
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as suggested by Chang (2011) and Chang (2006).
The third essay assesses the role of property rights institutions on foreign direct investment in
Kenya. The results from this essay provide evidence that indeed property rights institutions are
central in attracting FDI to Kenya. This evidence supports the emerging theoretical claim by
the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature that developing countries are unable to attract
and retain foreign capital because of weaknesses in property rights institutions. This evidence
notwithstanding, there are other factors that remain important in attracting FDI. These factors
include: overall macroeconomic management and political stability. This essay contributes to
the economic literature in three ways. First, it provides evidence in support of the claim that
property rights institutions are central in attracting FDI. This analysis meets Chang (2011) and
Rodrik (2008)’s suggestion that institutions and economic development studies must also apply
Time Series case studies to understand the role of institutions in economic development outcomes.
Second, it contributes to this literature by constructing a theoretical model that presents the chan-
nel that links the quality of property rights institutions and foreign direct investment decisions to
invest in a developing country. Third, it contributes to the growing development literature that
looks at the channels through which institutions influence the process of economic development
in developing countries. As pointed out by Alfaro et al. (2007) there is little systematic evidence
on the specific mechanisms of how institutions affect economic development. This work identifies
FDI as one of those missing links.
The last essay explores the relationship between political institutions and illicit financial flows
from Kenya. This exercise is motivated by the puzzle of continued net outflows of financial
resources experienced by a number of African countries despite their lack of resources to finance
their developmental goals. This essay addresses one question: What is the relationship between
political institutions and illicit financial flows and rent extraction from Kenya? The essay assesses
empirically the role of political institutions with respect to illicit financial flows. This empirical
assessment reveals that increased executive power in Kenya is positively associated with illicit
financial flows. Thus weaknesses in political institutions matter for illicit financial flows from
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Kenya. The implications from this evidence are clear in that reducing the powers of the executive
could reduce illicit capital flows, especially those associated with corruption in government.
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